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Abstract
The first chapter of this thesis considers a contractual principal-agent relation-
ship in an unstable environment. The players are uncertain whether repeated
interaction is possible. I examine the role that the deliberate choice of an in-
complete (non-verifiable and unenforceable) contract plays in signalling sta-
bility and trust. In this model, contractors may privately observe shocks that
force them to end the relationship after the current period. Complete (verifi-
able) contracts, which are assumed to be feasible, ensure cooperation in com-
pliance with the contract. With incomplete contracts, the players make them-
selves vulnerable to exploitation by their partners. But if cooperation occurs
notwithstanding, the contractors update their beliefs about each other’s will-
ingness to interact again. When the agent observes that her partner and herself
are able to continue the relationship, she undertakes a non-contractible, mutu-
ally beneficial investment.
The second chapter is based on the theory by Hart and Moore (QJE, 2008)
that regards contracts as reference points for feelings of entitlement. Parties’ ex
post performance depends on whether they receive what they feel entitled to,
which is assumed to be the best possible outcome permitted by the contract.
Consequentially, there exists a trade-off between contractual flexibility (agree-
ment on a price interval) and rigidity (agreement on a single price). Hart and
Moore do not analyse the role that third party contract enforcement plays for
parties’ feelings of entitlement, shading on performance and contract choice.
V
I demonstrate that Hart and Moore’s results rely on a number of assumptions
that can be challenged when incorporating litigation into the model. They
assume that trade is voluntary but renegotiation is prohibited. I argue that ei-
ther trade is voluntary but renegotiation is possible or courts compel parties
to trade according to the contract. In the former scenario, fixed price contracts
may not act as reference points and the parties feel entitled to the best possible
outcomes from renegotiation. In the latter scenario, contracts may act as refer-
ence points because of the option of contract enforcement. However, potential
flexibility incorporated in the contract is lost.
The third chapter provides an experimental examination of the effect of
contract enforcement on contractors’ reference points for feelings of entitle-
ment. Previous experiments by Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (AER 2011) analyse
and support the theory by Hart and Moore (QJE, 2008) that contracts are ref-
erence points. Both theory and experiments ignore the role of contract en-
forcement for contractors’ feelings of entitlement. I replicate and confirm Fehr,
Hart and Zehnder’s baseline experiment. I also run an additional treatment in
which buyers can offer sellers more or less favourable prices than specified in
the contract, whereas sellers can request enforcement of contracts as written.
I find that contract enforcement matters, without being invoked, for sellers’
punishment behaviour through feelings of entitlement. Without explicit con-
tract enforcement, flexible contracts (agreement on a price range instead of a
single price) leave sellers feel entitled to the best possible price permitted by
the contract. However, buyers rarely offer such a price which leads to disap-
pointment and punishment. With the option of contract enforcement, sellers
feel entitled to the price which the court would enforce, even if it is equally
unfavourable than in the no court treatment. The presence of the court pro-




Contracts are inevitably incomplete and cannot perfectly describe and provide
for all possible future contingencies. In the most extreme cases, contracts are
so incomplete that courts (or other third parties) cannot enforce them because
for example they do not recognise a claim or it is unclear what outcome to im-
pose based on the (vague) contract. Other incomplete contracts may clearly
define some obligations but leave others unspecified. In general, incomplete
contracts leave room for disagreement and exploitation when the contracting
partners cannot sue each other for breach of obligations. Many questions then
arise, for example, of why agents go through the trouble of writing (incom-
plete) contracts, what the role of contract enforcing institutions is, how eco-
nomic relationships can function and how agents behave under contractual
incompleteness. This thesis examines some aspects of the effects of contractual
incompleteness on bilateral relationships considering different circumstances
and different restrictions on contractual completeness.
The first chapter deals with bilateral relationships in unstable environments.
The agents are only able to contractually commit to trade today but not in the
future. Contractors may experience a shock which forces them to end the re-
lationship. These shocks cannot be observed by the trade partner. I show
that deliberately choosing to rely solely on a verbal agreement today (which
cannot be enforced in a court) can create trust and indicate stability to the part-
ner. Trust in the relationship leads to more investment and thus better trade
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outcomes. Written contracts (which can be enforced in court) ensure compli-
ance with the contract. With verbal agreements on the other hand, the contrac-
tors make themselves vulnerable to exploitation by their partners. In case of
exploitation, the relationship ends. Cooperation occurs when the contractors
are willing to continue the relationship because future benefits from trade are
higher than from one-time exploitation. Deliberately offering a verbal agree-
ment is, hence, a sign of trust because contractors who cannot continue the
relationship have no incentive to expose themselves to the possibility of ex-
ploitation.
The second chapter is based on a theory that regards contracts as reference
points for feelings of entitlement (Hart and Moore, QJE, 2008). In this set-up,
the seller’s cost of production and the buyer’s value of the product can vary
depending on the circumstances after contract signing. Contracts are incom-
plete because the cost and value can only be observed by the involved parties,
but not the court, and can thus not be part of the contract. The contractors may
want to agree on a range of prices in order to be able to later adjust the trad-
ing price to the circumstances. However, this can create disappointment when
both buyer and seller feel entitled to different prices permitted by the contract.
Disappointment may lead to lower performance (which is not specified in the
contract) as a punishment of the contracting partner, for example by provid-
ing low quality. Consequentially, there exists a trade-off between contractual
flexibility (agreement on a price interval) and rigidity (agreement on a single
price).
This model does not analyse the role that contract enforcement plays for
parties’ feelings of entitlement, shading on performance and choice between
flexible and rigid contract. I demonstrate in the second chapter of this thesis
that the results in the literature rely on a number of assumptions that can be
challenged when incorporating litigation into the model. It is assumed, that
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the contractors can walk away from trade without repercussion but that rene-
gotiation is prohibited. I argue that either trade is voluntary but renegotiation
is possible or courts can compel parties to trade based on the contract. In the
former scenario, fixed price contracts may not act as reference points and the
parties feel entitled to the best possible outcomes from renegotiation. In the
latter scenario, contracts may act as reference points because of the option of
contract enforcement but then contracts cannot be flexible.
The third chapter provides an experimental examination of the effect of
contract enforcement on contractors’ reference points for feelings of entitle-
ment based on the theoretical analysis in the second chapter. Previous labora-
tory experiments in the literature (Fehr, Hart and Zehnder, AER, 2011) analyse
and support the theory that contracts are reference points. Both theory and
experiments ignore the role of contract enforcement for contractors’ feelings
of entitlement. I replicate and confirm the baseline experiment. I also run an
additional treatment in which buyers can offer sellers more or less favourable
prices than specified in the contract, whereas sellers can request enforcement
of contracts as written. I find that contract enforcement matters, without being
invoked, for sellers’ punishment behaviour through feelings of entitlement.
Without explicit contract enforcement, flexible contracts (agreement on a price
range instead of a single price) leave sellers feel entitled to the best possible
price permitted by the contract. However, buyers rarely offer such a price
which leads to disappointment and punishment. With the option of contract
enforcement, sellers feel entitled to the price which the court would enforce,
even if it is equally unfavourable than in the no court treatment. The presence
of the court provides an outside validation for which prices are reasonable and
thereby limits disappointment and punishment. These results can inform the
discussion on optimal enforcement procedures with regard to limiting disap-
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Chapter 1
Signing incomplete contracts as a
signal for trust and stability in an
ongoing relationship
1.1 Introduction
Contracts in a functioning legal system are an important tool for governing
economic relationships. Explicit and perfectly specified contracts prevent mis-
understanding, align expectations about outcomes and ensure mutual cooper-
ation as the breach of a contract can lead to punishment by, for a example, a
court of law. However, many economic relationships are in fact based on ei-
ther vague contracts, which make contract enforcement in courts difficult, or
without signing contracts at all. The standard contract theory provides many
explanations why it is often not possible to construct complete contracts in-
cluding all information and perfectly describing future contingencies and ac-
tions.1 However for many economic relationships, simple and low cost con-
1One explanation for exogenously incomplete contracts lies in the bounded rationality of
the contractors. If the parties are not able to perfectly foresee all future contingencies, writing
perfectly state contingent contracts is not possible. For example, Tirole (2009) accounts for
cognitive limitations. Also, writing complete contracts and monitoring compliance leads to
1
tracts are available that are sufficient to eliminate incentives to exploit the con-
tract partner. Regardless, they are often not utilised. When the parties delib-
erately choose not to rely on complete contracts, it indicates that the partners
trust each other to follow the agreement without the option to enforce a claim
in court. The question arises where this trust stems from.
I address this question by introducing asymmetric information in a rela-
tional contract setting. The standard relational contract theory demonstrates
that compliance with an incomplete contract comes from repeated interaction.
The parties trust each other because they can anticipate that all players’ value
from continued future trade is greater than the one period benefit of breach-
ing such that cooperation occurs (MacLeod, 2007).2 In this paper, however,
I assume that the parties do not know whether their partner is willing to be
part of repeated interaction. Most economic relationships are situated in an
ever-changing environment and are prone to shocks. It is not unusual that
contractors experience a change in the environment which forces them to end
the relationship. Thus, I assume that the parties repeatedly interact unless one
party experiences an exogenous, privately observed shock. Will the parties still
rely on incomplete contracts even when concluding complete contracts is pos-
sible? How does trust develop in such a relationship and how can the parties
signal trustworthiness? Are the initiation and the outcome of a relationship
influenced by trust?
In this paper, I analyse a contractible exchange between an agent who of-
fers a service and a principal who is paying a reward for receiving it. There is
asymmetric information about the stability of parties’ environment. The main
finding of this paper is that the choice between relying on a complete or an in-
complete contract serves as a signal for the ability to continue the relationship.
very high transaction cost (Williamson, 1985) such that the contractors agree on less complete
contracts, for instance, as in Crocker and Reynolds (1993).
2For a review of the literature on relational contracts see Malcomson (2010).
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Signalling to be in a stable environment, and thus being trustworthy, is impor-
tant in this setting as the continuation of the relationship is non-contractible. In
many situations, the expectation of continuing a collaboration incentivises the
parties to invest in the relationship, for example, by developing better ways
of providing a service. Trust in the sustainability of the relationship is impor-
tant in order to induce this non-contractible, mutually beneficial investment.
By offering an incomplete contract, the principal makes himself vulnerable to
exploitation by the agent. A principal that has to end the relationship is not
interested in the investment and cannot benefit from signalling trustworthi-
ness. He has thus no incentive to make himself vulnerable by relying on an
incomplete contract. Therefore, the deliberate choice to rely on an incomplete
contract is a credible signal for the ability to continue the collaboration and in-
duces the agent to undertake the non-contractible investment. The setting of
this model is such that it can enlighten the interaction between economic play-
ers, for instance a firm and its suppliers, which are in a close and dependent
relationship and repeatedly exchange as long as possible.
The definition of trust varies across disciplines but also within the eco-
nomics literature. I follow the definition that trust is the willingness of a player
to accept vulnerability although he is not completely sure that the other party
will not exploit him. This willingness is based on positive expectations about
the integrity of the other party, i.e. its trustworthiness, and leads to risk taking
(Vosselman and Meer Kooistra, 2009).3 In my model, the principal demon-
strates that he trusts the agent by making himself vulnerable to exploitation
by choosing an incomplete contract. The principal expects that the agent co-
operates and that signalling induces the agent to undertake investment. Trust
3There are also authors that criticise the use of the term trust in economics. Williamson
(1993) argues that real trust exists only in personal relationships whereas everything else is
calculativeness. He distinguishes between calculative trust, which is based on rational con-
siderations of cost and benefit of trusting, and personal trust, which does not follow concious
calculations but is warranted in special relationships. See James Jr (2002) for a survey for the
nature of trust in economics.
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is usually build up in a costly process. If costs are too high, the interaction
can fail regardless of the actual trustworthiness of the parties (Braynov and
Sandholm, 2002). In my paper, the principal is not certain that he will not be
exploited under incomplete contracts since the agent may observe a shock and
breach. If the principal’s expectation about the integrity of the agent is low, he
is not willing to risk exploitation under incomplete contracts. Hence in very
unstable environments, the expectation about parties’ trustworthiness is low,
investment is not undertaken and surplus is not maximised. I also show that
trust is not a guarantee for cooperation because some agents are not trustwor-
thy and exploit trust under incomplete contract. However, trust in my model
is not based on the accumulation of knowledge about the partner over several
periods as discussed, for instance, in the psychology literature (see for example
Kramer (1999)), because the parties’ environment can change every period.
Furthermore, I discuss that the importance of trust for the outcome of the
relationship influences the principal’s willingness to trust the agent. If the non-
contractible part of the relationship does not significantly increase the relation-
ship’s surplus, the parties prefer to solely rely on complete contracts for the
contractible part of the relationship. On the other hand, the more important is
the investment for the relationship’s payoff, the more willing is the principal
to offer an incomplete contract.
Several experimental papers examine the influence of contract choice on
trust in a relationship. Chou et al. (2011) find that more complete contracts can
undermine trust and cooperation and can reduce relational expectations, sub-
jective satisfaction, and trust and therefore lead to less cooperation than incom-
plete contracts. Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) find that the use of binding
contracts to promote cooperation leads to a reduced likelihood of trust devel-
oping because the parties attribute each others’ cooperation to the constraints
imposed by the contract rather than to the individuals themselves. On the
4
other hand, using non-binding contracts leads to personal attributions for co-
operation and thus to interpersonal trust building. The experiments by Chou
et al. (2011) and Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) are based on different set-ups
than in my model. However, the intuitions of my model are in line with the
findings in the experiments although I do not make behavioural assumptions
about trust. I show that trust development with complete contracts is diffi-
cult as the parties do not learn about each other’s willingness to continue the
relationship. The use of incomplete contracts is a signal for trust and trustwor-
thiness and enhances the expectation about the future of the relationship.
The paper by Herold (2010) analyses the interaction of trust and contract
choice in a static setting and is closely related to the notions in my paper. The
agents are assumed to be either intrinsically motivated (trustworthy) or not.
Principals receive private signals about agents’ types, which determines their
trust. An agent updates his belief about the principal’s signal depending on the
choice of contractual completeness by the principal and behaves accordingly.
Herold (2010) concludes that a principal may prefer a less complete contract
over signalling distrust. In contrast to my paper, trust is modeled in a differ-
ent way as the parties are of different types and the agents desire information
about how the principals perceive them. Furthermore, Herold (2010) examines
contractual incompleteness in a one-shot game and does not consider the role
of trust in an on-going relationship and the impact of contractual incomplete-
ness on relational expectations.
Spier (1992) also considers the signalling function of incomplete contracts
in a static setting. The principal is assumed to have private information about
his type which is characterised by his productivity. When the principal of-
fers a complete contract, wages are contingent on productivity, whereas they
are insensitive to productivity under incomplete contracts. Thus, the princi-
pal takes into account the degree of information revelation when choosing a
5
contract. The analysis by Spier (1992) differs to mine, since in her model the
results are driven by considerations of ex ante and ex post transaction costs.
Furthermore, she considers a different type of asymmetric information and
the motivation of the players to signal and to learn are dissimilar to my model.
In Spier (1992), the principal is interested in getting best effort for lowest wage
in a single exchange, whereas in my model the principal considers the relation
between trust and contract choice in a repeated interaction.
Similarly to my model, several papers explore the deliberate choice of con-
tractual (in)completeness in a relational contract setting as opposed to the mod-
els that assume contracts to be incomplete for exogenous reason. However in
this literature, the choice is driven by the assumption that explicit contract-
ing is costly. For example, Desrieux and Beuve (2011) examine the choice of
contractual incompleteness in repeated interactions under asymmetric infor-
mation on discount rates and costly contracting. They argue that higher dis-
count rates make relational contracts more stable and result in less investment
in contractual completeness. Under asymmetric information on discount rates,
the level of contractual completeness evolves over time. As parties cooperate,
contracts become more incomplete, whereas they become more complete when
hold-up occurs. In contrast, contractual incompleteness in my paper does not
stem from contracting cost considerations since I investigate relatively simple
but common relationships, in which complete contracts are costless.
Also Kvaloy and Olsen (2009) endogenise the choice of contractual (in)com-
pleteness by allowing parties to invest in contract design and show that con-
tractual incompleteness increases with the discount factor. They assume that
perfect contractual completeness cannot be achieved for any part of the rela-
tionship. My paper in contrast accounts for the fact that some parts can be ex-
plicitly contracted. Moreover, Kvaloy and Olsen (2009) interpret the discount
factor as a proxy for trust. However in my model, trust is the willingness to
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accept vulnerability in order to signal trustworthiness.
Some models also investigate circumstances in which contractual (in)com-
pleteness is deliberately chosen in a relational contract settings for different
reasons than contracting costs. However, to my knowledge, none of these pa-
pers explicitly model the relationship between trust and contractual (in)com-
pleteness for repeatedly interacting parties. For instance, Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1998) argue that not contracting on verifiable aspects of performance can
be optimal when it improves unverifiable performance by giving the parties
more options to punish each other, since punishment can be more easily elab-
orated under incomplete contracts. Another example is the work by Halonen-
Akatwijuka and Hart (2013). They argue that contracts are deliberately in-
complete as complete contracts serve as a reference point to what parties feel
entitled to.
Outside the economics literature, especially in the management and politi-
cal science literature, the relationship between trust and contracts has attracted
significant attention. Hoffman (2002) argues that trusting relationships cannot
evolve with binding commitments, because they make betrayal impossible.
Gulati (1995) argues that contracts and trust are substitutes, whereas Poppo
and Zenger (2002) reason that they are complements. Mellewigt et al. (2007)
argue that it can be both. They identify two functions of contracts – control
and coordination. By considering the control function of contracts, trust and
contracts can act as substitutes because in the presence of trust less complex
contracts are needed and writing more detailed contracts can increase mutual
suspicion. However, when considering the coordination function of contracts,
trust and contracts can act as complements. The higher the trust, the more will-
ing firms are to communicate or to exchange knowledge, and to consider the
interests of partners in their decisions. My model focuses on the control func-
tion of contracts. By considering contracts as a commitment device, I show
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that under certain circumstances explicit contracts can indeed negatively in-
fluence the trust between contractors and thereby the outcome of the relation-
ship. Thus, the intuition developed in my model complements observations
from researchers outside the economics literature.
This paper is organised as follows. In section 1.2, the setting and the as-
sumptions of the model are explained. Section 1.3 discusses the decisions and
potential equilibria of the model starting with an analysis of the model under
the assumption of complete information. Subsequently, all perfect Bayesian
equilibria are identified assuming that the parties do not know their part-
ners’ state. The arising problem of equilibrium multiplicity is addressed in
section 1.3.3. Section 1.4 presents comparative statics and a discussion of the
results. The paper ends with concluding remarks in section 1.5.
1.2 The model
Consider a contractual relationship between an agent (hereafter A and her)
and a principal (hereafter P and he). Both have a positive, sufficiently large
discount factor δ > 0 and interact repeatedly over time. A has a service to offer
that requires her to exert effort e. P is willing to pay wage w for receiving the
service. Choice variables and outcome in the relationship are binary. A’s effort
choice, denoted by e′, is between exerting positive effort at an exogenously
given level, e′ = e, or zero effort, e′ = 0. Thus, A simply decides whether to
undertake a standardised task or not. Exerting effort creates costs c(e′) to A
in period t. Not undertaking the task is costless for A, whereas providing the
service is costly, such that c(e) > c(0) and c(0) = 0. Similarly, receiving effort
e′ generates benefit y(e′) for P in period t. When A exerts positive effort, P’s
benefits are positive, whereas there are zero benefits from getting no service,
such that y(e) > y(0) and y(0) = 0.
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P pays a wage for receiving the service. Since A is providing a standardised
task, I assume that there is a conventional compensation for it and the wage
choice is also binary. P decides whether to pay the reward at an exogenously
given level, w′ = w, or not, w′ = 0. P’s payoff function is thus v = y(e′) − w′,
whereas A’s payoff function is u = w′ − c(e′). I also assume that y(e) > w >
c(e) > 0 such that there exists a contract (w′, e′) that yields positive payoffs to
A and P.
In addition to the contractible effort e, A can also undertake a mutually ben-
eficial, non-contractible investment I , which pays off in the next period. This
investment captures all activities that A may undertake in the current period
relying on a repeated interaction in the next period. For example, A might find
ways of providing the service at lower costs or adjust the service to the needs
of P. The choice of investment, denoted by I ′, is also assumed to be binary.
A decides whether to undertake investment at an exogenously given level,
I ′ = I , or not, I ′ = 0. The investment is assumed to be non-contractible. P
understands that A has an investment opportunity that improves the relation-
ship’s surplus, but he cannot observe the specifics and thus cannot explicitly
define them in a contract. The investment creates cost c(I ′t) = I ′t to A in period
t. In period t+ 1, the investment from period t increases P’s benefits of receiv-
ing A’s effort e and reduces the cost of providing e for A. In the first period t,
cost and benefit from e′ are c(e′t, 0) and y(e′t, 0), respectively. If the relationship
continues, in the following period, cost and benefit depend on the investment
decision I ′t made in the preceding period and c(e′t+1, I ′t) and y(e′t+1, I ′t). Invest-
ment is assumed to be mutually beneficial such that y(e, I) > y(e, 0) > 0 and
c(e, 0) > c(e, I) > 0 hold. However, investment is not beneficial to either party
if no effort is exerted such that y(0, I) = 0 and c(0, I) = 0. A’s choice of invest-
ment in period t, I ′t, is observed by P in period t + 1, if the parties reach that
period.
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P’s payoffs, in period t and the potentially following period t+ 1 are
vt = y(e
′






A’s payoffs in period t and the potentially following period t+ 1 are
ut = w
′
t − c(e′t, 0)− I ′t ,
ut+1 = w
′
t+1 − c(e′t+1, I ′t)− I ′t+1 .
At the beginning of each period, each party may experience a shock which
forces him/her to end the relationship after the current period. I refer to this
as his/her state in period t. A has a shock with probability (1 − ρ) and P has
a shock with probability (1− θ). The probabilities of experiencing a shock are
common knowledge and the draws are independent every period. However,
the parties can only observe their own shock but not their partner’s. If P ob-
serves a shock in period t, he is not able to continue the relationship in the next
period(s) and is labeled myopic. He is still interested in the current period’s
relationship but will not propose a contract in t + 1. If A observes a shock,
she will not be able to offer her service in t + 1 and is also labeled myopic. In
contrast, a P that did not observe a shock is referred to as patient. He is willing
to propose a new contract in t + 1 if A has been cooperating in the previous
period(s). Similarly, an A that did not experience a shock is labeled patient and
always accepts a new contract in t + 1.4 If the parties meet in period t, they
continue working together unless one party observes a shock and/or behaves
4When assuming that the draws of observing a shock are independent every period, I
consider an environment which can fundamentally change every period. The parties cannot
anticipate how it will change. Therefore, they are not more likely to survive the next period
based on their survival in the past and thus there is no option to learn about each other’s ability
to continue. However, note that the parties only continue given that they have survived in the
past, because otherwise they would not exist any longer.
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non-cooperatively.
In the contracting stage, P proposes (W,E), where W represents wage and
E effort, and decides whether to utilise a verifiable contract or to rely on a ver-
bal agreement for this in principle contractible part of the relationship. If P
chooses a verifiable contract, compliance with the contract terms is costlessly
enforceable in court. A verifiable contract is, in the following, referred to as a
complete contract. I assume that no party has an incentive to breach the agree-
ment under complete contracts since the punishment is very severe compared
to the obligations in the contract. Since the players engage in an uncertain
environment, it is likely that signing a contract over multiple periods is not
costless. Therefore, I assume that, for contracting to be costless, the parties can
only record a contract for the current period. If the parties rely on a verbal
agreement, compliance is not verifiable in court since there are no records of
a contract. A verbal agreement is henceforth referred to as an incomplete con-
tract.5 The outside option for A is assumed to be zero. Therefore, without loss
of generality, I assume that A always accepts any contract that yields at least
zero payoff.
The timing of the game is summarised in Figure 1.1. At the beginning of
period t, the parties privately observe whether they have a shock or not. In
the subsequent contracting stage, P proposes (W,E) and decides whether to
utilise a complete or an incomplete contract. A will accept any type of contract
that yields at least zero payoff. After the parties have agreed on the contract,
P pays the wage w′t and subsequently A exerts effort e′t and chooses I ′t. Then,
P receives the benefits from A’s effort y(e′t, 0). If both parties comply with the
contract and neither party observes a shock in period t, they continue follow-
5Note that the assumptions that part of the relationship is non-contractible and complete
contracts can only be signed for the current period manifest that the contract between P and A
is never complete in the strict sense. However for simplicity, in this paper I refer to complete
or incomplete contracts only when discussing the contractible part of the relationship, i.e. the
exchange of wage for effort. Alternatively, complete and incomplete contracts in this set-up
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t) continuation if both
parties have complied
and neither party
has observed a shock
t+ 2 all potentially following periods are the same as period t+ 1
Figure 1.1: Timing
ing the same timing. However in the following period(s), cost and benefit
depend on the investment decision made in the preceding period, so c(e′t+1, I ′t)
and y(e′t+1, I ′t) in period t+ 1, for example.
1.3 Decisions and equilibria
Before analysing the equilibria under incomplete information in section 1.3.2,
I discuss the optimal decisions by all parties under complete information such
that the parties can observe each other’s shocks and know whether their part-
ner is able to continue the relationship or not.
1.3.1 Decisions under complete information
Claim 1.1. The complete contract that P proposes is (w, e).
If P proposes a complete contract (0, e), A does not accept this contract since
her payoffs from this contract are negative, u = 0 − c(e, 0) < 0. The complete
contract (w, 0) yields negative payoffs for P, since v = 0− w < 0, and he never
offers such a contract. The complete contract (0, 0) leads to zero payoffs for
both parties. I assume, without loss of generality, that P never offers such a
contract because he prefers not to interact with A instead of offering a zero
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payoff contract. Therefore, the only complete contract P offers in either state
is (w, e) which demands A to exert positive effort e′ = e and P to pay positive
wage w′ = w.
Claim 1.2. If the contract (w, e) is complete and under full information, all parties
comply with the agreement. If both parties are patient and the benefits from invest-
ment are sufficiently high (condition 1.1 holds), a patient A undertakes investment
and chooses I ′ = I .
If P chooses a complete contract (w, e), compliance with the agreement is
costlessly enforced by a court. Since punishment is very severe neither party
breaches the contract. Consider the case that a least one party is myopic. The
myopic A always chooses I ′ = 0 as she is not able to offer her service next
period and thus cannot benefit from investment. If A is patient but P is myopic,
A chooses I ′ = 0 because she knows that the relationship will not continue as
P is not interested in her service next period. Given that at least one party is
myopic, the expected payoffs for P and A, denoted by V and U respectively,
are
V = y(e, 0)− w ,
U = w − c(e, 0).
Consider the case where both contractors are patient. They will continue
to work together. The contract choice as well as the decisions on investment,
wage and effort are identical every period. Also, the probability of shocks is ex-
ogenous and draws are independent every period such that the parties do not
accumulate knowledge about each other over time. Therefore, I conclude that
the setting is stationary and time indices are dropped for the rest of the paper.
As enforced by a court, P pays wagew′ = w and A exerts effort e′ = e. A knows
that the relationship continues and chooses I ′ = I when the expected payoff
with investment is greater than without investment, U(I ′ = I) ≥ U(I ′ = 0).
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This is the case if
w − c(e, 0)− I + δ
1− δθρ
[w − c(e, I)− θρI] ≥ w − c(e, 0) δ
1− δθρ
[w − c(e, 0)] ,
δ[c(e, 0)− c(e, I)] ≥ I . (1.1)
For the rest of the paper, I assume that condition 1.1 always holds. Thus,
I consider only relationships in which the investment is beneficial to a patient
A such that she always has an incentive to invest when she is certain that her
partner is patient and that the relationship continues.
Claim 1.3. If P offers an incomplete contract, he proposes (w, e).
As in the previous analysis, I assume, without loss of generality, that P
prefers not to interact with A instead of offering a contract that yields zero or
negative payoffs with certainty. Therefore, P does not offer (0, 0) and (w, 0).
The payoffs are also zero when P offers (0, e) since either A breaches this con-
tract or does not accept it in the first place. Thus, P always proposes (w, e)
when he has an incentive to offer an incomplete contract.
Claim 1.4. With incomplete contracts and under complete information, cooperation
does not occur, w′ = 0 and e′ = 0, if at least one party is myopic. When both parties are
patient and if future payoffs are sufficiently high (condition (1.2) holds), cooperation
and investment arise, w′ = w, e′ = e and I ′ = I .
If P chooses an incomplete contract, compliance with the agreement (w, e)
is not enforceable by a court. If P is myopic, A sets I ′ = 0 in both states because
she knows that the relationship will not continue and she will not receive the
investment benefits. Also since there are no future benefits that she loses when
breaching and since the contract is not enforced by court, A sets e′ = 0. This
is anticipated by P and he chooses to pay no wage, w′ = 0. The same deci-
sions are made if A is myopic and P is patient because the parties are certain
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that the interaction finishes at the end of the current period. So irrespective of
the agreement, the payoffs for both parties are zero with incomplete contracts
when at least one party is myopic.
If both A and P are patient in period t, they will exist in the next period
t + 1 and can potentially interact again. P has to decide whether to offer a
complete or an incomplete contract in t+1. Consider the case where the parties
continue but either party observes a shock in t+1. As shown above, P’s payoff
from offering an incomplete contract, given that at least one party is myopic,
is zero under complete information. If a patient P had an incentive to offer an
incomplete contract in t, he will switch to a complete contract in t + 1 if one
partner has a shock in t+ 1. This is reflected in the following expected payoffs
from incomplete contracts. In the current period t, a patient A can exploit a
patient P by taking the wage but not exerting effort. She also makes a decision
about the investment. The expected payoffs for a patient A depending on her
choices are
U(e′ = e, I ′ = I) = w − c(e, 0)− I + δ
1− δθρ
[w − c(e, I)− θρI] ,
U(e′ = e, I ′ = 0) = w − c(e, 0) + δ
1− δθρ
[w − c(e, 0)] ,
U(e′ = 0, I ′ = 0) = w .
The patient A cooperates and invests, i.e. chooses e′ = e and I ′ = I , when
working with a patient P if
U(e′ = e, I ′ = I) > U(e′ = 0, I ′ = 0) , thus if
δ[w − c(e, I)] > (1− δθρ)c(e, 0) + I . (1.2)
Note that I have assumed that condition 1.1 always holds. Therefore, con-
dition 1.2 holds as well. Consequently, I only consider situations where under
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complete information and with incomplete contracts, a patient A cooperates
instead of taking the wage without exerting effort and also has sufficient incen-
tives to invest. Thus, when both parties are patient and P offers an incomplete
contract, the contractors set I ′ = I , e′ = e and w′ = w.
Proposition 1.1. Under complete information, the myopic P always offers a complete
contract. The patient P offers a complete contract to a myopic A, whereas he is indif-
ferent between relying on an incomplete or a complete contract when working with a
patient A given that conditions 1.1 and 1.2 hold.
Since the myopic P’s expected payoff is zero with incomplete contracts
whereas it is positive with complete contracts, he always chooses to conclude
a complete contract. The patient P offers a complete contract if A is myopic,
because he will be exploited by her when relying on an incomplete contract.
When A and P are both patient and given that conditions 1.1 and 1.2 hold,
A cooperates and invests under incomplete contracts. However, cooperation
and investment is also achieved under complete contract if both parties are pa-
tient. Therefore, the patient P is indifferent between offering an incomplete or
a complete contract, when A is patient. Thus in this setting, neither a myopic
nor a patient P strictly prefers to offer an incomplete contract and incomplete
contracts are irrelevant under complete information.
1.3.2 Potential PBE equilibria under incomplete information
The previous analysis demonstrates that P relies on complete contracts when
the parties can observe each other’s state. When they have incomplete infor-
mation, P may deliberately choose an incomplete contract in order to induce
investment behaviour. This section analyses under which circumstances either
complete or incomplete contracts are chosen, which perfect Bayesian equilibria
(PBE) exist and which equilibria can be selected.
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The strategies played by P in period t depending on his state s ∈ {µ, %},
where µ represents myopia and % patience, is denoted by σP (s). The strategies
played by A in period t depending on her state i ∈ {µ, %} is σA(i). P’s contract
choice γ is between offering a complete or an incomplete contract such that γ ∈
{c, in}. A’s belief, i.e. the probability that A assigns to P’s state s after observing
the contract choice γ, is denoted by α(s|γ). P’s expected payoff depending on
his state and his contract choice γ is denoted by V γs .
Separating equilibrium I
Proposition 1.2. There exists a separating equilibrium where the myopic P offers a
complete and the patient P an incomplete contract such that
σP (s) =

c if s = µ
in if s = % ,
A’s best response depending on her state i is characterised by
σA(γ, α(s|γ), i) =

if c e′ = e and I ′ = 0 for all i
if in

e′ = 0 and I ′ = 0 if i = µ
e′ = e and I ′ = I if i = % ,








If this equilibrium exists and A’s beliefs are as defined above, what is A’s
best response after observing an incomplete contract? The myopic A sets e′ =
I ′ = 0 independent from her belief because the contract is not enforced by a
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court and she does not lose future payoffs by breaching the agreement. The
patient A chooses e′ = e and I ′ = I given that condition 1.2 holds, since she
believes that P is patient. If A observes a complete contract, A in either state
chooses e′ = e as enforced by a court. Since A believes that P is myopic when
being offered a complete contract, she chooses I ′ = 0.
A’s beliefs are Bayesian by construction and A’s strategies are best responses
given those beliefs. Hence this is an equilibrium if neither type of P has an in-
centive to deviate. P follows the assigned strategies as long as the payoff from
this is at least as high as with deviation. The myopic P’s expected payoffs from
offering a complete or an incomplete contract, given the above defined beliefs,
are
V cµ = y(e, 0)− w ,
V inµ = ρy(e, 0)− w.
The myopic P has no incentive to deviate as V inµ < V cµ holds under all circum-
stances.
Given the above defined beliefs, the patient P’s expected payoff depends
on whether he observes a shock or not in the next period(s). If the patient P is
myopic in the next period, he has no incentive to offer an incomplete contract
in the next period since V inµ < V cµ . Thus, if this equilibrium exists, the patient P
switches to a complete contract next period if he observes a shock next period
and continues offering an incomplete contract otherwise. The patient P’s ex-
pected payoff from offering an incomplete or a complete contract this period,
given the above defined beliefs, are
V c% = y(e, 0)− w +
δρ
1− δθρ
(y(e, 0)− w) , (1.3)









The patient P has no incentives to deviate if V in% > V c% . Hence, his incentive




[(1− θ(1− ρ))y(e, I)− y(e, 0)] > (1− ρ)y(e, 0) . (ICP )
If ICP does not hold, P has an incentive to deviate and separation I (the myopic
P offering a complete and the patient P offering an incomplete contract) is not
a PBE. If ICP holds, no P has an incentive to deviate, the assumed beliefs are
correct and separation I is a PBE.
Whether ICP holds, depends on three factors. First, the probability that
A receives no shock has to be sufficiently high. When offering an incomplete
contract, the patient P risks being exploited by a myopic A. If he expects that
the probability that A observes a shock is low, he is willing to take on the
risk in order to distinguish himself from a myopic P and thus to induce in-
vestment. Secondly, whether ICP holds depends on the increase in payoff,
(1 − θ(1 − ρ))y(e, I) − y(e, 0), which the patient P can potentially receive in
future period(s) when signalling his type and inducing investment. If this in-
crease is not sufficiently high, it is not worth for the patient P to risk exploita-
tion by a myopic A. Note that this depends on the level of I but also on θ and
ρ. (1− θ(1− ρ)) includes all states in which the patient P is not exploited by A.
Thirdly, ICP depends on the discount rate, which is assumed to be sufficiently
high. So for separation I to be an equilibrium, investment and the future have
to be sufficiently important for the patient P and A’s probability of shocks has
to be sufficiently low.
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Separating equilibrium II
Proposition 1.3. There does not exist a separating equilibrium in which the patient
P offers a complete and the myopic P offers an incomplete contract such that
σP (s) =

in if s = µ
c if s = % .
If this equilibrium existed, A’s corresponding beliefs would be α(µ|in) = 1
and α(%|c) = 0. Given these beliefs, what would be A’s best response after ob-
serving the contract choice? Both A would choose e′ = I ′ = 0 with incomplete
contracts. Given that she observed a complete contract, A of both types would
choose e′ = e as enforced by a court. The patient A would set I ′ = I whereas
the myopic A would choose I ′ = 0. This were an equilibrium if neither type of
P would have an incentive to deviate given the above defined beliefs. P would
follow the assigned strategies as long as the payoff is at least as high as under
deviation. P’s expected payoffs depending on his state and his contract choice,
if the above defined beliefs held, would be
V cµ = y(e, 0)− w,
V inµ = V
in
% = 0 .
The patient P would have no incentives to deviate if V c% > V in% , which is always
the case. The myopic P would have no incentives to deviate if V inµ > V cµ , which
never holds. Therefore, the myopic P would have an incentive to deviate to
complete contracts and this kind of separation is not an equilibrium.
Pooling on writing incomplete contracts
Proposition 1.4. There does not exist a pooling on incomplete contracts equilibrium
such that σP (s) = in for s ∈ {µ, %}.
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If pooling on incomplete contracts were an equilibrium, A’s belief for on-
the-equilibrium-path behaviour would be α(%|in) = θ and α(µ|in) = (1 − θ).
Given these beliefs, a myopic A would always choose e′ = I ′ = 0 with incom-
plete contracts and e′ = e and I ′ = 0 with complete contracts. The patient
A’s decision with incomplete contracts would depend on θ and with complete
contracts on the off-equilibrium-path belief. The myopic P’s expected payoff
depending on the contract choice would be
V cµ = y(e, 0)− w ,
V inµ = ρy(e
′, 0)− w .
Hence, V inµ < V cµ would always hold, incentivising the myopic P to deviate
to complete contracts with which he cannot be exploited by the myopic A.
Therefore, pooling on writing an incomplete contract is not a PBE.
Pooling on writing complete contracts
Proposition 1.5. There exists a pooling on complete contract equilibrium where P’s
strategy is σP (s) = c for s ∈ {µ, %}, equilibrium best responses by A are
σA(c, α(s|c), i) =

e′ = e and I ′ = 0 if i = µ
e′ = e and I ′ = I if i = % ,
















where λ ∈ [0, 1] represents off-equilibrium-path behaviour belief.
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Observing a complete contract, the best response for both A is e′ = e as
enforced by a court. The myopic A always sets I ′ = 0 since she will not be
active next period. To identify the patient A’s decision on investment, consider
the expected payoffs from investing and not investing,
U c%(I
′ = 0) = w − c(e, 0) + δθ
1− δθρ
[w − c(e, 0)] ,
U c%(I
′ = I) = w − c(e, 0) + 1
1− δθρ
[δθ(w − c(e, I))− I] .
The patient A chooses I ′ = I if U c%(I ′ = I) > U c%(I ′ = 0), hence if the investment
constraint
θδ[c(e, 0)− c(e, I)] > I (ICA)
holds. Otherwise, the patient A chooses e′ = e and I ′ = 0.
Being offered an incomplete contract, the myopic A’s best response is e′ =
I ′ = 0. The best response for the patient A depends on the expected payoff
from cooperating or not,
U in% (e
′ = 0, I ′ = 0) = w ,
U in% (e
′ = e, I ′ = I) = w − c(e, 0)− I + λ δ
1− δθρ
(w − c(e, I)− ρI) .
The patient A chooses e′ = e and I ′ = I if U in% (e′ = e, I ′ = I) > U in% (e′ =




[w − c(e, I)− ρI] > I + c(e, 0) (1.5)
holds, which depends inter alia on A’s off-equilibrium-path belief that P is
patient (λ). Otherwise, the patient A sets e′ = I ′ = 0.
To summarise, both A choose e′ = e with complete contracts and the my-
opic P has under no circumstances an incentive to deviate. If ICA holds, the
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patient A chooses I ′ = I with complete contracts. This is the case if the ben-
efits from investment are very high and/or the probability of P observing a
shock is low such that the patient A is likely to receive the investment’s bene-
fits. If ICA holds and the patient A chooses I ′ = I with complete contracts, no
P has an incentive to deviate and pooling on writing a complete contract is a
PBE. If ICA does not hold, pooling on writing a complete contract can still be
a PBE. Since the off-equilibrium-path belief that P is myopic (1 − λ) could be
anything in the interval [0, 1], there always exists such a pooling equilibrium. If
ICA does not hold and the off-equilibrium-path belief is such that condition 1.5
holds, the patient P has an incentive to deviate such that the patient A chooses
I ′ = I with incomplete contracts. If ICP holds and thus V in% > V c% (i.e. the
patient P has an incentive to signal), the patient P can benefit from deviating to
incomplete contracts and pooling on writing complete contracts is not a PBE.
Therefore pooling on complete contracts is a PBE if either ICA holds, or if ICA
does not hold and also conditions 1.5 and ICP do not hold. In the latter case,
the off-equilibrium path beliefs are such that the patient A chooses no invest-
ment when offered an incomplete contract and the patient P has no incentive
to signal.
1.3.3 Comparison of equilibria
The previous analysis examines the equilibria that can potentially be reached
by the parties. This section aims at comparing all possible equilibria and ad-
dresses the problem of equilibrium multiplicity. Furthermore, intuition for the
results are discussed.
Existence of equilibria
As demonstrated before, pooling on incomplete contracts and separating II
(the myopic P choosing incomplete, the patient P choosing complete contracts)
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will never be an equilibrium, since at least one type of P always has an incen-
tive to deviate.
There always exists a PBE in pooling on complete contracts. If condition
ICA holds, the patient A invests under complete contracts and no P has an
incentive to deviate from complete contracts. However if ICP holds as well,
the patient P is willing to signal his type and separation is also a possible equi-
librium. Therefore, multiple equilibria, either pooling on complete contract or
separation I (the myopic P choosing complete, the patient P choosing incom-
plete contract) exist. If ICA does not hold, A’s belief regarding off-equilibrium-
path behaviour can be such that it sustains a pooling equilibrium irrespective
of ICP . However, given ICP is and ICA is not satisfied, separation I can also
be an equilibrium (depending on λ). Therefore, there exist multiple equilib-
ria when ICP holds. If ICP is not satisfied, the only possible equilibrium is
pooling on complete contracts. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the existing
equilibria depending on these conditions.
ICA does not hold ICA does hold
ICP does hold
Separation and Separation and
Pooling (w/o I) Pooling (w/ I)
ICP does not hold Pooling (w/o I) Pooling (w/ I)
Table 1.1: Existing equilibria
Selection of equilibria
If ICP does not hold, the only possible equilibrium is pooling on complete con-
tracts. If ICP is satisfied, separation I and pooling are both possible equilibria
and the question arises whether one equilibrium can be selected in this case. If
both ICP and ICA hold, signalling by P has no effect on patient A’s investment
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behaviour and none of the equilibria can be selected.
If ICA is not satisfied (but ICP holds), whether pooling is an equilibrium
depends on the off-equilibrium-path belief λ which influences patient A’s in-
vestment decision. If the off-equilibrium-path belief is such that condition 1.5
does not hold and the patient A would not invest after observing an incom-
plete contract, pooling is an equilibrium. Condition 1.5 does not hold if the
belief of A that he is working with a patient P is sufficiently low. In order to
select one equilibrium, the intuitive criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987) can be
utilised. If a deviation is dominated for one of the players but not the other
one, this deviation cannot be expected by the player for which it is dominated.
It is not in the myopic P’s interest to deviate from pooling on complete con-
tracts to incomplete contracts, since he cannot benefit but risks exploitation
by a myopic A. The patient P is the only one who can potentially gain from
deviation. This should be reflected in the off-equilibrium-path belief. Hence,
the most favourable belief following a deviation is α(%|in) = 1. Given this
off-equilibrium-path belief, the patient A would invest after observing an in-
complete contract and the patient P has an incentive to deviate from offering
a complete contract. Hence, pooling on complete contracts is not an equilib-
rium that passes the intuitive criterion given that ICP does hold and ICA does
not hold. Table 1.2 provides an overview of the selected PBE depending on
conditions ICP and ICA.
ICA does not hold ICA does hold
ICP does hold Separation
Separation and
Pooling (w/ I)
ICP does not hold Pooling (w/o I) Pooling (w/ I)
Table 1.2: Selected equilibria
25
Discussion
The myopic P has never an incentive to offer an incomplete contract. Thus,
the patient P can signal his state by choosing an incomplete contract. He is
willing to do so if the patient A is not investing without knowing P’s state and
if the investment is sufficiently important to him. This is represented by ICP .
If ICP does not hold, the patient P is not willing to signal. This is the case if
either investment benefits are not sufficiently high or the probability of a shock
for A, and thus the risk of exploitation with an incomplete contract, is too high.
Therefore, if ICP does not hold and irrespective of his state, P offers a complete
contract and pooling is the only sustainable equilibrium.
However, if ICP does hold, the patient P is willing to signal his state. This is
the case if the patient P values the extra surplus from investment and assesses
A to be sufficiently trustworthy, i.e. A has a low probability of experiencing a
shock. Thus, separation is always an equilibrium given that ICP holds. If ICA
is satisfied, the probability that P is patient is high and the patient A invests
without receiving a signal on P’s state. So, the patient P receives investment
with a complete contract and pooling on complete contracts is an equilibrium.
However, if ICP holds as well, the patient P is willing to signal his state and
separation is also an equilibrium. Since P can choose the contract, it can be
expected that in this situation he will offer a complete contract which yields a
higher expected payoff than an incomplete contract, V c% > V in% , because
V c% (I
′ = I) = y(e, 0)− w + (1− ρ) δ
1− δ
[y(e, I)− w] ,
V in% (I








However, I cannot predict that this will happen and separation is a sustainable
equilibrium. Note, both types of A receive a higher expected payoff with an
incomplete than with a complete contract given ICP and ICA hold. The my-
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opic A has the option to exploit the patient P under incomplete contracts. The
patient A knows that she is working with the patient P, undertakes the invest-
ment and receives investment’s benefits. When offered a complete contract, A
cannot infer P’s state but if ICA is satisfied, the patient A makes the investment
and risks to do so in vain given P is myopic. Hence, if ICA and ICP hold, the
patient P faces the risk of exploitation with an incomplete contract, whereas
the patient A faces the risk of investing in vain with complete contracts.
1.4 Comparative statics
Which equilibrium P and A achieve, depends on whether conditions ICA and
ICP hold. This depends in turn on the values of the parameters θ, ρ and I . The
following thresholds indicated by θ∗ and ρ∗ are derived from conditions ICA
and ICP , respectively:
θ∗ =
I
δ(c(e, 0)− c(e, I))
ρ∗ =
Z − y(e, 0)





[δ(1− θ)(y(e, I)− y(e, 0)) + y(e, 0)]2 + 4δθy(e, 0)[y(e, I)− y(e, 0)] .
The thresholds indicate when the parties are indifferent between acting ac-
cording to one equilibrium or another. If the probability that P has no shock
exceeds θ∗, condition ICA holds. If the probability that A has no shock is higher
than ρ∗, condition ICP holds.
1.4.1 ρ∗ and θ∗ thresholds with medium investment level
The ρ∗ threshold changes with θ. Since ∂ρ
∗
∂θ
> 0, as shown in the appendix,
the ρ∗ threshold is increasing in θ. The second derivative can be both positive
and negative, depending on the parameter values. Also, it can be shown that
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ρ∗(θ = 1) < 1 always holds. The θ∗ threshold does not depend on ρ. Figure 1.2
depicts the relationship between the ρ∗ and θ∗ thresholds and the equilibria.
Note, the ρ∗ threshold is drawn assuming that the parameter values are such







Separation Sep & Pool w/ I
Pooling w/o I Pooling w/ I
Figure 1.2: Equilibria with medium investment level
1.4.2 Change of ρ∗ and θ∗ thresholds with investment
As shown above, the probabilities that each party experiences a shock influ-
ences the achieved equilibrium. However, the level of investment also effects
the equilibrium because investment influences the threshold values. As shown




slope of ρ∗ threshold can be increasing or decreasing in investment. The θ∗
threshold is increasing in investment, ∂θ
∗
∂I
> 0, under the assumption that the
cost function is convex, ∂c(e,I)
∂I




Figure 1.3 depicts how the thresholds react to a change in the level of invest-
ment assuming c(e, I) is convex, ∂
2ρ∗
∂θ2
< 0 and ∂
2ρ∗
∂θ∂I
> 0. Given the exogenous
investment level is very high, as on the right side of Figure 1.3, the θ∗ threshold
is relatively high. Even if the probability that P is patient is quite high, invest-
ment is so expensive that the patient A wants to be certain not to invest in vain
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(high θ∗ threshold). Since investment is very beneficial, the patient P is willing
to signal even if the probability that A has no shock is low (low ρ∗ threshold).
Hence, separation is the equilibrium reached with most combinations of prob-
abilities to have a shock.
Given that investment level is very low, as on the left side of Figure 1.3, the
patient A is willing to invest under complete contract even when the proba-
bility that P has no shock is relatively low (low θ∗ threshold). The patient P is
not willing to risk exploitation and chooses complete contracts even when the
probability that A has no shock is relatively high (high ρ∗ threshold). Hence,
with very low investment and for most combinations of probabilities to have





















P w/o I P w/ I
High investment
Figure 1.3: Equilibria with low and high investment level
1.4.3 Discussion of the results
To summarise, in this model, A can decide to undertake a non-contractible in-
vestment in the current period that increases surplus and payoff for herself and
P in the next period. Both parties can experience a shock, which forces them to
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stop the relationship after the current period. The myopic A is never willing
to invest. The patient A is only willing to invest if he expects the continuation
of the relationship. By writing a complete contract, the parties are only able to
commit to cooperation in the current period. Furthermore, with complete con-
tracts, the contractors do not gain information about the partner’s state since
cooperation occurs in compliance with the contract and is not a sign for com-
mitment and cooperative behaviour. So, in order to learn about the state of the
partner, the patient parties are under certain circumstances willing to agree on
incomplete contracts.
If θ < θ∗, the belief of A in the patience of P is low. This lack of trust
induces the patient A not to invest. If at the same time ρ > ρ∗, P has high belief
in A’s patience and regards A to be trustworthy. The patient P, thus, decides
to trust A and offers an incomplete contract. He pays the wage w′ = w before
receiving effort e′ = e and thus makes himself vulnerable to exploitation by
A. However, because of this vulnerability, the myopic P would never choose
to offer an incomplete contract. Therefore, offering an incomplete contract is
a good signal of patience. After the patient P successfully signalled that he
observed no shock, the patient A cooperates and invests, i.e. sets e′ = e and
I ′ = I . However, P’s trust will be exploited by a myopic A who chooses e′ =
I ′ = 0 but receives w′ = w. If the patient P observes cooperation by A, P offers
a contract in the next period according to the same decision rules than in the
previous period. The benefits of investment for P occur in the next period if
either P offers a complete contract or if he offers an incomplete contract and
cooperation occurs again. A receives the benefits of investment in the next
period because undertaking effort will be less costly.
If both parties mistrust each other, because the probability that the partner
experiences a shock is high, i.e. θ < θ∗ and ρ < ρ∗, the patient P is not willing to
risk exploitation and offers a complete contract which leads to no investment
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by the patient A.
If P is relatively unlikely to experience a shock, i.e. θ > θ∗, A’s belief in
P’s patience is high. This trust of A in P leads the patient A to invest without
knowing P’s state. However, the patient P is not willing to signal his type un-
der this condition if he does not trust A, i.e. if ρ < ρ∗. If A trusts P but not
vice versa, A is investing and risking to do so in vain. If both trust each other,
because the probabilities of observing a shock are low for both contractors,
each party is willing to take on risk. The patient A is willing to invest with-
out knowing P’s state. The patient P is willing to signal his type and thereby
risking exploitation by a myopic A. Under this circumstance, separation and
pooling with investment can both be potential equilibria.
The meaning of low and high belief in the partner’s patience depends on the
exogenous level of investment, because the θ∗ and ρ∗ threshold change with
I . If the investment level is very high, the patient A is less willing to invest
without knowing P’s state. For the patient P, however, high investment is very
beneficial and he is even more willing to signal his type. So, the higher the in-
vestment level, the lower the belief of P in A’s patience has to be in order for the
patient P to be willing to offer an incomplete contract. Thus, with most combi-
nations of probabilities to have a shock for both parties, separation is achieved
under high investment. Also, since under high investment, the patient A is
less willing to invest without knowing P’s state, the parties will only reach a
potential pooling with investment equilibrium if A’s belief in P’s patience is
very high.
Another interesting result is that the ρ∗ threshold is increasing in θ. In order
for P to be willing to signal his state, he demands A’s probability of no shock to
be higher if his probability of no shock is higher. Compare P’s expected payoff
from offering complete and incomplete contracts in the separation equilibrium
(equation 1.3 and 1.4). As θ increases, (1− (1− ρ)θ)y(e, I) decreases. Thus, P’s
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potential benefit from signalling, i.e. the payoff from investment, will decrease
as θ increases. If the patient P experiences no shock next period, he will offer
an incomplete contract again. However, if A experiences a shock next period
and is offered an incomplete contract, he will exploit P. Thus, P receives benefit
y(e, I) only with probability (1− (1− ρ)θ) where (1− ρ)θ represents the prob-
ability that P is patient and offers an incomplete contract but A is myopic and
exploits P. If, however, the patient P is more unlikely to be patient next period,
he is more likely to offer a complete contract next period and to receive y(e, I)
with certainty. Therefore, the more likely the patient P is to be patient next
period, the more likely he is to be exploited by A next period and to lose the
benefits from investment. Hence, the more likely P is to be patient, the higher
A’s probability of experiencing no shock needs to be for P to be willing to sig-
nal his type. Although in this model the draws are independent every period,
there exists a certain dependence between patience in the current period and
continuation in future period(s). This is due to the fact that the next period(s)
can only be reached if both parties are patient in this period.
1.5 Conclusion
Contractual incompleteness does not only stem from bounded rationality or
transaction costs but may be deliberately chosen for various reasons. How-
ever, the existing theories on the choice of contractual (in-)completeness do
not account for asymmetric information about partner’s ability to be in an on-
going relationship and its impact on the sustainability and benefits of a rela-
tionship. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the contract theory literature
by examining the role that incomplete contracts play in signalling stability and
trustworthiness.
This model illustrates the relationship of contract choice and trust as well as
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the outcome of the cooperation. Contractual incompleteness is under certain
circumstances deliberately chosen and is rather a consequence of relational
contracting than a cause of it. If A’s trust in P is very high, the patient A invests
even with complete contracts and incomplete contracts become irrelevant. It
is not a surprising result that pooling on complete contract can be an equilib-
rium. Given complete contracts are feasible, it is usually expected that parties
employ them to avoid exploitation by their partners. The interesting result is
that separating equilibria exist as well and that a patient P may deliberately
offer an incomplete contract. Given that A does not trust P but P trusts A and
investment is sufficiently important for the relationship’s surplus, a separation
equilibrium, in which the patient P offers incomplete and the myopic P offers
complete contracts, is achieved. By offering an incomplete contract, the patient
P risks exploitation but facilitates the revelation of his trustworthiness, i.e. his
ability to continue the relationship. However, if both parties highly distrust
each other, they will not agree on an incomplete contract. Consequently, A
will not invest and total surplus is not maximised. This model also illustrates
that high beliefs in the trustworthiness of the partner are not a guarantee for
cooperation. The myopic A is always able to exploit trust under incomplete
contracts, so that cooperation can fail.
These results follow from the model without taking into account agents’
motivation. Several authors discuss the impact of explicit incentives on intrin-
sic motivation as, for instance, Benabou and Tirole (2003). Also, as discussed
by Herold (2010), experiencing distrust can make agents react negatively for
psychological reasons. In this model, trust is important to induce A to under-
take a non-contractible investment. When departing from standard assump-
tions on preferences and assuming that agents tend to reciprocate negatively
when distrusted, this non-contractible investment might not be necessary to
show that trust is important in an on-going relationship. Although these issues
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are not considered in my model, it can be expected that the impact of trust on
the outcome of the relationship would be even greater when taking them into
account. Allowing for intrinsic motivation and reciprocity and analysing its in-
fluence on the level of effort or investment would be an interesting extension
of the model.
Furthermore, the model illustrates how trust building works. If A’s belief
in P’s trustworthiness is not sufficiently high to incentivise her to invest under
complete contracts, P decides to facilitate that parties learn about each other’s
trustworthiness by relying on incomplete contracts. One can interpret the se-
quential move under incomplete contracts as a gift exchange. The patient P
undertakes a costly action only beneficial to A, i.e. pays the wage, in hope that
A returns the favour, i.e. exerts effort. When the parties successfully exchange
gifts, cooperation continues, otherwise cooperation ends. It is also possible
that A has a sufficiently higher belief in the trustworthiness of P than vice
versa. In this model, this leads to pooling on complete contracts in which the
patient A undertakes investment. However, it is conceivable that the patient A
is willing to start the gift exchange and exert effort before receiving wage with
incomplete contracts. Thereby, the patient A would reveal she had no shock
before learning about P’s state. However, this would allow the patient A to get
an insight into P’s state and she would not risk to invest in vain. Whether the
parties would agree on such a timing in certain circumstances is an interesting
question for future work.
One limitation of the model lies in the focus on the commitment function
of contracts. In my model, wage, effort and investment levels are exogenously
given. Contracts can, however, also be coordination devices as discussed by
Mellewigt et al. (2007). It would be interesting to allow parties to choose the
level of effort, wage and investment and to analyse the decisions of both con-
tractors and the impact of trust on the outcome of the relationship.
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Appendix
1.A Change of ρ∗ threshold with θ
The ρ∗ threshold changes with θ. In order to determine how it changes, con-





















[δ(1− θ)(y(e, I)− y(e, 0)) + y(e, 0)]2 + 4δθ[y(e, I)− y(e, 0)]y(e, 0) .
The ρ∗ threshold is increasing in θ if ∂ρ
∗
∂θ





2θδ[y(e, I)− y(e, 0)]
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2θδ[y(e, I)− y(e, 0)]
]
and
W − (1− θ)δ[y(e, I)− y(e, 0)] > − 1
W
− 1




> 0 always holds and the ρ∗ threshold is upward sloping. The second
derivative can be both positive and negative, depending on the parameter val-
ues.
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Also consider the value of ρ∗(θ = 1):
ρ∗(θ = 1) =
√
y(e, 0)2 + 4δ[y(e, I)− y(e, 0)]y(e, 0)− y(e, 0)
2δ[y(e, I)− y(e, 0)]
.
ρ∗(θ = 1) < 1 as long as 4δ2[y(e, I)− y(e, 0)]2 > 0, which always holds.
1.B Change of ρ∗ threshold with investment
In order to find the effect that investment has on the ρ∗ threshold, consider the






2δθ(y(e, I)− y(e, 0))2W
[W − δ(1 + θ)(y(e, I)− y(e, 0))− y(e, 0)] , (1.6)
with W = {[δ(1− θ)(y(e, I)− y(e, 0)) + y(e, 0)]2 + 4δθy(e, 0)[y(e, I)− y(e, 0)]}
1
2 .
All terms in equation 1.6 are positive and y(e, I)− y(e, 0) > 0. Thus, ∂ρ∗
∂I
< 0 if
W − δ(1 + θ)(y(e, I)− y(e, 0))− y(e, 0) < 0 ,
hence if − 4θδ(y(e, I)− y(e, 0)) < 0 .
Since this always holds, ∂ρ
∗
∂I
< 0 and as investment increases the ρ∗ threshold
decreases.
A change in investment also effects the slope of the ρ∗ threshold. However,
∂2ρ∗
∂θ∂I
can be positive and negative, depending on the parameter values.
1.C Change of θ∗ threshold with investment
The effect that investment has on the θ∗ threshold depends on the first deriva-




δI ∂c(e,I)∂I + δ(c(e, 0)− c(e, I))








> 0 if − ∂c(e, I)
∂I
<





< 0 if − ∂c(e, I)
∂I
>
c(e, 0)− c(e, I)
I
.
Thus, the effect that investment has on the θ∗ threshold depends on the cost
function. Assume that c(e, I) is convex, such that ∂c(e,I)
∂I




and the θ∗ threshold is increasing in investment.
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Chapter 2
Contracts as reference points in
the presence of a court
2.1 Introduction
It is widely accepted in the literature that most contracts are incomplete. In
fact, why incompleteness arises and how trade relationships can function nev-
ertheless is an extensively examined topic in contract theory.1 But if contracts
are prevalently incomplete, why do parties go to the trouble of writing con-
tracts instead of relying on ex post renegotiation? Hart and Moore (2008) an-
swer this question by arguing that, in trade relationships, contractual terms an-
chor parties’ feelings of entitlement which limits detrimental, non-contractible
shading on performance. In this paper, I discuss if and how the reference point
for parties’ feelings of entitlement depend on the enforcement of the contract
in courts. In general, the option to make claims in courts is what makes con-
1The classic explanation for why incompleteness arises is that parties economise on trans-
action costs of writing contracts as discussed by Williamson (1985). Also some literature, for
example Tirole (2009), argues that parties are boundedly rational and hence not able to de-
scribe future contingencies and obligations. Unverifiability of payoff-relevant variables as a
cause for incompleteness is discussed by, for instance, Hart and Holmström (1987), Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988). With incomplete contracts, long-term relation-
ships can function for instance due to relational contracting; see for example Baker et al. (2002)
and Levin (2003).
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tracts valuable. Most economics literature, however, assumes that courts can-
not enforce incomplete contracts which include unverifiable terms or contrac-
tual gaps. In contrast, I argue that courts have to decide on all disputes, sup-
posedly especially if they are related to unverifiable terms. Indeed, the issue of
contract interpretation by courts, because contractual gaps exist or terms are
vague or ambiguous, is an important part of the legal and law and economics
literature.2 The prospect of resolving potential contractual disputes in courts
ex post will presumably influence parties’ ex ante incentives to write contracts,
the contract design and also parties’ feelings of entitlement. In this paper, I in-
tend to analyse this interplay.
For this purpose, I utilise the theory by Hart and Moore (2008) (henceforth
HM), which offers a new explanation for contract formation under contractual
incompleteness, and introduce a contract enforcing court to the model.3 HM
argue that in a simple trade relationship, i.e. exchange of a good for a price,
a contract anchors parties’ feelings of entitlement and thus acts as a reference
point. Suppose parties have some discretion over performance, they provide
full performance only if they feel ‘well-treated’ with regard to the contract, oth-
erwise they ‘shade’. Therefore, an ex ante contract that specifies future trade
eliminates ‘aggrievement’ ex post. Contractual incompleteness arises as the
states of nature are unverifiable and thus state contingent contracts are not
possible. The state is assumed to affect the seller’s cost of production and
the buyer’s value from the product. Parties can ex ante determine a single
trade price and write a rigid contract. Alternatively, contractors can choose
to write a flexible contract that bounds but does not fix the price and enables
price adjustments ex post. This, however, can cause parties to expect differ-
ent outcomes within the contract, leading to aggrievement and shading. HM’s
2See for example Katz (2004) and Gilson et al. (2014).
3See Walker (2013) for a literature review on a new approach towards the theory of the
firm that was initiated by the reference point approach towards contracts by Hart and Moore
(2008).
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reference point theory has been tested and mainly supported in several exper-
iments by Fehr et al. (2009, 2014) using a similar set-up.
In this paper, I introduce a court to HM’s model and allow for ex post rene-
gotiation. If either party does not feel well-treated with the proposed terms,
it can take the case to the court. Going to court is costly for both parties. The
judge enforces trade and makes a decision on the price based on the contract
terms and the observed price offer but without observing the state. I analyse
whether and when parties have incentives to claim compliance with the con-
tract in court and how this affects the ex ante contract design.
I analyse how HM’s results rely on certain (implicit) assumptions and ex-
plicitly include a contract enforcing court into their model. HM assume that
trade is voluntary. Thus, either party can walk away from trade and the con-
tract partner has no option to file a lawsuit for contract breach. Nevertheless,
renegotiation is ruled out in HM’s model. I show that these assumptions are
equivalent to a set-up in which a court simply monitors that no trade outside
of the contract terms occurs instead of enforcing trade according to the con-
tract. Deviating from HM’s assumptions, I show that if trade is voluntary but
renegotiation is not prohibited, contracts that fix the trade price ex ante may
not act as a reference point. Thus, the parties are indifferent between writing
a contract or solely relying on negotiation of the trade terms ex post. How-
ever, when parties have the option to take the case to the court, which enforces
compliance with the contract, contracts can in fact act as reference points. Ad-
ditionally, in contrast to HM’s findings, parties will not agree on a flexible con-
tract that only determines a price interval in the presence of the court. Hence,
parties will not incorporate flexibility into the contract to address uncertainty
about the state.
In order to analyse the effect that the presence of a court has on parties’ feel-
ings of entitlement and thus their shading decision, behavioural assumptions
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are necessary although this restricts the generalisability of the results. In the
main part of the paper, I utilise the conservative assumption that court’s deci-
sion does not change contractors’ reference points for feelings of entitlement.
In the appendix, I analyse the effects of alternative behavioural assumptions
where the contract is not the sole reference point and court’s decision affects
parties’ feelings of entitlement. I find that the results are qualitatively not in-
fluenced by these assumptions, but the price at which parties trade is affected.
The potential for renegotiation and hold-up is examined by Hart (2009) in
a model based on HM but which allows for high uncertainty about value and
cost. He shows that fixed price contracts are valuable in normal times whereas
in extreme states hold-up can occur causing deadweight losses. He proposes
that indexing the contract price to a verifiable signal related to industry con-
ditions and allocation of asset ownership can reduce hold-up incentives. So,
Hart (2009) addresses some of my concerns with HM but does not examine the
role of courts. Contract interpretation by courts would be especially interesting
in the case of indexation in his model. Renegotiation also plays an important
part in Halonen-Akatwijuka and Hart (2013). But they do not discuss interval
contracts and also do not examine the effect of courts on reference points and
renegotiation. Furthermore, they assume that renegotiation only takes place if
the contract price would not allow for mutual beneficial trade. I do not impose
this restriction. In their model, contractors feel entitled to a certain share of
the surplus from renegotiations but there is disagreement about the reference
point for the evaluation of this surplus. If a state arises that is not covered in
the contract, parties may choose different verifiable contingencies as the refer-
ence point for renegotiation. Thus, parties may sometimes decide to write less
complete contracts in order to avoid creating too many reference points.
The novelty of HM’s theory is that it explains contract formation in case of
contractual incompleteness in a model without ex ante, relationship-specific
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investment. In contrast, much of the incomplete contract theory literature fo-
cuses on an underinvestment problem and analyses solutions to the hold-up
problem.4 For instance, Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) focus on selfish invest-
ment (investment that affects the investor’s own profit) and argue that a sim-
ple contract that specifies price and quantity achieves first-best efficient invest-
ment. In contrast, Che and Hausch (1999) examine cooperative investment (in-
vestment that affects the opponent’s profit) and find that no contract decreases
investment inefficiencies.
Within these frameworks, Willington (2013) analyses the role of an imper-
fect court assuming that litigation is costly. He argues that courts decide on
all disputes, even related to unverifiable terms. If one party claims that the
opponent is breaching contractual terms, the court makes a decision on con-
tract breach without additional information about unverifiable variables and
independent of whether breach actually occurred or not. If courts decide that a
breach happened, parties are not committed to any transaction and the breach-
ing party has to pay liquidated damages as specified in the contract. Willington
(2013) shows that in the presence of such an imperfect court a simple contract
can achieve first-best in case of unverifiable cooperative investment whereas
not always in case of selfish investment. I follow Willington’s idea of an im-
perfect court although I assume a different source of imperfection because I
analyse a different type of contractual incompleteness. The court in my paper
does not make a decision on the non-contractual term, which is shading in my
model as opposed to investment, but on the trade price without observing the
4For the literature on the underinvestment problem, see, for example, Williamson (1985)
and Hart and Moore (1988). Relationship-specific investment is assumed to be unverifiable
and is thus not specified in the contract. However, investment decisions take place before
state uncertainty is resolved. Due to opportunistic behaviour in ex post negotiations, parties
may lose benefits from these investments. Therefore, incomplete contracts result in underin-
vestment (Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996). Regarding the hold-up problem, for instance, Aghion
et al. (1994), Chung (1991) and Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995) propose a solution based on con-
tracts that allocate bargaining power and thus specify the renegotiation game such that parties




The role of an imperfect and costly court is also discussed by Zhang and
Zhu (2000) in a simple procurement model where the buyer can behave op-
portunistically ex post. The court in their model resolves the price dispute on
the basis of receiving an informative but noisy signal about quality. They show
that as long as court’s decision is not arbitrary, first-best contingent contracts
are possible. In my analysis, however, court’s decision is completely indepen-
dent of the state and I examine contractors’ decision between flexible and fixed
price contracts in the presence of such a court.
Furthermore, contract enforcement and, in case of flexible contracts, con-
tract interpretation affect the ex ante contract choice in my model. An array of
literature focuses on the relationship between contract writing costs, contract
interpretation and contract formation. Shavell (2006) discusses a model with-
out relationship-specific ex ante investment where contractual incompleteness
arises from contracting costs. Contract interpretation is beneficial for contrac-
tors as it may improve on imperfect contracts but allows for less specific and
thus less costly contracts. Furthermore, he finds that the enforcement of con-
tracts as written is inferior to contract interpretation in which the court (some-
times) overrides general terms but interprets specific terms as written. The
set-up has similarities to mine as it does not consider investment and the court
enforces specific performance but has to identify what specific performance
means based on the contract. As opposed to my analysis where contracts are
by assumption incomplete, court costs are zero but contract writing costs are
positive. This affects the relationship between contract choice and court deci-
sion.
Heller and Spiegler (2008) is an extension of Shavell (2006) that focuses
on contracts with contradictions, i.e. intersecting events call for different ac-
tions. In contrast to my approach, they model a conflict of interest between
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contract writer and interpreter and analyse the optimal amount of contradic-
tions. Other literature that endogenises contractual incompleteness based on
complexity and cost of writing contracts are for example Battigalli and Maggi
(2002) and Kvaloy and Olsen (2009) which, opposed to my paper, do not allow
for contract interpretation and assume costless litigation.5
The literature on contract interpretation focuses on which rules the court
should follow to reach decisions, which breach remedies courts should employ
and how interpretation rules affect ex ante contract formation and investment.
Schwartz and Watson (2013) discuss the optimal interpretive rule for a legal
enforcer who is interested in maximising welfare over the set of contracting
relationships. They focus on the trade off between contract writing costs, liti-
gation and efficient ex ante investment. In contrast, I make assumptions about
courts’ decision rule and analyse the effects on contract choices and behaviour.
Stremitzer (2010) also compares different legal rules and examines their ef-
fect on incentives for cooperative investment and trade decisions. He shows
that expectation damages induce first-best and contracts are not useless as
found in Che and Hausch (1999). The result stems from the assumption that
if the court can observe whether trade took place it can verify that quality ex-
ceeds a certain minimum threshold. However, reliance and expectation dam-
ages are not feasible with unverifiable investment and parties might select spe-
cific performance due to lower informational requirements for courts. I do not
compare the impact of different breach remedies in this paper but assume that
the court enforces specific performance. Expectation damages are not feasi-
ble in my set-up with unverifiable states and reliance damages were similar to
voiding contracts as there are no reliance expenditures.
5Battigalli and Maggi (2002) distinguish two forms on contractual incompleteness, dis-
cretion (parties’ behaviour is not sufficiently specified) and rigidity (obligations are not suffi-
ciently state contingent), and describe the optimal contract. Kvaloy and Olsen (2009) focus on
repeated interactions where the principal can invest in the verifiability of agent’s actions by
drafting the contract such that the probability of verifiability is increasing in the investment in
contract specification.
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I also do not allow for voiding of the contract. Anderlini et al. (2007) and
Anderlini et al. (2011) discuss set-ups where voiding of contracts by a court
can be optimal. Anderlini et al. (2007) discuss court’s decision of voiding or
upholding contracts (but not interpreting them) in case that unforeseen and
non-contractual contingencies arise. The possibility of contract voiding is an
insurance against occurrence of unlikely states, whereas it lowers ex ante in-
vestment incentives. The court in their model can distinguish (but not per-
fectly observe) normal and exceptional states ex post and voids or upholds
the contract based on the severeness of the state. Subsequently, parties can
renegotiate. The source of contractual incompleteness, and thus the role of the
court, is different in my model. Ex ante contractors know all possible states
but states are unverifiable and contracts cannot be state contingent. In Ander-
lini et al. (2007), the contract does not contingent on all possible states and the
court needs to infer the intend of the parties not to follow the contract in ex-
treme states. Anderlini et al. (2011) analyse a setting with ex ante asymmetric
information on value and cost of trade among contractors. The court is void-
ing trading contracts with extreme prices (exceeding an announced price cap)
which can induce parties to reveal private information ex ante and thus be wel-
fare enhancing. In my analysis, information is symmetric, so the court’s role is
not to induce information revelation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 summarises HM’s
model and its findings. In section 2.3, I discuss HM’s assumptions related to
contractual incompleteness and contract enforcement and explain my addi-
tional assumptions when incorporating a court to HM’s model. Subsequently,
I investigate parties’ behaviour with different contracts and analyse parties ex
ante contract choice by focusing in section 2.4 on HM’s contract examples and
generalising the results to other possible contracts in Section 2.5. Section 2.6
compares my results with HM’s findings and examines how they depend on
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different assumptions. The last section concludes. An analysis with alterna-
tive behavioural assumptions on contractors’ reference points is provided in
the appendix.
2.2 Recapitulation of Hart and Moore (2008)
HM consider the relationship between a buyer (henceforth B and he) and a
seller (henceforth S and she) who want to trade a good or a service in exchange
for money. Initially, at date 0, the parties negotiate about the price and sign a
contract. Contract negotiations occur in a perfectly competitive environment
for buyers and sellers. At date 1, the contractors face bilateral monopoly and
trade.6 Furthermore, HM assume that information is symmetric, parties are
risk-neutral and not wealth constrained. At date 1, any uncertainty from date
0 is resolved.
At date 0, B and S can consent to three possible agreements. They can write
a simple contract which is an agreement to trade at a certain price p or a flexible
contract which is an agreement to trade at a price in a certain range [pl, ph].
Alternatively, the parties can decide not to sign a contract and simply reach an
“agreement to agree” with the opportunity to renegotiate in the future. HM
further assume that B’s value, denoted by v, and S’s cost, denoted by c, are
only observable to both parties but not verifiable to a third party. Thus, B and
S cannot write state contingent contracts. Furthermore, it is assumed that trade
is voluntary, which means that trade only occurs at date 1 if both parties want
it, irrespective of what has been specified in the contract. This assumption
raises the question whether simple and flexible contracts can be regarded as
binding and the agreement to agree as non-binding. I will get back to this
issue later.
6A possible explanation for the fundamental transformation in the trade relationship could
be unmodelled relationship-specific investment.
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For the reference point aspect of contracts to matter, HM assume that per-
formance has two parts, a judicially enforceable (‘perfunctory performance’)
and an unenforceable part (‘consummate performance’). Thus, trade is only
partially contractible. The cost of providing either form of performance is
assumed to be the same, hence both parties are initially indifferent between
them. However, given this indifference, it can be assumed that the contractors
will provide full performance if they feel well-treated and inferior performance
if they feel badly treated. HM take the view that parties feel well-treated if at
date 1, they receive what they feel entitled to. The sole reference point for these
feelings of entitlement is the best possible outcome permitted by the contract.
If parties feel badly treated, they are aggrieved and provide only inferior per-
formance, referred to as ‘shading’. Aggrievement is measured as the difference
between the trade terms that an agent faces versus what (s)he feels entitled to.
HM assume that $ 1 of aggrievement causes a psychic loss of $ θ, 0 < θ ≤ 1,
to the affected party. This pain is fully transferred back to the party causing it.
B and S feel aggrievement in the same way and make the shading decision si-
multaneously. Shading is assumed to be non-contractible and will not be part
of the contractual terms.
Consider the following example where value is v = 10 and cost is c = 0.
At date 0, the parties choose between signing no contract or a simple contract.
Without a contract, parties agree to agree later and implicitly consent that trade
at date 1 is possible at any price p between value and cost. Eventually, B and
S will negotiate to a certain price p̂ and trade. The best possible outcome for
B from this agreement is to trade at a price p = 0 and that is what he feels
entitled to. Hence, B is aggrieved by the difference (p̂ − 0) and shades by
θ(p̂ − 0), which lowers S’s payoff. However, S’s best possible outcome from
this agreement is trade at p = 10. S is aggrieved by the difference (10− p̂) and
shades on performance by θ(10 − p̂). Thus, B and S’s payoffs, UB and US , at
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date 1 are
UB = 10− p̂− θ(10− p̂)
US = p̂− θ(p̂− 0) .
Consequently, the total surplus W from trade is only given by
W = (1− θ)10.
If the parties agree on a simple contract at date 0, they fix the price p at a
level that reflects the competitive environment at date 0. Thus, the contract
formation is considered as fair and at date 1 there is no aggrievement and
no shading. The surplus from the trade is therefore W = 10. In a nutshell,
HM argue that simple contracts (i.e. contracts that fix a specific price) anchor
parties’ feelings of entitlement and thus lead to better trading outcomes.
In order to demonstrate the relevance of flexible contracts consider another
example with at date 0 uncertain cost and value, as summarised in Table 2.1.
state s1 s2
value (v) 9 20
cost (c) 0 10
Table 2.1: Uncertain value and cost example
When signing the contract at date 0, the parties know that at date 1 they can
face two different states of nature; s1 and s2. HM assume that value and cost
are observable to the contractors but due to the unverifiability of the states,
contracts cannot be state contingent. Furthermore, HM assume that trade at
date 1 is voluntary but renegotiation does not occur. Under these assumption,
“a simple contract [can] achieve first-best if (i) only v varies; (ii) only c varies;
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or (iii) the smallest element of the support of v is at least as great as the largest
element of the support of c” (Hart and Moore, 2008). This, however, is not the
case in the example presented in Table 2.1. Here, first-best outcomes cannot
be achieved by a simple contract because one party always has an incentive
to walk away from trade due to the voluntary trade assumption. A flexible
contract that specifies the price range [9, 10] can, however, achieve first-best.
Since trade is voluntary, S does not feel entitled to p > 9 in s1 as B would not
trade at a price that is higher than his value from the product. Similarly, B does
not feel entitled to p < 10 in s2 because the seller would not trade at a price that
does not cover her cost of production. In s1, parties will agree to trade at p = 9
and in s2 at p = 10. Hence, trade occurs in either state without aggrievement
and shading.
The timing of the game is summarised in Figure 2.1. The parties meet and
decide whether to sign no contract, a simple contract swith ps or a flexible con-
tract f with pf ∈ [pL, pH ]. Then the state of nature is realised. Without a con-
tract, the parties negotiate the pricing terms ex post. With a simple contract,
the parties either trade at ps or walk away from trade, whereas the contrac-
tors agree on a price within the price range with a flexible contract. Once the
trade terms are specified, both contractors determine their individual degree
of shading.
In general, HM argue that the contractors face a trade-off between writing
simple and flexible contracts. The latter allow for ex post adjustment of the
pricing terms to the realised state of nature but leave room for aggrievement
and detrimental shading. The former creates only one reference points for
feelings of entitlement but adjustments to the state are ex post not possible.
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The parties meet and
agree on no contract
or sign either a simple
contract with ps,
or a flexible contract






The parties negotiate to a price p
at which they trade and
determine the degree of shading.
simple
contract
The parties either do not trade
or agree to trade at ps, and
determine the degree of shading.
flexible
contract
The parties agree on a price
p̂ ∈ [pL, pH ] at which they trade
and determine degree of shading.
Figure 2.1: Timing in HM’s model
2.3 Introducing a court to HM’s model – assump-
tions
HM do not explicitly model a court of law and its effect on parties’ shading
behaviour and contract design decisions. In this section, I first examine how
HM’s assumptions can be translated into a model that explicitly incorporates
a court. Secondly, I explain which additional assumptions about the court are
necessary in order to achieve that parties can renegotiate and/or claim com-
pliance with the contract. Thirdly, I discuss additional assumptions about the
reference points that I make when incorporating a court to HM’s model. If and
how the results of HM’s model, as summarised above, change depending on
these assumptions is discussed in the next sections.
2.3.1 (Implicit) assumptions about contract enforcement in
HM’s model
Although HM do not explicitly model a court, they make some (implicit) as-
sumptions about a contract enforcing entity. In the following, I will examine
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how HM’s assumptions translate into a set-up with a court.
The underlying main assumption by HM is that states are unverifiable by
third parties. A court is not able to observe which state of nature has occurred.
Therefore, the parties cannot write state contingent contracts. This is the ba-
sis for the discussion on which contract type, simple or flexible contract, the
parties should utilise. But although the court cannot observe the state, it can
observe that a contract about the delivery of a product or service in exchange
for a price has been signed and whether such trade occurred or not. Thus,
HM assume that the delivery of performance is judicially enforceable. How-
ever, the level of performance is assumed to be non-contractible either because
it cannot be perfectly described or not perfectly observed by a court. There-
fore, contracts in this set-up are incomplete because states are unverifiable and
shading on performance is non-contractible. The parties can write a contract
specifying the delivery of a product in exchange for a price, but the state of
nature and shading cannot be part of the contractual terms.
HM’s (implicit) court assumption 1. Contracts are incomplete. The state of nature
is unverifiable and state contingent contracts are not possible. The level of performance
(shading) is non-contractible.
The court enforces ex post the delivery of performance in exchange for a
price that is in line with the contract terms if an agreement has been reached
ex ante. The court does not rule on the level of performance as it is not part of
the contract and the court is completely unaware of shading issues. Contract
enforcement is costless and occurs automatically.
HM’s (implicit) court assumption 2. The court costlessly and automatically en-
forces contracts.
HM’s (implicit) court assumption 3. The court enforces the delivery of perfor-
mance in exchange for a price that is not violating the contract terms. It does not rule
on the level of performance.
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Furthermore, HM assume that trade is voluntary. Combined with the as-
sumption that the court enforces the delivery of performance, this means that
the court must be willing to costlessly void contracts if one party demands it.
Since states are unverifiable, a court voids a contract without having informa-
tion on whether this is reasonable or not as it cannot observe contractors’ value
or cost from trade. HM also rule out renegotiation. This means that no trade
occurs after a contract is voided.
HM’s (implicit) court assumption 4. Trade is voluntary. A court costlessly voids
contracts if one contractor requests it.
HM’s (implicit) court assumption 5. Renegotiation is monitored and prohibited by
the court.
2.3.2 Additional assumptions about contract enforcement
By applying HM’s assumption to a model with a court, it becomes evident that
HM’s set-up is not very realistic. In the following, I explain which assumptions
I make about the court in order to address some of these issues.
For contract design and the effect of reference points to matter, I keep HM’s
assumptions about the contractual incompleteness. In general, it seems real-
istic to assume that in some circumstances contracts cannot be perfectly de-
scribed unless parties invest in the writing of contracts.7
Court assumption 1. Contracts are incomplete, see HM’s (implicit) court assump-
tion 1.
In contrast to HM, I do not assume that the court enforces contracts auto-
matically without claims being filed. In my model, at date 0, parties contract
upon the delivery of performance in exchange for a price. At date 1, parties
7See for example Shavell (2006), Kvaloy and Olsen (2009), Battigalli and Maggi (2002) for
analyses of contractual incompleteness due to complexity and cost of writing contracts.
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renegotiate and can either stick to the contractual terms or not. I assume that
B makes a first offer for the trade price, denoted by p̂. The price offer can be
equal or not to the contract price p. S can accept B’s price offer, start renegoti-
ation or decide to litigate. Assume that the renegotiated price leads to a 50/50
split of the surplus , i.e. p̂n = 0.5(v + c). If either party is unhappy with the
price at date 1, either p̂ or p̂n, (s)he can litigate. The court only becomes active
if at least one party files a law suit.
Furthermore, I assume that going to court is costly. Both parties have to pay
litigation cost e, for example because they have to prepare for trial and hire a
lawyer. Litigation costs have to be paid irrespective of court’s ruling. This is
close to the system in the US where litigation costs have to be paid by each
party individually. In contrast, in the UK the loser has to pay all legal fees in-
cluding the breach victim’s. Who pays the legal fees can also be part of court’s
ruling in civil law countries (for example Germany). My results do not quali-
tatively depend on how litigation costs are distributed among the contractors.
Court assumption 2. The court enforces the contract only if either contractor liti-
gates and both parties pay litigation cost e.
If a case is submitted to the court, the court observes the contract, the pro-
posed price p̂ and the fact that trade has not occurred yet. Given this infor-
mation, the court has to resolve the dispute. Note that I assume that the court
does not consider any additional evidence.8 For simplification, I assume that
the court imposes specific performance, meaning that it enforces the contract
as written if possible. In my set-up, one part of the trade is always contracted
upon, namely the provision of the good. Hence, I assume that the court always
ensures that trade takes place. However depending on the contract choice, the
8Posner (2005, p. 1598) argues that “party’s self-serving testimony that cannot be verified
because it concerns his state of mind or a conversation to which the only witness was the
other party to the contract [which] disagrees about what was said” should be excluded. In the
American system, contractual ambiguities are usually resolved without extrinsic evidence “by
making a ‘best guess’” (Posner, 2005, p. 1603).
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price is up to dispute and the court decides on the trade price. For example,
Ben-Shahar (2004) argues that parties are usually compelled by courts to stick
to agreements to agree. Some terms are deliberately left incomplete and open
for later agreement, such as the trade price with flexible contracts in this set-
up, but there is a commitment to be bound to the agreed-upon terms, which is
here the willingness to trade.
Court assumption 3. The court enforces the delivery of performance and makes a
decision about the contract price. It does not rule on the level of performance.
Based on (the interpretation of) the contract, courts have to decide on wheth-
er to request specific performance, void the contract or demand breach reme-
dies such as expectation, liquidated or reliance damages. If courts enforce spe-
cific performance, either party can demand performance as specified in the
contract. Demanding expectation damages means that the breaching party has
to pay damages such that the victim of breach is in the position he would have
been had the contract been performed. With reliance damages, the breach-
ing party compensates the victim of breach for any expenditures (for example
ex ante investment) made in reliance on contract performance (Shavell, 1980).
Parties can also specify in the contract liquidated damages, which have to be
paid in case of breach (Edlin and Schwartz, 2003).9
I assume that the court never voids the contract and that it does not award
damages. In practice, the typical default remedy is expectation damages. How-
ever, courts can enforce specific performance, especially when damages are
inadequate or goods are unique. Courts usually refrain from enforcing con-
tracts as written when specific performance is impossible or would cause se-
vere hardship (‘impracticability of performance’ and ‘frustration of purpose’)
or the contract is too vague (Avraham and Liu, 2006). Nevertheless, a small risk
9The optimality of different penalties is, for example, discussed by Edlin and Schwartz
(2003) and Liu and Avraham (2012). The impact of breach remedies on investment incentives
is analysed by Shavell (1980, 1984), Rogerson (1984) and Schweizer (2012).
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is usually not a cause for voiding of contracts (Anderlini et al., 2007). In this
example, no unforeseen contingencies arise and parties are ex ante aware of all
possible states of nature. Specific performance in this context is thus neither
impossible nor especially severe. Also, it is easier for the court to enforce con-
tracts as written than to estimate expectation damages in my set-up as value
and costs are unobservable to the court. The restrictions on court’s information
also make the determination of liquidated damages complicated. Contractors
are not allowed to specify damages above “a reasonable ex ante estimation of
the promisee’s expectation interest [which] thus prohibit penalties”(Edlin and
Schwartz, 2003). This would be difficult to prove in court. Furthermore, re-
liance damages are not relevant in this set-up as enforcing them would have
similar effects to the voiding of contracts as the parties do not undertake and
need to be compensated for reliance expenditures.
If parties write a simple contract (s) with price ps, the contract does not
leave room for interpretation and I assume that the court enforces the contract
price, i.e. ps = pc.10 A flexible contract, however, does not clearly specify
the price and thus calls for interpretation. I assume that the court randomises
within the price range specified in the contract, [pl, ph]. By doing so, the court
takes a relatively neutral position in contract enforcement. In practice, courts
follow different approaches in case of incomplete contracts. One is the contra-
proferentum penalty price, where the price is set biased against the party who
drafted the contract (Posner, 2005, p.1607). Whereas in the pro-defendant gap
filling approach, prices are enforced in favour of the defendant. In the legal
literature, advantages and disadvantages of either rule are discussed (see, for
instance, Ben-Shahar (2004) and Posner (2005)). I do not restrict the model
to either approach. The employed rule does not fundamentally change the
10As Posner (2005, p. 1582) argues: “The defendant may challenge the plaintiff’s interpreta-
tion of the contract rather than acknowledge the breach, but unless there is a real uncertainty
about meaning, the challenge will present no interesting question of interpretation.”
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results but the enforced price would be in favour of either party. Furthermore,
I assume that the court monitors that the parties obey its decision and that the
court does not become active if no contract has been signed.
Court assumption 4. The court enforces the contract as written and never voids
contracts. Thus, trade always takes place. The court enforces the contract price ps
when a simple contract s has been signed. If a flexible contract f has been breached,
i.e. p̂f 6∈ [pl, ph], the court randomly picks a price from the contract price range [pl, ph].
Otherwise, the court enforces the proposed price p̂f .
2.3.3 Assumptions about reference points
HM assume that the contractors feel entitled to the best possible outcome un-
der the contract. If no contract has been signed, they assume that the parties
feel entitled to the best possible outcome from negotiation.
HM’s reference point assumption 1. If a contract has been signed, the contractors
feel entitled to the best possible outcome under the contract. If no contract has been
signed, both parties feel entitled to the whole surplus from negotiation.
The presence of the court might affect contractors’ reference points for feel-
ings of entitlement. Whichever decision the court reaches, it is debatable how
the parties feel towards the court’s ruling. It appears reasonable to assume
that parties will not be aggrieved when the court enforces simple contracts as
written. However, the reference point for aggrievement is not clearly identifi-
able when the court settles flexible contracts. It is possible that parties regard
the original contract as a reference point and B is aggrieved by the difference
(pc − pl), whereas S is aggrieved by the difference (ph − pc). Also, the par-
ties could be pleased that the dispute is resolved by the court, who is due to
randomisation not on purpose deciding in favour of either party. Thus, it is
imaginable that the parties do not feel any aggrievement after court’s ruling
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and shading is completely eliminated. Alternatively, parties’ reference point
could change. It is possible that the contractors regard the at date 1 proposed
trade price, p̂, as the new reference point. Hence, the by the court enforced
price, pc, would lead to aggrievement by B of max[(pc − p̂), 0] and aggrieve-
ment by S of max[(p̂ − pc), 0].11 In the following, I assume that the contractors
reference points are solely based on the contract and do not change with or
without litigation. In the appendix of this chapter, I provide an analysis using
the other assumptions which do not qualitatively change the results.
Furthermore, it is possible that the conditions are such that either party
prefers to walk away from the contract at date 1 but that the opponent has
no incentives to litigate, because the litigation costs are too high compared to
the gains from litigation. In this case the parties will renegotiate in order to
receive a positive payoff. I assume that in such a case the parties feel entitled
to the best possible outcome from renegotiation because the contractual terms
are not realistically achievable.
Reference point assumption 1. The reference points for contractors’ feelings of
entitlement are based on the contract and do not change during litigation. If renegoti-
ation occurs, both parties feel entitled to the whole surplus.
2.4 Contract choice and shading in the presence
of the court – HM’s contract examples
In the following, I focus on the example from Table 2.1 and discuss how HM’s
analysis changes in the presence of a court. In this section, I consider the con-
tract examples used by HM. I analyse parties’ decisions to shade and to litigate
and examine parties’ ex ante contract choice. In the next section, I examine
11If pc > p̂, S receives more than she feels entitled to and does not shade whereas B is
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agree on no contract,
or sign either a simple
contract with ps,
or a flexible contract




offers trade at p̂.
S accepts. The parties decide
on shading and trade at p̂.
S walks away.
B bargains, the parties
agree on p̂n, decide on
shading and trade at p̂n.
B litigates, the court imposes
pc. The contractors decide
on shading, pay litigation
cost e and trade at pc.
S litigates, the court imposes pc. The
contractors decide on shading, pay
litigation cost e and trade at pc.
Figure 2.2: Timing in the model with a court
other contract options.
The timing of the game is summarised in Figure 2.2. At date 0, B and S meet
and decide whether to sign a simple (s) or flexible contract (f ), or to agree on
no contract (n). At date 1, any uncertainty is resolved and B offers to trade at
p̂. Subsequently, there are three options of how the game continues: 1) S can
accept the price offer p̂, the parties decide on the amount of shading and finally
trade at price p̂; 2) S can reject the price offer by threatening to walk away and
B can response to this by either renegotiating to a new p̂n or by going to court
and have the contract enforced; 3) S can litigate and have the contract enforced.
If either party decides to litigate, the court enforces the contract and decides
at which price, pc, the parties must trade. Subsequently, the parties decide on
shading, pay litigation cost e and trade at pc. Note that the litigation costs are
paid after parties’ shading decisions such that shading is only influenced by
the trade price.
Consider no contract. If the parties do not write a contract at date 0, they
agree to agree later and implicitly allow for trade to take place at any price
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between v and c. I assume that the court does not decide on a dispute when no
contract has been signed because it does not recognise that either party has a
claim. Thus, the parties have to solely rely on bargaining at date 1. The parties
may for example eventually agree on a 50/50 split as they are in a bilateral
monopoly at date 1, i.e. p̂n = 4.5 in s1 and p̂n = 15 in s2. Both parties feel
entitled to the whole surplus and B and S’s expected payoffs are
E[UB(p̂
n)] = E[US(p̂
n)] = Π1(1− θ)4.5 + Π2(1− θ)5 .
The expected total surplus is given by
E(W ) = Π1(1− θ)9 + Π2(1− θ)10 .
Consider a simple contract with ps = 9. Irrespective of the state of nature,
B has three options for his price offer at date 1. He can either offer exactly
what is written in the contract (p̂ = 9), less than what is agreed upon (p̂ < 9)
or more (p̂ > 9). B has no incentives to offer p̂ > 9. With a price offer p̂ = 9, S
has no incentive to go to the costly court which would enforce the same price,
pc = p̂ = 9. In this case, B and S’s payoff are U1B(p̂ = 9) = 0 and U
1
S(p̂ = 9) = 9
in s1 and U2B(p̂ = 9) = 11 and U
2
S(p̂ = 9) = −1.
If B offers p̂ < 9, S can litigate. The court would enforce pc = p̂ = 9 but
litigation cost e have to be paid. Thus, S is indifferent between going to court
or accepting if p̂ = 9− e. However, S is aggrieved by (p− p̂) = 9− (9− e) as she
gets less than specified in the contract. Thus, B’s payoff from offering p̂ = 9− e
isU1B(p̂ = 9−e) = 9−(9−e)−θ(e) = (1−θ)e in s1 andU2B(p̂ = 9−e) = 11+(1−θ)e
in s2.
If B offers p̂ < 9, S can walk away from trade and force B into renegotiation.
B has an incentive to go to court (c) to have the contract enforced when the
payoff is higher than under renegotiation. In s1, U1B(pc = 9, c) ≥ U1B(p̂n) holds
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if
(1 + θ)4.5 ≥ e . (2.1)
In s2, U2B(pc = 9, c) ≥ U2B(p̂n) holds if
(1 + θ)5 + 1 ≥ e . (2.2)
In this section, I assume that litigation costs are not very high such that con-
dition 2.2 and therefore also condition 2.1 holds. Thus, I am only considering
cases in which B always has an incentive to litigate if S walks away.
Given constraint 2.2 holds, B offers p̂s = 9−e as U iB(p̂s = 9−e) > U iB(p̂ = 9)
for i = 1, 2, and no party has an incentive to litigate. Note that I assume that
there is no negative shading, meaning that B is not providing better perfor-
mance because he has to pay less than he feels entitled to. Considering a sim-
ple contract with ps = 10 gives similar results. B offers p̂s = ps− e = 10− e and
given constraint 2.2 holds, nobody has an incentive to litigate.
Consider a flexible contract with pf ∈ [9, 10]. Likewise, B has three price
offer options at date 1, irrespective of the state of nature. If B offers p̂ = 9, S
can litigate. I assume that the court in this model decides that B did not breach
the contract because he chose a price within the contract price range [9, 10], see
court assumption 4. Thus, the court enforces pc = p̂ = 9. Anticipating this, no
party has an incentive to go to the costly court. Also, B has no incentives to
offer p̂ > 9.
However, if B offers p̂ < 9 and S litigates, I assume that the court decides
that the contract was breached because the proposed price lies outside the con-
tract price range. The court demands that trade takes place but has to decide
on the trade price. I assume that the court randomly picks a price from the con-
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tract price range [9, 10], see court assumption 4. If the parties consider the best
outcome under the contract as their reference point, see HM’s reference point
assumption 1, both will be aggrieved after court’s decision. B is aggrieved by
(pc−pl), whereas S is aggrieved by (ph−pc). S faces a trade-off in her litigation
decision. On the one hand, she can benefit from litigation as the court would
enforce a higher price (E(pc) = 9.5). On the other hand, she would face shad-
ing by B and has to pay litigation cost e. Therefore, S is indifferent between
going to court or not if the payoff from accepting p̂ is equal to the expected
payoff from going to court, i.e. if p̂f = 9.5− e− θ(9.5− 9) in s1. Her opponent
B is willing to offer p̂f = 9.5 − e − 0.5θ if the payoff is at least as high as the
payoff from offering p̂ = 9. This is the case in s1 (the same holds in s2) if
9− p̂f − θ(10− p̂f ) ≥ 9− 9− θ(10− 9)
e ≥ (1− θ)0.5 .
To summarise, when a flexible contract has been signed, at date 1 B offers
p̂feh = 9.5−e−0.5θ under relatively high litigation costs e ≥ (1−θ)0.5, whereas
he offers p̂fel = 9 under relatively low litigation costs e < (1 − θ)0.5. Note
that B’s price offer with flexible contracts is higher than with simple contracts,
p̂f > p̂s. Hence, if condition 2.2 holds, B has an incentive to litigate if S walks
away.
Compare the different contract options. Assume that the aforementioned
contracts are the only possible contracts. The parties have the choice between
no contract; writing a simple contract with ps = 9 and trade at p̂s = 9 − e;
writing a simple contract with ps = 10 and trade at p̂s = 10 − e; and writing
a flexible contract with pf ∈ [9, 10] that leads to trade at p̂feh = 9.5 − e − 0.5θ
if e ≥ (1 − θ)0.5 or trade at p̂fel = 9 if e < (1 − θ)0.5. In all cases, the con-
tractors do not litigate but the option of going to court affects the trade price.
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Note that with a flexible contract, the trade price is higher than with a simple
contract with ps = 9. The flexible contract gives B less incentives to undercut
the contractual (lower bound) price because the price enforced by the court is
in expectations E(pc) = 9.5 and the potential punishment is more severe with
flexible contracts.
Assume that the probability of both states occurring is equal, i.e. Π1 = Π2.
The total surplus given by the different contracts is presented in Table 2.2. It is
evident that the simple contract always yields a higher surplus than the flex-
ible contract as it leaves less room for shading. The surplus loss by θe with
simple contracts is less than with flexible contracts where S feels entitled to
ph = 10 but receives p̂f ≤ 9. Nevertheless, wasteful shading cannot be com-
pletely eliminated with simple contracts and simple contracts are second-best
contracts. If litigation costs are high, more specifically e ≥ (1 − θ)0.5, the sur-
plus is very low with flexible contracts. This is because B can undercut the
price heavily without incentivising S to go to court which increases shading.
Consequently, B’s payoff is the highest with a simple contract with ps = 9 but
he prefers a flexible contract over a simple contract with ps = 10. In contrast,
S is best off with a simple contract with ps = 10 but prefers a flexible contract
over a simple contract with ps = 9.
Proposition 2.1. In the presence of a court that enforces contracts as written and if
litigation costs are not very high, e ≤ (1 + θ)4.5, simple contracts are second-best
contracts. If the competitive environment at date 0 is such that B (S) chooses between
no contract, writing a simple contract with ps = 9, with ps = 10 or a flexible contract
























































































































































































































































































































































2.5 Contract choice and shading in the presence
of the court – all possible contracts
In the previous section, I focused on HM’s contract examples to illustrate the
role of courts in their analysis. In the following, I consider other possible con-
tracts. Which contract is written depends on the competitive environment at
date 0. First, I analyse which contract type is chosen if one party can unilat-
erally select it. Second, I examine the range of possible contract prices when
parties bargain in the contract writing stage. Third, I discuss comparative stat-
ics and how the contract prices are affected by changes in the litigation cost and
the shading parameter. Assume in the following that both states are equally
likely to occur, i.e Π1 = Π2.
2.5.1 Contractual terms if one party unilaterally imposes
them
In the previous section 2.4, I showed that B (S) prefers a simple contract with
ps = 9 (ps = 10) to a flexible contract with pf ∈ [9, 10]. Thus, B (S) also prefers
a simple contract with ps < 9 (ps > 10) to a flexible contract. If at date 0,
the competitive environment is such that one party can unilaterally choose the
contract type, (s)he proposes a simple contract with the price most favourable
to him/her that makes the opponent just indifferent to signing. The following
derives those boundaries on possible simple contracts. A simple contract with
ps is undercut by B at date 1 and leads to trade at p̂s = ps − e which makes S
indifferent to litigation.
Consider the case where B chooses the contract. If there are many sellers
but only one buyer, B chooses a simple contract with a very low price such
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that sellers are just indifferent to signing,
E[US(p
s)] = Π1(p
s − e− 0) + Π2(ps − e− 10) = 0
ps = 5 + e .
A simple contract with ps = 5 + e leads to trade at p̂s = 5. The difference
between contract and trade price results in shading by θe. Thus, the higher are
the litigation costs, the higher must be the contract price to compensate S for
the anticipated undercutting of the contract price at date 1. Also, the higher are
the litigation costs, the higher is the level of shading that B faces as a response
to undercutting. B is willing to write a contract with ps = 5 + e if the expected
payoff is higher than the expected payoff from relying on negotiation at date 1,
E[UB(p
s = 5 + e)] ≥ E[UB(p̂n)]
Π1(4− θe) + Π2(15− θe) ≥ Π1(1− θ)4.5 + Π2(1− θ)5
1 + θ
θ
4.75 ≥ e . (2.3)
In s1, with a simple contract with ps = 5+e, S gets a higher payoff than with
renegotiation and has no incentives to litigate when p̂s = 5. B has no incentive
to offer anything lower than p̂s = 5 as S would litigate. B and S’s payoffs are
UB(p
s = 5 + e, nc) = 4− θe and US(ps = 5 + e, nc) = 5, respectively.
In s2, S makes negative profit US(ps = 5 + e) = −5 but has no incentives to
litigate. She can, however, try to force B into renegotiation by walking away. B
has an incentives to litigate when
UB(pc = 5 + e, c) ≥ UB(p̂n)
20− (5 + e)− e ≥ (1− θ)5
5 + 2.5θ ≥ e . (2.4)
68
Therefore, if e ≤ 5 + 2.5θ < 1+θ
θ
4.75, a simple contract with ps = 5 + e leads to
trade at p̂s = 5 without litigation and renegotiation. If 5 + 2.5θ < 1+θ
θ
4.75 ≤ e,
B offers no contract and the parties rely on renegotiation at date 1.
If the litigation costs are such that condition 2.3 holds but 2.4 is not satisfied,
i.e. 5+2.5θ < e < 1+θ
θ
4.75, the parties’ behaviour depends on the realised state.
In s1, trade at p̂s = 5 occurs without litigation (because condition 2.3 holds).
In s2, S forces B into renegotiation by walking away and B has no incentive
to litigate (because condition 2.4 does not hold). Given that the parties can
anticipate renegotiation in s2, B can offer an even lower contract price (which





s′ − e) + Π2(1− θ)5 = 0
ps
′
= (1− θ)5 + e .
B is willing to offer a contract with ps′ = (1− θ)5 + e if
E[UB(p
s′ = (1− θ)5 + e)] ≥ E[UB(p̂n)]








4.75, B offers ps′ = (1 − θ)5 + e and in s1
trade occurs at p̂s′ = (1 − θ)5 without litigation or renegotiation whereas in s2





4.75, B offers no contract and the parties solely rely on renegotiation.
Note that no other contract does better than ps = 5 + e if condition 2.4 does
not hold. In order to make S indifferent to renegotiation, B could offer a higher
price p̂′ > p̂s. However, the price offer that would make S indifferent, p̂′ =
15− 5θ, makes B prefer the renegotiation outcome. On the other hand, B could
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sign a contract with S that make him just indifferent to litigate if S threatens to
walk away. However a contract with such a low price, ps = 15− e+ 5θ, would
not be accepted by S at date 0.
Consider the case where S chooses the contract. If S faces many buyers, she
will offer a simple contract with a price ps that makes B just indifferent to sign-
ing such that
E[UB(p
s)] = Π1(9− ps + e− θe) + Π2(20− ps + e− θe) = 0
ps = 14.5 + (1− θ)e .
Similar to above, S offers to write a simple contract with ps = 14.5 + (1− θ)e as
opposed to relying on negotiation at date 1 only if litigation costs are low and
condition 2.3 holds.
In s1, such a contract always leads to trade at p̂s = 14.5 − θe without
renegotiation or litigation because S is better off than under renegotiation,
US(p̂
s = 14.5 − θe) = 14.5 − θe ≥ US(p̂n = 4.5) = (1 − θ)4.5 and has an in-
centive to litigate if B walks away as US(pc = 14.5 + (1− θ)e, c) ≥ US(p̂n = 4.5)
if 10
θ
+ 4.5 > 1+θ
θ
4.75 ≥ e.
In s2, B has no incentive to walk away to force S into renegotiation as
UB(p̂
s = 14.5− θe) = 5.5 + θe ≥ UB(p̂n = 15) = (1− θ)5. S has either no incen-




2−θ , where S prefers renegotiation and B has no incentive to litigate,
US(p̂
s = 14.5−θe) < US(p̂n = 15) and UB(pc = 14.5+(1−θ)e, c) < UB(p̂n = 15).
However, although B has no incentive to litigate, he is willing to offer a higher
price in order to avoid renegotiation. The price offer p̂′ = 15 − 5θ at date 1
makes S indifferent to renegotiation US(p̂′) = US(p̂n = 15) = (1 − θ)5. B has
an incentive to offer this price p̂′ if UB(p̂′) ≥ UB(p̂n = 15), which holds for
(2−θ)5





> e > 5θ+0.5
2−θ ). B
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can anticipate he has to pay p̂′ > p̂s in s2 in this special case. However as B has
nevertheless (weakly) positive expected payoff for all e for which S wants to
offer a contract, E[UB] = Π1[UB(p̂s)] + Π2[UB(p̂s)] ≥ Π1[UB(p̂s)] + Π2[UB(p̂′)] ≥ 0
for 1+θ
θ
4.75 ≥ e, he is willing to sign a simple contract with ps = 14.5 + (1− θ)e.
Proposition 2.2. In the presence of a court that enforces contracts as written, the
parties write simple contracts if litigation costs are not very high, i.e. e ≤ 5 + 2.5θ
(if S decides on the contract e ≤ 1+θ
θ
4.75). Only simple contracts with prices
ps ∈ [5 + e, 14.5 + (1 − θ)e] induce participation by both parties and lead to trade
without renegotiation and litigation.
Under high litigation costs (1+θ
θ
4.75 ≤ e), the parties agree to agree later and
negotiate at date 1.
When B decides on the contract and for intermediate level of litigation costs
(5 + 2.5θ < e < 1+θ
θ
4.75), the parties write no contract (if 9.5θ−0.5
θ
< e) or do write a
contract with ps′ = (1− θ)5 + e (if e ≤ 9.5θ−0.5
θ
) but renegotiate in s2.
2.5.2 Contractual terms if parties bargain over them
The competitive environment at date 1 can also be such that buyers and sellers
bargain over the contract type and the pricing terms. Assume in the following
that condition 2.4 holds. As shown before, B strictly prefers a simple contract
with ps = 5 + e over a flexible contract with pf ∈ [9, 10], whereas S prefers the
flexible contract. B might be willing to offer S a higher price ps in the simple
contract in order to achieve an agreement on this contract type and to avoid
high shading levels from flexible contracts. In the following, consider the two
different levels of litigation costs that with flexible contracts affect B’s price
offer at date 1 (p̂fel and p̂
f
eh) and thus parties’ payoffs, as presented in Table 2.2.
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Consider relatively high litigation costs, e ≥ (1− θ)0.5. S is indifferent be-




s = psmin − e)]
Π1(9.5− e− 0.5θ) + Π2(−0.5(1 + θ)− e) = Π1(psmin − e) + Π2(psmin − e− 10)
psmin = 9.5− 0.5θ.
B’s expected payoff from concluding a simple contract with psmin = 9.5 − 0.5θ
is higher than the expected payoff from a flexible contract as
E[UB(p̂
s = psmin − e)] = Π1((1− θ)e− 0.5(1− θ)) + Π2(10.5 + 0.5θ + (1− θ)e)
E[UB(p̂
f
eh)] = Π1((1− θ)e− 0.5(1 + θ
2)) + Π2(10.5− 0.5θ2 + (1− θ)e),
E[UB(p̂
s = psmin − e)] > E[UB(p̂
f
eh)] .
However, there are simple contract prices that are so high that B prefers to
sign a flexible contract at date 0 and having the chance to offer p̂f ≤ 9 at date
1. B is indifferent between a simple contract with psmax and a flexible contract
with pf ∈ [9, 10], if
E[UB(p̂
s = psmax − e)] = E[UB(p̂
f
eh)]
Π1(9− psmax + (1− θ)e) + Π2(20− psmax + (1− θ)e) =
Π1((1− θ)e−0.5(1 + θ2)) + Π2(10.5 + (1− θ)e− 0.5θ2)









higher than the expected payoff from flexible contracts as
E[US(p̂
s = psmax − e)]) = Π1(9.5 + 0.5θ2 − e) + Π2(−0.5(1− θ2)− e)
E[US(p̂
f
eh)] = Π1(9.5− 0.5θ − e) + Π2(−0.5(1 + θ)− e),
E[US(p̂
s = psmax − e)]) > E[US(p̂
f
eh)] .
Therefore, under high litigation costs, B and S agree on a simple contract




both (weakly) prefer a simple over a flexible contract. Which contract price
the parties agree on depends on the competitive environment and contractors’
bargaining powers at date 0.
Consider relatively low litigation costs, e < (1− θ)0.5. S is indifferent be-




s = psmin − e)]
Π1(9) + Π2(−1) = Π1(psmin − e) + Π2(psmin − e− 10)
psmin = 9 + e .
B’s expected payoff from signing a simple contract with price psmin = 9 + e is
higher than the expected payoff from a flexible contract as
E[UB(p̂
s = psmin − e)] = Π1(−θe) + Π2(11− θe)
E[UB(p̂
f
el)] = Π1(−θ) + Π2(11− θ),
E[UB(p̂
s = psmin − e)] > E[UB(p̂
f
el)] .
B is indifferent between a simple contract with psmax and a flexible contract
73




s = psmax − e)]
Π1(−θ) + Π2(11− θ) = Π1(9− psmax + (1− θ)e) + Π2(20− psmax + (1− θ)e)
psmax = 9 + θ + (1− θ)e .
S’s expected payoff from signing a simple contract with psmax = 9 + θ+ (1− θ)e
is higher than with flexible contracts as
E[US(p̂
s = psmax − e)] = Π1(9 + θ(1− e)) + Π2(−1 + θ(1− e))
E[US(p̂
f
el)] = Π1(9) + Π2(−1),
E[US(p̂ = p
s
max − e)] > E[US(p̂
f
el)] .
Therefore, under relatively low litigation costs, B and S agree on a simple
contract with a price of at least psmin = 9 + e and at most psmax = 9 + θ+ (1− θ)e,
which makes both (weakly) prefer a simple over a flexible contract. Which
contract price the parties agree on depends on the competitive environment
and contractors’ bargaining powers at date 0.
Note that, for example if e ≥ (1−θ)0.5, both parties prefer a simple contract
with 9.5−0.5θ ≤ ps ≤ 9.5+0.5θ2 to a flexible contract with pf ∈ [9.5−0.5θ, 9.5+
0.5θ2]. The contractors prefer simple contracts to all other flexible contracts and
my results are not restricted to flexible contracts with pf ∈ [9, 10].
Proposition 2.3. In the presence of a court that enforces contracts as written under
not very high litigation costs, such that condition 2.4 holds, B and S can find a simple
contract that both (weakly) prefer to a flexible contract with pf ∈ [pL, pH ]. Under
relatively high litigation costs, e ≥ (1−θ)0.5, such a simple contract comprises a price
9.5− 0.5θ ≤ ps ≤ 9.5 + 0.5θ2. Under relatively low litigation costs, e < (1− θ)0.5,
such a simple contract comprises a price 9 + e ≤ ps ≤ 9 + θ + (1− θ)e.
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2.5.3 Contractual terms – comparative statics
Figure 2.3 depicts how the shading parameter θ and the litigation costs e affect
the range of simple contracts for which both contractors (weakly) prefer simple
over flexible contracts, assuming that litigation costs are not very high and
condition 2.4 holds.
Under relatively high litigation costs, e ≥ (1 − θ)0.5, represented in area
I, the contract price is not affected by changes in e (for same θ). The trade
price, however, decreases as e increases. With flexible contracts parties trade
at p̂feh = 9.5− e− 0.5θ. Since this price depends on the litigation costs, the par-
ties are aware that irrespective of the contract choice, litigation costs lower the
trade price and the simple contract that makes parties at least indifferent does
not depend on e. For same levels of e but different θ’s, the minimum of the
range of possible simple contract prices psmin decreases whereas the maximum
psmax increases. Less favourable prices make both parties indifferent between
simple and flexible contracts. This is because as θ increases shading with flex-
ible contracts becomes increasingly hurtful. Hence, the contract price ps that
makes B indifferent between simple and flexible contract increases in θ. S, on
the other hand, is aware that with flexible contracts, the trade price is decreas-
ing with θ as p̂feh = 9.5 − e − 0.5θ. This is because the higher is θ, the lower
are the incentives for S to go to court to claim E(pc) = 9.5 because B will be
aggrieved by this. Thus, the trade price that makes S just indifferent to litigate
with flexible contracts is lower the higher is θ.
Under relatively low litigation costs, e < (1 − θ)0.5, presented by area II,
the contract price directly depends on the litigation costs e (for same θ). With
a flexible contract, the contractors trade at p̂fel = 9. S is indifferent between a
flexible and a simple contract only if ps = 9 + e, thus only if the simple contract
accounts for the fact that the trade price p̂s is decreasing in litigation costs. B is







9 + e ≤ ps ≤ 9 + (1− θ)e+ θ
II
p̂fel = 9
9.5− 0.5θ ≤ ps ≤ 9.5 + 0.5θ2
I
p̂feh = 9.5− e− 0.5θ
Figure 2.3: Range of simple contracts for which both contractors (weakly) pre-
fer simple over flexible contracts depending on θ and e
contracts.
If going to court is costless, i.e. e = 0, B offers trade price p̂fel = 9 with
flexible contracts since otherwise S litigates to gain E(pc) = 9.5. S is indifferent
between the contract types when ps = 9 (p̂s = p̂fel = 9). B, however, prefers a
simple contract over a flexible as long as ps ≤ 9 + θ, as he avoids shading by
θ with simple contracts. Note that if e = 0, shading is completely eliminated
when the parties write a simple contract as the contract price equals the trade
price. Thus, the total surplus is maximised atE(W ) = Π19+Π210 with a simple
contract when litigation is costless.
2.6 Discussion of the results
In this section, I discuss the results and compare how the assumptions in HM’s
and my analysis, specifically on voluntary trade, renegotiation and shading,
affect the contract choice and conclusions about reference points for feelings of
entitlement.
Consider a set-up in which shading is never occurring and where litigation
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costs are really high, i.e. θ = 0 and e → ∞. In such a setting, a contract
is not necessary to decrease shading. Also, courts would not be involved in
either enforcing contracts or prohibiting renegotiation. Hence, the parties do
not have incentives to write contracts at date 0 but rely on agreements to agree
later and negotiation at date 1.
In contrast, consider θ > 0 and e→∞. Thus, shading is possible. However,
since litigation is unaffordable, trade is voluntary and renegotiation cannot be
prohibited. Thus, instead of assuming voluntary trade by not allowing for a
court as HM did, voluntary trade occurs in the presence of a court if litiga-
tion costs are set very high. Since shading is an issue, one could argue that
the parties want to write a contract to anchor parties’ feelings of entitlement.
However, take the example from Table 2.1 and assume that the parties have
agreed on a simple contract with ps = 9. Say at date 1, s2 is realised. Since
trade is voluntary and renegotiation is not prohibited, S has no incentives to
trade at ps = 9 given that her costs are c(s2) = 10 and she would rather walk
away from trade. Consequently, B and S start to renegotiate and eventually
agree on some price p̂ ∈ [10, 20]. The parties can anticipate this ex ante. Thus,
it is questionable whether a simple contract actually does anchor parties’ feel-
ings of entitlement in the absence of a (affordable) court. Alternatively, parties
could feel entitled to the best possible outcome of the renegotiation process
at date 1, which in s2 would be p = 20 for S and p = 10 for B. This creates
room for aggrievement and a simple contract does not eliminate shading. At
date 0, the parties are indifferent between not contracting and writing a simple
contract. Hence, HM’s result that contracts are reference points for feelings of
entitlement rely on the assumption of voluntary trade in combination with the
assumption that courts automatically enforce simple contracts and renegotia-
tion is prohibited.
In the analysis of Section 2.3, I assume that shading is an issue and that
77
trade is not necessarily voluntary because the contractors can litigate, i.e. θ > 0
and e is small or zero. Renegotiation is also not ruled out. Under additional
assumptions about the court, I argued that simple and flexible contracts can
both always be enforced. Furthermore, I showed that both parties prefer writ-
ing simple and flexible contracts to no contracts. I also showed that simple
contracts lead to shading by only θe whereas flexible contracts induce more
shading. I concluded that the parties always agree on a simple contract as
there always exists a simple contract that makes both parties (weakly) prefer
simple over flexible contracts if there is a court (costly or not) that enforces
contracts as written.
My analysis suggests that renegotiation does make a difference for the re-
sults. However, in addition to voluntary trade and shading, HM assume that
renegotiation does not occur and thus do not examine the effect that renegotia-
tion has on contractors’ feelings of entitlement. But if trade is in fact voluntary,
because litigation costs are very high, why should renegotiation not occur or
how should renegotiation be prohibited? A necessary (or implicit) assumption
in HM’s set-up is that contracts are not only a benchmark for feelings of enti-
tlement influencing non-contractable performance but also make parties stick
to the contractable terms and not to renegotiate even in the absence of a court.
This, however, would be a very much stronger behavioural assumption than
found in the literature.
One could argue that given renegotiation is possible in my set-up, the con-
tractors feel entitled to the best possible outcome from renegotiation. However
as opposed to HM’s set-up, in the presence of a court, the contract limits the
possible trade prices that the court would enforce. Hence, my analysis sub-
stantiates where contractors’ feelings of entitlement from contracts are coming
from. The parties feel entitled to the best possible outcome that the court can
impose based on the contract. Thus, contract enforcement is crucial for the
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creation of reference points. My assumptions about (in-)voluntary trade and
renegotiation are in line with the legal literature, see the discussion in Sec-
tion 2.3.2. With flexible contracts, the trade price is deliberately left incomplete
whereas there is a commitment to trade. So flexible contracts, as well as simple
contracts, can be enforced. However, courts do not become active if no party
decides to litigate and do not automatically enforce contracts.
A similar set-up to mine is utilised by Halonen-Akatwijuka and Hart (2013)
although they only allow for renegotiation if ps > v or ps < c. If trade is volun-
tary and renegotiation cannot be prohibited, restricting renegotiation to these
cases is not realistic. Consider the example where parties write a simple con-
tract with ps = 9 at date 0 and s1 is realised with v(s1) = 9 and c(s1) = 0 at
date 1. B is indifferent between trade at p = 9 and no trade. However, he may
feel entitled to renegotiation and a lower price. So even in this case, a simple
contract may not eliminate shading. A necessary (or implicit) assumption is
that states are ex ante unverifiable but that a court can ex post observe v and
c and thus void contracts when ps > v or ps < c but enforcing contracts oth-
erwise. However, since the contractors are ex ante aware of all possible states,
the court would not necessarily void the contract, see the discussion in Section
2.3.2. Furthermore, if ex post courts can observe v and c then the parties have
no incentives to write other than state-contingent contracts.
My analysis relies on behavioural assumptions about how parties develop
reference points and how they feel and behave when they receive less than
what they feel entitled to. To check the robustness of my results, I analyse
my hypotheses employing different behavioural assumptions in the appendix.
The results do not qualitatively depend on the assumptions. Merely the range
of possible contract prices changes.
Furthermore, this paper very much relies on HM’s example where the cost
in one state is higher than the value in another state. The argument, that
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with renegotiation and voluntary trade contracts are not likely to be reference
points, holds also for other examples where the smallest possible value of trade
is at least as high as the largest possible cost.12 I argue that in order for con-
tracts to be reference points, a not too costly court or any other trusted third
party needs to be present. The analysed choice of contracts and specifically
the decision between flexible and simple contracts is relevant only in similar
set-ups. However, my initial goal was to show that it matters whether courts
are explicitly modeled or not. It is not always reasonable to assume that courts
are either blindly and costlessly enforcing complete contracts or are not active
at all in case of incomplete contracts. I examined one example with contractual
incompleteness where the presence of a court affects parties’ ex ante contract
choice and their behaviour ex post. It would be very interesting to further anal-
yse this interplay in different set-ups and with different forms of contractual
incompleteness.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I discuss the role that a contract enforcing court plays for con-
tracts to serve as reference points based on HM’s model. I assume that the
contractors have the option to claim compliance with the contractual terms but
also have the option to renegotiate. If litigation costs are not too high, the par-
ties feel entitled to the best possible outcome that a court can enforce and not
to the best possible outcome from ex post renegotiation, as it would be the case
in HM’s set-up without prohibiting renegotiation. As long as litigation costs
are not too high, parties always write contracts. Simple contracts restrict the
possible court decisions to a single price whereas flexible contracts give courts
some discretion over the enforced price. Thus, flexible contracts leave more
12In all other examples where trade is efficient in each state, flexible contracts are not nec-
essary in HM’s basic model as the contractors can always find a first best simple contract.
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room for aggrievement and lead to more shading on performance. I show that
the parties always agree on a simple contract where the fixed price reflects the
competitive environment at date 0. Simple contracts reduce the level of waste-
ful shading but, nevertheless, do not eliminate shading completely. The higher
the litigation costs are, the more shading occurs. The downside of simple con-
tracts in the presence of a court is that the parties are not able to incorporate
flexibility into the contracts and are thus not able to adjust ex post to ex ante
uncertain states of the world.
HM’s theoretical predictions were tested and supported in several experi-
ments, for example by Fehr et al. (2009), which utilised a similar set-up. It is
desirable to run similar experiments but in the presence of a contract enforc-
ing institution and to examine if and how the results differ and whether my
predictions hold. In addition, it would be interesting to test which of my be-
havioural assumptions comes closest to how parties form reference points and
to analyse whether reference points can change when a third party is involved.
This paper showed that the presence of a court affects parties’ ex ante con-
tract choice and ex post behaviour under contractual incompleteness. It is thus
one step towards understanding the relationship between contract interpreta-
tion by a court, which depends inter alia on the type of contractual incomplete-
ness, and contract formation. One could further pursue this analysis and ex-
amine in more detail how the ex ante use of specific or general terms as well as
deliberate contractual gaps can be explained by ex post contract interpretation.
Halonen-Akatwijuka and Hart (2013) work along these lines but do not incor-
porate an active court of law and solely rely on how these different types of
contract terms affect ex post renegotiation. Furthermore, it would be valuable
to investigate how a court decides if it observes that parties had an agreement
but no explicit contract was concluded (verbal contract) and how this affects
ex ante contract formation. I assume in this paper that the court does not make
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any decisions in this case. In practice, however, verbal contracts are commonly
used, especially for fairly simple trade relationships without high stakes.
Moreover, I assume throughout the paper that the parties are risk neutral.
The analysis most likely changes if the contractors are risk-averse. On the one
hand, I expect risk aversion to increase parties’ preference for contractual flex-
ibility in order to be able to adjust to ex ante uncertain states of nature. On the
other hand, risk aversion will decrease parties’ incentives to go to court, espe-
cially if contracts are incomplete and court’s ruling is not perfectly predictable,
and thus also influence pre-trial renegotiations. Pursuing to merge the ideas
of contract interpretation from the legal literature and the aspects of incom-




2.A Alternative reference point assumption 2:
The price offer as the reference point
In this section, I use the same example than in the main part of the paper, see
Table 2.1, but I assume that the reference point can change when the contrac-
tors litigate.
Assumptions. In the model of Section 2.4, I assume that the contract written
at date 0 is the reference point for feelings of entitlement at date 1, irrespective
of whether litigation occurs or not, see reference point assumption 1. Alterna-
tively, I assume that if B offers p̂ at date 1 and S litigates, the reference point for
feelings of entitlement is the price offer at date 1, p̂, and not the original con-
tract. At date 1, the parties argue about the trade price and if one party is not
happy, (s)he can litigate. The price enforced by the court, pc, compared to the
price offer, p̂, can be the same, or higher for one and lower for the other party.
Thus, it is possible that one party is pleased that the court settled the dispute
in its favour and is not aggrieved even if the contract promised him/her a bet-
ter trade outcome. Shading still occurs because the court resolves the dispute
against the other party.
Reference point assumption 2. The reference point for contractors’ feelings of en-
titlement after litigation is B’s price offer p̂ before litigation at date 1.
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Furthermore, for simplification assume that at date 1, S has only two op-
tions. She can either 1) accept B’s price offer p̂; or 2) litigate. Hence, she does
not have the option to walk away and force B into further renegotiation. The
main results are not affected by this assumption, however more restrictions on
the litigation cost e are necessary without this additional assumption.
Consider a simple contract with ps. B always offers p̂s = ps − e and parties
do not litigate similarly to the analysis in Section 2.4.
Consider a flexible contract with pf ∈ [9, 10]. B has three options for price
offers at date 1. In the following, I focus on s1 but the results similarly hold in
s2. If B offers p̂f = 9, S can litigate. The court decides that B did not breach the
contract and enforces pc = 9. S’s reference point for aggrievement is B’s price
offer at date 1 p̂f = 9 (instead of ph as in the analysis in Section 2.4). If B offers
p̂f = 9 and the parties go to court (c) which enforces pc = p̂f = 9, S and B’s
payoffs are
US(p̂
f = 9, pc = 9, c) = 9− e− θ(9− 9) = 9− e
UB(p̂
f = 9, pc = 9, c) = 9− 9− e− θ(9− 9) = −e .
If B offers p̂f = 9 but the parties do not go to court (nc), the reference point is
the contract and the payoffs are
US(p̂
f = 9, nc) = 9− θ(9− 9) = 9
UB(p̂
f = 9, nc) = 9− 9− θ(10− 9) = −θ .
In this case, S has no incentives to litigate as she cannot achieve a higher price
but pays litigation costs. However, B has an incentive to go to court if θ > e.
Thus, if the litigation costs are low relative to the shading parameter, B can use
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the court to eliminate shading. The court in this case ‘convinces’ S that p̂f = 9
is a reasonable price offer based on the signed contract.
B has no incentives to offer p̂f > 9 but might have an incentive to offer
p̂f < 9. With p̂f < 9, S may want to litigate. The reference point for S’s ag-
grievement after the court’s decision is p̂f . S is indifferent to litigation if the
payoff with p̂f is equal to the expected payoff from litigation with enforced
price E(pc) = 9.5, i.e. if
US(p̂
f , nc) = E[US(p̂
f , pc, c)]
p̂f = 9.5− e− θ(9.5− p̂f )
p̂f = 9.5− e
1− θ
.
If B offers p̂f = 9.5− e
1−θ , neither contractor litigates and S’s reference point for
aggrievement is ph. Whether B is willing to offer p̂f = 9.5− e1−θ depends on the
litigation costs relative to the shading parameter. If θ < e, B decides between
offering p̂f = 9 and no litigation or p̂f = 9.5− e
1−θ . If θ > e, B chooses between
offering p̂f = 9 and litigation or p̂f = 9.5− e
1−θ .
For θ < e, B offers p̂f = 9.5− e
1−θ if
UB(p̂
f = 9.5− e
1− θ
, nc) ≥ UB(p̂f = 9, nc)
9− p̂f − θ(10− p̂f ) ≥ 9− 9− θ(10− 9)
e ≥ (1− θ)0.5 .
For θ > e, B offers p̂f = 9.5− e
1−θ if
UB(p̂
f = 9.5− e
1− θ
, nc) ≥ UB(p̂f = 9, c)
9− p̂f − θ(10− p̂f ) ≥ 9− 9− θ(9− 9)
e ≥ (1 + θ)0.25 .
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Consequently, there are four cases and B’s price offer and litigation deci-
sions depend on the shading parameter and the litigation costs. Table 2.3 pro-
vides an overview over the cases and B’s choices, which are also illustrated in
Figure 2.4.
Conditions Price offer p̂f Litigation?
Case I: θ > e and e ≥ (1 + θ)0.25 p̂f = 9.5− e
1−θ no
Case II: θ > e and e ≤ (1 + θ)0.25 p̂f = 9 yes (pc = 9)
Case III: θ < e and e ≥ (1− θ)0.5 p̂f = 9.5− e
1−θ no
Case IV: θ < e and e ≤ (1− θ)0.5 p̂f = 9 no
Table 2.3: B’s price offer and litigation choice under flexible contracts (reference
point assumption 2)
Flexible contract with pf ∈ [9, 10]
Cases E(UB) E(US) E(W )
I & III
Π1(e− 0.5(1 + θ))+ Π1(9.5− e1−θ )+ Π1(9− θ(0.5 +
e
1−θ) ))+
Π2(10.5 + e− 0.5θ) Π2(−0.5− e1−θ ) Π2(10− θ(0.5 +
e
1−θ ))
II Π1(−e) + Π2(11− e) Π1(9− e) + Π2(−1− e) Π1(9− 2e) + Π2(10− 2e)
IV Π1(−θ) + Π2(11− θ) Π1(9) + Π2(−1) Π1(9− θ) + Π2(10− θ)
Simple contract with ps
Cases E(UB) E(US) E(W )
all
Π1(9− ps + (1− θ)e)+ Π1(ps − e)+ Π1(9− θe)+
Π2(20− ps + (1− θ)e) Π2(ps − e− 10) Π2(10− θe)
Table 2.4: Expected payoffs and total surplus with different contract types un-
der different conditions (as identified in Table 2.3)
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Compare the contract options. The parties have the choice between signing
a simple contract with ps but trading at p̂s = ps−e or signing a flexible contract
with pf ∈ [9, 10] and trading at p̂f with or without litigation according to Table
2.3. Table 2.4 provides an overview over B and S’s payoffs and the total surplus
with the different contract types under the different conditions identified in
Table 2.3.
One party always strictly prefers to write a simple contract and may be
willing to offer the opponent a more beneficial price to avoid a flexible contract.
In the following, I analyse which contract prices with simple contracts make
both parties (weakly) prefer simple over flexible contracts. Which contract the
parties write depends on the competitive environment at date 0.
In case I and III, B is indifferent between a flexible contract and a simple
price contract with psmax = 9.5− θ(e− 0.5). S is indifferent if psmin = 9.5− θ1−θe.
Thus, a simple contract with 9.5 − θ
1−θe ≤ p
s ≤ 9.5 − θ(e − 0.5) makes both
parties (weakly) prefer a simple over a flexible contract, in case I and III. Note
that ps < 9 if e > 0.5(1+θ)
θ
, ps > 9 if e < 0.5(1−θ)
θ
and the price can be below or
above 9 if 0.5(1+θ)
θ
> e > 0.5(1−θ)
θ
. Furthermore, if ps is very low in case I and III,
namely ps < 5 + e, S will not want to write a contract.
In case II, B is willing to offer S a simple contract with a price up to
psmax = 9 + e(2 − θ) to avoid a flexible contract. The parties agree on a fixed
price contract with 9 ≤ ps ≤ 9 + e(2− θ). Similarly in case IV, the parties agree
on a simple price contract with 9 + e ≤ ps ≤ 9 + (1− θ)e+ θ. In case II and IV,
trade at any price in the derived range are in expectation better for both parties
than no trade and the outside option of zero. Given the different conditions,
the parties agree on different prices when writing a simple contract. Table 2.5
provides an overview of the possible contract prices in simple contracts under
the different conditions, which are illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Proposition 2.4. If parties’ reference points for feelings of entitlements change to-
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wards the price offer p̂ after litigation, there exists a simple contract with ps which















Figure 2.4: Different conditions depending on θ and e (reference point assump-
tion 2)
Case Simple contract with psmin ≤ ps ≤ psmax
I & III 9.5− θ
1−θe ≤ p
s ≤ 9.5− θ(e− 0.5)
II 9 ≤ ps ≤ 9 + (2− θ)e
IV 9 + e ≤ ps ≤ 9 + (1− θ)e+ θ
Table 2.5: Simple contracts with ps that make both parties (weakly) prefer sim-
ple over flexible contracts (reference point assumption 2)
Comparative Statics. Figure 2.4 depicts the different conditions the contrac-
tors can face. The range of simple contract prices that make both parties (weak-
ly) prefer a simple over a flexible contract differ depending on whether the
parties trade in an environment such as area I, II, III or IV in Figure 2.4.
Assume that the parties face low litigation cost e such that depending on
θ they are in area IV or II. psmin and psmax are both lower in area II, i.e. when
θ is relatively high. This is the case because in area II, B would litigate with
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a flexible contract in order to eliminate shading. Hence, B can ask for a price
lower by e with a simple contract. On the other hand, B faces a trade-off be-
tween eliminating shading completely but paying litigation costs with flexible
contracts and facing shading by θe but saving litigation costs with simple con-
tracts. Since in area II, the shading parameter is relatively high compared to
the litigation costs, a simple contract with a lower price makes him indifferent.
Assume that the parties face relatively high litigation costs such that de-
pending on θ, they are in area III or I. If θ is high, psmin can get (very) low, i.e.
less than 9. If θ is small, psmin is above 9. In general, psmin and psmax are higher in
in area III than in area I. The trade price with flexible contracts, p̂f = 9.5− e
1−θ ,
decreases as θ increases. This is because S faces shading by B of θ(9.5 − p̂f )
if she litigates. Thus, S has less incentives to go to court and B can lower p̂f
further. The lower is the price offer with flexible contracts, the lower is also
psmin, the contract price in simple contracts that makes S indifferent. Similarly,
the contract price that makes B indifferent, psmax, is decreasing as θ increases,
because flexible contracts allow him to trade at a relatively low price.
For a given low level of θ, as e increases, psmin and psmax both increase com-
paring area II, IV and III. But also the difference between the contract price and
the price offer increases as e increases. In area II, S’s payoff would be lower by
e because B litigates, thus lower simple contract prices make her indifferent
than in area IV. For even higher e, comparing area IV and III, B can offer lower
prices with flexible contracts and thus psmin is lower. Focusing on a high level
of θ, changes in e have ambiguous affects on psmin and psmax, comparing area II
and I & III. For example, if e is very high, i.e. e > 0.5(1+θ)
θ
, the simple contract
price ps is lower than 9 and if e is low, i.e. e < 0.5(1−θ)
θ
, ps is higher than 9 .
Conclusion. The alternative assumption, that buyer’s price offer at date 1 is
the reference point for feelings of entitlement after litigation, does not change
the result that the parties can find a simple contract that both (weakly) prefer
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over a flexible contract. Furthermore, I find that if this assumption holds, the
buyer can strategically use litigation to reduce shading when litigation costs
are small and shading is not a very minor issue (case II).
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2.B Alternative reference point assumption 3:
Court’s decision eliminates aggrievement
In this section, I use the same example than in the main part of the paper, see
Table 2.1, but I assume that the parties believe in the fairness of the court and
are not aggrieved after court’s decision.
Assumptions. If B offers p̂ at date 1 and the parties trade at this price, assume
that the contract signed at date 0 is the reference point for feelings of entitle-
ment and shading occurs. It is imaginable that if one party litigates, the price
pc enforced by the court is seen as a fair trading price and no party shades on
performance. The parties are happy that the court settles the dispute and are
not aggrieved even if the contract promised a better trade outcome.
Reference point assumption 3. Without litigation, the contractors feel entitled to
the best possible outcome under the contract. However, contract enforcement by the
court completely eliminates aggrievement and shading.
Furthermore, for simplification assume that at date 1, S has only two op-
tions. She can either 1) accept B’s price offer p̂; or 2) litigate. Hence, she does
not have the option to walk away and force B into further renegotiation. The
main results are not affected by this assumption, however more restrictions on
the litigation cost e are necessary without this additional assumption.
Consider a simple contract with ps. B always offers p̂s = ps− e and no party
has an incentive to litigate.
Consider a flexible contract with pf ∈ [9, 10]. B has three options of price
offers at date 1. In the following, I focus on s1 but the results similarly hold
in s2. If B offers p̂f = 9, and the case is taken to the court, the court enforces
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pc = 9. S has no incentive to litigate as U
f
S (p̂ = 9, nc) = 9 if the court is not
involved (nc) whereas U fS (p̂
f = pc = 9, c) = 9 − e if the court is involved (c).
However, shading can be completely eliminated by letting the court decide on
the trade price. B has an incentive to litigate if
U fB(p̂ = pc = 9, c) > U
f
B(p̂ = 9, nc)
9− 9− e > 9− 9− θ(10− 9)
θ > e .
Thus, if litigation costs are low in relation to the shading parameter, B can use
litigation to eliminate shading completely.
B has no incentive to offer p̂f > 9. If B offers p̂f < 9, he wants to avoid
litigation as the court would decide that he breached the contract and impose
E(pc) = 9.5. In order to make S indifferent to litigation, B offers
US(p̂
f , nc) = US(p̂
f , E(pc) = 9.5, c)
p̂f = 9.5− e ,
as long as e < 0.5. If e > 0.5, offering p̂f = 9 is optimal for B. B’s payoff from
offering p̂f = 9.5− e and not going to court is
UB(p̂ = 9.5− e, nc) = 9− (9.5− e)− θ(10− (9.5− e)) = (1− θ)e− (1 + θ)0.5 .
If θ > e and with flexible contracts, B chooses between offering p̂f = 9 and
litigation or offering p̂f = 9.5− e and no litigation. B offers p̂f = 9.5− e if
UB(p̂
f = 9.5− e, nc) ≥ UB(p̂f = pc = 9, c)
(1− θ)e− (1 + θ)0.5 ≥ −e




B is indifferent to the contract type with psmin = 9 + (1 + θ)0.5, S is indifferent
with psmax = 9.5. If θ > e but e <
(1+θ)0.5
2−θ , B offers p̂
f = 9 with flexible contract
and litigates. In this case, B is indifferent to the contract type with psmin =
9 + (2− θ)e and S is indifferent with psmax = 9.
If θ < e and with flexible contracts, B does not litigate and chooses between
offering p̂f = 9 or p̂f = 9.5− e. B selects p̂f = 9.5− e if
UB(p̂
f = 9.5− e, nc) ≥ UB(p̂ = 9, nc)
(1− θ)e− (1 + θ)0.5 ≥ −θ
e ≥ 0.5 .
B is indifferent to the contract type if psmin = 9 + (1 + θ)0.5 and S is indifferent
if psmax = 9.5. If θ < e and e < 0.5, B offers p̂f = 9 with flexible contracts. In
this case, B is indifferent to the contract type if psmin = 9 + (1− θ)e+ θ and S is
indifferent if psmax = 9 + e.
Consequently, there are four cases, as illustrated in Figure 2.5, and B’s price
offer and litigation decisions depend on the shading parameter and the litiga-
tion costs, see Table 2.6 for an overview. Depending on B’s decisions under
flexible contracts, the prices in simple contracts that make the parties at least
indifferent between the contract types differ, as presented in Table 2.7.
Proposition 2.5. If litigation can eliminate aggrievement completely, there exists a
simple contract with ps which both parties (weakly) prefer over a flexible contract with
pf ∈ [9, 10].
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Conditions Choice of p̂f Litigation?
Case I: θ > e and e > (1+θ)0.5
2−θ p̂
f = 9.5− e no
Case II: θ > e and e < (1+θ)0.5
2−θ p̂
f = 9 yes (pc = 9)
Case III: θ < e and e > 0.5 p̂f = 9.5− e no
Case IV: θ < e and e < 0.5 p̂f = 9 no
Table 2.6: B’s price offer and litigation choice under flexible contracts (reference
point assumption 3)
Case Simple contract with psmin ≤ ps ≤ psmax
I & III 9.5 ≤ ps ≤ 9 + (1 + θ)0.5
II 9 ≤ ps ≤ 9 + (2− θ)e
IV 9 + e ≤ ps ≤ 9 + (1− θ)e+ θ
Table 2.7: Simple contracts with ps that make both parties (weakly) prefer sim-












Figure 2.5: Different conditions depending on θ and e (reference point assump-
tion 3)
94
Comparative Statics The range of possible simple contract prices that make
both parties (weakly) prefer simple over flexible contracts depend on whether
parties trade in an environment such as area I, II, III or IV in Figure 2.5, de-
termined by litigation costs e and shading parameter θ. Both parties are better
off signing a simple contract with any price in the derived ranges presented in
Table 2.7 than without trade and outside option of zero.
Consider low levels of litigation costs (e < 0.5) and interaction in area II
and IV depending on θ. In both areas, B offers p̂f = 9 with flexible contracts. In
area II, B litigates with flexible contracts because e is low and he can eliminate
(high) shading with litigation. Thus, S has to pay e with flexible contracts in
area II but not in IV. A simple contract with a lower price makes her indifferent
and psmin is lower in area II. In contrast, psmax is higher in II, because B is willing
to offer better simple contract prices in order to avoid costly litigation that
would be necessary with flexible contracts to eliminate shading.
Consider high levels of litigation costs (e > 0.5) and interaction in area III,
I or II depending on θ. psmin in area III and I does not depend on θ, however
psmax increases in θ. B is willing to sign simple contracts with higher prices to
avoid high shading levels under flexible contracts, which cannot be eliminated
by litigation due to high e. Comparing III (and I) and II, psmin is lower in II but
psmax increases in θ. As shading becomes more severe and if e is high, both par-
ties are willing to accept less favourable prices in order to sign simple instead
of flexible contracts. In area II, S has a lower payoff from flexible contracts
because B offers low prices (p̂f = 9) with flexible contracts but litigates to elim-
inate shading. In contrast, in area III (and I), B offers p̂f = 9.5−e under flexible
contracts. The high e discourages B from litigation and S does not incur e.
Consider a given level of shading and compare area II, IV and III. For low
litigation costs (e < 0.5) and interaction in area II and IV, psmin and the trade
price p̂s increase in e. B offers p̂f = 9 with flexible contracts in both areas. In
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area II, S has to pay e and is thus indifferent to flexible contracts with lower
simple contract prices. In area IV, B cannot eliminate shading under flexible
contracts and is willing to offer higher prices in order to make S indifferent.
Thus, psmax is higher in IV. For high litigation costs (e > 0.5, area III), psmin
is even higher. However, the difference between the trade and the contract
price increases in e. The higher is e, the more B can exploit S under simple
contracts by undercutting the contract price, making S indifferent at higher
simple contract prices. Similarly, psmax is higher in area III as B is willing to sign
simple contracts with higher prices because he can exploit S at date 1.
Conclusion. The alternative assumption, that litigation completely eliminates
aggrievement and shading, does not change the result that the parties can find
a simple contract that both (weakly) prefer over a flexible contract. Further-
more, I find that if this assumption holds, the buyer can strategically use litiga-
tion to reduce shading (almost always) when the litigation cost is smaller than
the shading parameter (case II).
2.C Comparison of the results with different refer-
ence point assumptions
In the main part of this paper, see Section 2.3, I assume that the contract shapes
the reference points for feelings of entitlement through potential contract en-
forcement (reference point assumption 1). In the appendix, I make different
behavioural assumptions about contractors’ reference point and assume that
reference points can change with litigation. In Section 2.A, I assume that after
court’s decision B’s price offer p̂ is the reference point (reference point assump-
tion 2). In Section 2.B, I assume that litigation eliminates shading completely
(reference point assumption 3). In the following, I compare if and how my
96
results change based on the different assumptions.
The main finding is that with either behavioural assumption, the parties
can always agree on a simple contract with price ps that makes both parties
(weakly) prefer simple over flexible contracts. However, the range of prices
for which a simple contract is preferred differ based on the assumptions, see
Table 2.8 for an overview.
Comparing Figures 2.3 (reference point assumption 1), 2.4 (reference point
assumption 2) and 2.5 (reference point assumption 3), area II in Figure 2.5 is
bigger than in 2.4. Under reference point assumption 3, I assume that litigation
eliminates shading completely. In area II, B offers p̂f = 9 with flexible contracts
and litigates. Thus, there are more combinations of e and θ for which litigation
under flexible contracts is optimal under reference point assumption 3. Note
that if court decisions are not assumed to affect reference points as in the orig-
inal reference point assumption 1, it is never optimal for either party to litigate
and there is no equivalent for this area in Figure 2.3.
Under reference point assumption 3 and with high litigation cost, such that
the contractors interact in areas III or I, the possible simple contract prices are
the highest compared to all other assumptions and conditions. For low liti-
gation costs relative to θ, i.e. area II under reference point assumption 1, the
price decision are the same than in area IV under reference point assumptions
2 and 3. If litigation costs are very low, B offers p̂f = 9 with flexible contracts
(and does not litigate) because S has an incentive to go to court when p̂f < 9 in
order to claim in expectations E(pc) = 9.5. Under the original reference point
assumption 1, court’s decision does not diminish shading. Hence, B sticks to
his strategy even for higher θ and low e. Whereas under reference point as-
sumptions 2 and 3, if θ is high but e is low, it is optimal for B to offer p̂f = 9
and to litigate as this reduces shading. Therefore, area IV under reference point
assumptions 2 and 3 is smaller than area II under the original assumption 1.
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Under the original reference point assumption 1 and with high e
(e > (1 − θ)0.5), the simple contract price does not depend on the litigation
costs but only on θ. Nevertheless, the price offer p̂s decreases as e increases.
Thus, S suffers from very high litigation costs whereas B benefits. This is also
the case in areas III and I under reference point assumption 3, where litiga-
tion costs are also high. Under assumption 2, S is more negatively affected
by increases in litigation costs when θ is big (p̂smin decreases more than p̂smax),
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Chapter 3
Contract enforcement as a




Most contracts are incomplete, either because of the complexity to provide for
all contingencies or because of non-verifiability of contractual terms. The stan-
dard economics literature assumes that if a court cannot verify that a contin-
gency arose or whether an action was undertaken, it cannot enforce the con-
tract and thus has no effect on parties’ decisions. I follow the legal literature
and claim that court enforcement is relevant even for incomplete contracts that
include unverifiable terms. I find that writing incomplete contracts in the pres-
ence of a court is valuable. On one hand, writing incomplete contracts with the
option of contract enforcement ensures that in equilibrium parties fulfill the
contractual terms. More notably, I also have evidence that court’s enforcement
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procedure can shape contractors’ behaviour in the relationship beyond simple
compliance with the contract. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate
how contractors’ behaviour with regard to noncontractual terms (designed as
costly punishment) is shaped by the option of the enforcement of unverifiable
contractual terms. I find that contract enforcement affects contractors’ feel-
ings of entitlement from the contract. The court procedure can create a refer-
ence point for which outcomes are reasonable and thereby reduces retaliation
if those outcomes are reached.
The laboratory experiment was conducted with two different enforcement
procedures. One follows the theory set-up by Hart and Moore (2008) (hence-
forth HM), who have introduced the notion of contracts as reference points. In
this treatment, the court procedure is such that, in case a flexible contract has
been signed, the parties need to renegotiate to an allocation within the bounds
of the contract after uncertainty about the unverifiable state is resolved. Thus,
the court in this treatment does not enforce unverifiable contract terms. In the
additional treatment, the court does enforce unverifiable terms and is always
making a clear, foreseeable but uninformed decision. The two court proce-
dures lead to different behavioural results. In the former treatment, the con-
tractors are left to their own devices to reach an allocation. They have no
outside validation for what is reasonable and thus both seem to expect bet-
ter outcomes for themselves, creating room for noncontractual retaliation be-
haviour. In the latter treatment, the option to invoke a decision by the court
aligns which outcomes the contractors perceive as reasonable and thus limits
punishment. Hence, the reference point for feelings of entitlement differs with
the enforcement procedure. The experimental results support HM’s theory
that contracts are reference points and can lead to aggrievement and punish-
ment behaviour in contractual relationships. Furthermore, the results indicate
that institutions matter as they can shape the behavioural responses to writ-
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ing particular contracts and can inform the discussion on how to best design
contract enforcement and in turn contracts.
In the baseline treatment, I follow the experimental approach by Fehr et al.
(2011) (henceforth FHZ) which is based on the theory about the role of con-
tracts as reference points by HM. I consider a buyer and seller trade relation-
ship in which contracts about the trade of one unit of a standard good are
signed. Buyer’s value from trade is always the same but sellers’ cost of produc-
tion varies with the ex ante uncertain state of nature. States and costs are as-
sumed to be unverifiable and thus the parties cannot design the pricing terms
in the contract contingent on the state. In the baseline treatment, trade is de-
signed to be voluntary. After ex post uncertainty is resolved, trade only occurs
if the trade price is larger than the seller’s cost. Although trade is always effi-
cient, due to the restrictions imposed in the experiment, there exists no single
price such that both parties gain from trade with a rigid contract. To ensure
trade, the parties may agree on a range of prices. According to HM’s theory
a contract that fixes a price range (flexible contract) creates different feelings
of entitlement and each contractor expects the best possible outcome within
the contract. This leads to ex post aggrievement and punishment behaviour.1
The implicit enforcement procedure in this set-up is such that the court voids a
rigid contract if it is in the interest of the seller but prohibits renegotiation. For
flexible contracts, the court provides a renegotiation protocol such that parties
have to agree on a price within the bounds of the contract which covers the
seller’s costs.
In the experiment, buyers and sellers first write a contract and then trade
after uncertainty is resolved. Contracts are determined in the following way.
Each buyer chooses whether to offer a rigid or a flexible contract. A rigid
1Note that HM show that when lump-sum transfers are possible, first-best (fixed price)
contracts are possible if only cost or value vary or if only one contractor can punish, which is
both given in the experimental set-up. However, by ruling out lump-sum transfers, FHZ can
utilise this simpler set-up without first-best results applying.
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contract fixes a single price whereas parties agree on a price range with a flex-
ible contract. After the sellers observe the buyer’s contract choice, the sellers
compete for the contract in an ascending clock auction which determines the
pricing terms. The price at which a seller wins the auction becomes the price
in the rigid contract or the lower bound of the price range in the flexible con-
tract (the upper bound is exogenous). After contracts have been concluded,
the contractors learn the state of the world, which is either high or low cost of
production.
In the baseline treatment, trade is possible with both contract types in the
good state (low cost). In the bad state (high cost), trade is only possible with
the flexible contract. By design, costs are lower than the fixed price with rigid
contracts in the bad state. Under flexible contracts, prices covering the costs
of production are ensured in both states. If trade is possible and the parties
have agreed on a rigid contract, they trade at the contract price. If trade is not
possible, the parties receive the outside option. With a flexible contract, the
buyer chooses a price from the range such that the price is greater than the
seller’s cost. After observing the trade price, the seller chooses the product
quality. Producing low quality instead of normal quality is costly to the seller
and diminishes buyer’s value and is therefore a form of costly punishment.
The court treatment has a similar experimental set-up but allows for rene-
gotiation and contract enforcement. The buyer can offer any price (even out-
side of the contract) after uncertainty about the state is resolved. Furthermore,
the seller is permitted to actively choose contract enforcement. If the seller is
unsatisfied with the buyer’s price offer, she can reject it and ask for enforce-
ment of the contract as written. The court procedure is such that the price in
the fixed price contract is enforced, irrespective of the cost state. For flexible
contracts, the buyer’s price offer is enforced if it lies within the price range, oth-
erwise the computer randomly draws a price from the price range. Contract
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enforcement is costly and the enforcement procedure is known to all parties.
The experimental results show that contract enforcement matters both for
sellers’ punishment behaviour and buyers’ contract choice. Different levels
of punishment occur in both treatments with flexible contracts. One could
argue that in both treatments a flexible contract constitutes an ex ante promise
or an implicit understanding that higher prices will be offered ex post and
that if this does not occur, sellers may punish buyers. However, this is not
observed in the experiment. The amount of punishment is not significantly
different between the contract types in the court treatment although there is
a difference across contract types in the baseline treatment. Thus, it seems
that the option of contract enforcement makes both contracts similar in the
eyes of the parties and the court provides outside validation for which prices
are reasonable. Furthermore, the level of punishment with rigid contracts in
the good state is similar across treatments. Hence, parties do not seem to feel
entitled to the best possible outcome of renegotiation and the different levels
of restriction imposed on buyers’ ex post price offers across treatments do not
matter.
The results indicate that writing contracts, even if incomplete, in the pres-
ence of potential (uninformed) contract enforcement is not just about giving
parties the right to make claims in court about verifiable terms. Contracts also
shape parties’ reference points and thus affect their behaviour regarding non-
contractual terms. This seems to hold even if the court enforcement can be
detrimental to sellers (as a price below the seller’s cost may be enforced), if
the enforcing court is uninformed, for different contract types and if renego-
tiation is possible. Also, buyers’ contract choice differs with the enforcement
procedures and possibly due to sellers’ different behavioural responses. In the
baseline treatment, significantly more buyers (74 percent) choose flexible con-
tracts than in the court treatment (32 percent).
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It is recognised in the law and economics literature that courts play a vital
role in governing the relationship between parties and that contract enforce-
ment expands the contracting options. The availability of contract enforcement
by courts does not only prevent inappropriate contracts, but manages con-
tractual incompleteness as well as widen the range of credible promises and
threats (Hermalin and Katz, 1993). As opposed to the assumptions in HM’s
theory, in reality courts are not inactive or simply void contracts in case of in-
completeness, but might enforce at least the verifiable terms and/or interpret
the contract.2 As Ben-Shahar (2004) argues, courts usually compel parties to
trade if they agreed on this, even if some other terms like the price are in-
completely specified. I follow this approach in the court treatment, in which
an uninformed court enforces the trade promise and makes a decision on the
pricing terms as conforming to the contract as possible.
If courts follow a certain interpretative process, rational parties will form
expectations about contract enforcement. These expectations will affect the
contract design with regard to the provision of incentives and the allocation
of risk (Hermalin and Katz (1993), Katz (2004)). Furthermore, they might in-
fluence the decisions to write more precise (contingent) or more vague (non-
contingent) contracts (Posner, 2003). Hence, the law and economics literature
analyses whether courts should simply enforce contracts as written or interpret
them (Posner, 2003). However, this literature does not discuss the effect that
contract enforcement has for the formation of reference points for reasonable
outcomes. My experimental analysis indicates, utilising a very simple enforce-
ment procedure, that enforcement matters for parties’ behaviour and conse-
quently the contract design. It does not try to answer ‘what courts should do’
2There is plenty of legal discussion if and how courts should interpret incomplete con-
tracts. For example, Schwartz and Scott (2003) argue that contract interpretation aims at find-
ing the ‘correct answer’, which is what parties intended to enact. Posner (2005) looks at the
trade-off between different doctrines of contract interpretation (mutual mistake, contra pro-
ferentum, four corners rule and extrinsic nonevidence).
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in case of contractual incompleteness. Instead it shows, using two examples
of enforcement procedures, that the anticipated enforcement influences which
outcomes the contractors perceive as reasonable and thereby affects their pun-
ishment behaviour. These issues ought to be considered when analysing effi-
cient enforcement rules. It is an interesting array for future research to investi-
gate how various types of contract enforcement procedures affect contractors’
behaviour differently.
Some literature discusses the behavioural effects of contract enforcement,
mainly with a focus on breach and litigation decisions (Hermalin et al., 2007).3
Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman (2015) argue that “the law itself (or at least what
parties believe the law to be)” affect contractors’ decisions and their commit-
ment to personal obligations. My experimental results support this. An ar-
ray of literature examines how individuals perceive the law.4 Finkel (1995)
discusses the difference between the law that legislators follow (‘law on the
books’) and what people regard as just and fair (‘commonsense justice’) and
its consequences for contract enforcement.5 In my experiment, parties know
exactly how contracts are enforced, so uncertainty or different intuitions about
contract enforcement are not investigated. Also Wilkinson-Ryan (2015) argues,
individuals usually expect courts to enforce contracts as written. In law, how-
ever, contracts are not always enforced as written but damages might be a-
warded. The enforcement procedure used in my court treatment is thus close
to what people usually expect from courts. Furthermore, no actual good is
3For economic experiments that deal with litigation and dispute resolution, see for exam-
ple Kuhn (2009) for a literature review on arbitration in the laboratory. Loewenstein et al.
(1993) and Miettinen et al. (2012) analyse when parties reach a settlement and when cases
proceed to trial. Birkeland (2011) investigate whether the possibility of litigation influences
bargaining efficiency.
4For literature on people’s intuition about the law, see for example Mandel (2014) for an ex-
perimental study about how people perceive intellectual property rights and Friedman (2008)
for an experiment on perceived ownership rights.
5For some other examples of legal literature in this area, see Ellman and Braver (2012) for a
discussion of the role of intuitions in family law; Kelman (2013) for a discussion about whether
or not law should follow rules that are morally acceptable; and Robinson and Darley (2007) for
a discussion of the implications of people’s intuition of justice for the criminal law and policy.
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traded in the experiment. ‘Specific performance’ as opposed to paying dam-
ages is therefore in the seller’s interest. My experimental results indicate that
contractors’ view on the law matters. Investigating these effect for different
court procedures and heterogenous intuitions about what the law is, is an in-
teresting area for further research.
The experimental questionnaires by Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman (2015)
provide evidence, inter alia, that misunderstandings about legal rules affect
parties’ interactions. People seem to think that legal obligations follow from
formalisation of a contract and not actual assent, as opposed to the way this
is regarded in contract law. Parties tend to be more committed to a contract
if it has been formed even without formal sanctions in place. Furthermore,
Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman (2015) find that subjects differentiate between
legal and moral obligations. They argue that legal obligation comes from for-
mal manifestation, for example by signature, whereas moral obligation comes
from legal formalism and other moral norms, as promise and disappointment.
Wilkinson-Ryan (2015) conjecture that the ritual of formalisation has an inter-
nalized meaning and that signing a document is a sacred act making parties
more bound to the contract. Given that my experimental procedure does not
allow for actual contract signing and provides a rather artificial way of con-
tract formation, I am not able to fully investigate these issues. However in the
experimental set-up, the contract design as a way of legal formalism does not
play as much of a role as the contract enforcement. The contracts that the sub-
jects sign are the same in both of my treatments, nevertheless the difference in
contract enforcement is what shapes their behaviour.
Several experimental papers in the economics literature deal with the role
of contracts as reference points for feelings of entitlement. FHZ conduct sev-
eral robustness checks and allow for different treatments based on their base-
line experiment. FHZ analyse the effect that ex ante competition, imposed by
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the auction among sellers, has for the reference point effect of contracts. In
Fehr et al. (2009), the computer selects a basis price, which will become ei-
ther the fixed price or the lower bound of the price range, before the buyer
chooses the contract type; in Fehr et al. (2011) the buyer chooses first the con-
tract type before the computer exogenously sets the price. FHZ observe more
punishment with fixed price contracts in both these treatments. This suggests
that contracts are less strong reference points when competition is removed.
For this reason, I keep the auction among sellers in the experimental set-up.
In Fehr et al. (2011), FHZ also test the effect of reducing the price range in the
flexible contract. This leads to less punishment with flexible contracts and thus
indicates that sellers indeed feel entitled to the best possible outcome within
the contract as claimed by HM. In Fehr et al. (2015), FHZ allow for informal
agreements (the buyer can send non-binding, standardised messages). These
informal messages do not fully align reference points but mitigate the trade-
off between contractual flexibility and rigidity. Also Brandts et al. (2015) find
that communication (through a chat window) resolves the ambiguity created
by flexible contracts.
Fehr et al. (2015) test whether sellers expect better prices from renegotiation
than set in the contract by allowing for unilateral ex post revision of the con-
tract price. The buyer can choose a price between cost and valuation after the
state is revealed with both contract types. Because punishment levels are the
same with rigid contracts in the baseline and revision treatment, FHZ conclude
that renegotiation does not affect sellers’ reference points and the contract con-
tinues to shape sellers’ feelings of entitlement. I also allow for revision in my
experiment to make court enforcement meaningful. However, I impose less
restrictions and the buyers can offer any price (even below cost and below
the competitive auction outcome) which makes opportunistic revision always
possible in my court treatment. Also, in FHZ’s revision treatment, the buyer
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has very strong incentives to (mutual beneficially) revise the rigid contract in
the bad state, because otherwise he only receives the outside option. Never-
theless, my experimental results support FHZ’s finding that sellers do not ap-
pear to feel entitled to the best possible outcome of renegotiation. In contrast
to my court treatment, FHZ still find a difference, yet reduced compared to
their baseline treatment, in punishment behaviour across contract types when
allowing for revision. Bartling and Schmidt (2015) also analyse the effect of
renegotiation and compare a contract and a no-contract treatment in a differ-
ent contractual setting.6 They similarly conclude that contracts create reference
points because they observe that ex post sellers ask less often for markups and
buyers reject markups more often than without contracts. For an experimen-
tal analysis of the role of renegotiation in a contractual setting with hold-up
problems see Hoppe and Schmitz (2011) and Iyer and Schoar (2015).
Erlei and Reinhold (2016) replicate FHZ’s baseline treatment and in addi-
tion allow for exogenously determined contract types. Punishment decreases
with exogenous contract choice in their experiment. They argue that sellers
punish buyers for choosing a rigid contract in the endogenous contract type
treatment (‘reciprocity effect’). In the exogenous contract type treatment on
the other hand, concluding a flexible contract is not a ‘signal’ for cooperative
behaviour and thus induces less punishment. Nevertheless, there is a differ-
ence in punishment levels across both contract types in both treatments which
is evidence for reference point effects.
This paper is structured as follows. I explain the experimental procedure
for both treatments in section 3.2 and the behavioural predictions in section
3.3. Section 3.4 presents an overview of the aggregate results and compares
the results from my baseline treatment with FHZ and with my court treat-
6In the experiment by Bartling and Schmidt (2015), B and S have to agree on a contract
without knowing the optimal delivery time. After learning the optimal time, B can ask to
change the delivery time and S can ask for a markup on the contracted price. In the no-contract
treatment, the same threat points as in the contract treatment are imposed exogenously.
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ment. Section 3.5 focuses on sellers’ choices. Sellers’ punishment behaviour is
examined in order to draw conclusions about sellers’ reference points. Section
3.6 analyses buyers’ choices with regard to price offers and contract type. The
last section 3.7 summarises the findings. Some additional analysis is presented
in the appendix.
3.2 Experimental design
The following explains the experimental design of the baseline and the court
treatment and describes the procedures in the laboratory.
3.2.1 Baseline treatment
The experimental design follows the baseline treatment of the experiments
conducted by FHZ. There are 16 subjects in each experimental session. All
subjects receive a show-up fee of £3. At the very beginning of the experiment,
subjects are randomly divided into the role of buyer or seller, which they keep
for the whole session. In each of the 15 rounds, subjects interact in groups of
four, two buyers and two sellers, which are randomly formed at the beginning
of every round.
Buyers and sellers can trade a product in each round. Sellers can sell up two
units whereas buyers can buy only one unit. Hence, sellers face competition
for buyers. Payoffs for the sellers and buyers depend on the trade price and the
cost of production c or the value of the product v, respectively. There are two
state of nature σ, good (σ = g) and bad (σ = b) . The probability of the good
state occurring is P (σ = g) = 0.8. v does not depend on the state of nature but c
does. Furthermore, when trade occurs, the seller can choose between a normal
(qN ) and low quality level (qL). Providing low quality is costly to the seller and
decreases v. Whenever a seller or a buyer are not involved in a trade, which
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can happen for various reasons, they realise an outside option of xB = xS = 10.
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the experimental parameters. The structure of
each round of the experiment is as follows.
State (σ) Good [P (g) = 0.8] Bad [P (b) = 0.2]
Quality (q) normal (qN ) low (qL) normal (qN ) low (qL)
Value (v) 140 100 140 100
Cost (c) 20 25 80 85
Notes: Buyers’ valuation and sellers’ cost of production are displayed for the two
possible states of nature and the two quality levels between which sellers can choose.
Table 3.1: Experimental parameters
Step 1: Formation of interaction groups. At the beginning of every round,
two buyers and two sellers are randomly assigned to groups of four.
Step 2: Buyer’s choice of the contract type. Each buyer has to choose which
contract type he wants to use, flexible or rigid contract. A rigid contract fixes a
price pr whereas a flexible contract specifies a price range [pL, pH ].
Step 3: Determination of trade terms by the sellers in the contract auction.
After both buyers in the interaction group have decided on the contract type,
the contracts are auctioned off to the sellers in a randomly determined se-
quence. In case of a rigid contract, the auction determines the contract price
pr. In case of a flexible contract, the auction determines the lower bound pL of
the contract price range. The upper bound of the price range is exogenously
fixed at pH = 140, which is the highest possible value that the buyer can receive
(v(qN)). The auction starts at 35 Points and increases by one Point every half
second.7 The auction does not go above 75 Points to ensure that trade with a
7The auction starts at 35 Points to ensure that the seller does not make losses relative to his
outside option in the good state even when providing low quality to ensure that the seller will
not refrain from punishment due to loss aversion.
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rigid contract cannot occur in the bad state.8 Both sellers can stop the auction
at any point and the first one to accept the displayed price gets the contract.
The loser of the auction receives the outside option xS = 10.
Step 4: Determination of the state of nature. For each contract indepen-
dently, the computer randomly determines the state of nature which is ob-
served by both buyer and seller. Both parties are also informed whether mu-
tually beneficial trade can take place. With a rigid contract and in the bad
state, seller’s costs are higher than the contract price pr and mutually benefi-
cial trade is not possible. In that case, buyer and seller both realize outside
option xS = xB = 10. In all other cases, trade happens because with a rigid
contract the price covers the cost in the good state (by design), and with flex-
ible contracts, the buyer must adjust the trade price to ensure that the price
covers the cost.
Step 5: Buyer’s trade price offer. After the subjects have learned the state,
the buyer makes an offer for the actual trade price p̂. There is no choice with
a rigid contract and the trade price offer must equal the contract price p̂ = pr.
With a flexible contract, the buyer can pick any price in the contract price range
in the good state, p̂ ∈ [pL, pH ]. In the bad state, the buyer has to choose a price
such that the seller cannot make losses relative to the outside option even when
providing low quality. The buyer has to pick p̂ ∈ [c(ql, b)+xS, v(qN)] = [95, 140].
Step 6: Seller’s quality choice. After observing buyer’s trade price offer, the
seller chooses the quality level. Irrespective of the state, when choosing low
quality (qL) instead of normal quality (qN ), seller’s cost increases by 5 Points
8This restriction on the upper bound ensures that there is a trade-off between rigidity and
flexibility as in HM’s theory. In the theory, the trade-off stems from the fact that the costs in
one state are higher than the value in the other state. Consequently, there does not exist a
fixed price contract that leads to mutually beneficial trade in each state. Since FHZ changed
the payoff structure in order to simplify the game for the subjects, the trade-off is imposed by
restricting the possible prices in a fixed price contract.
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and buyer’s value decreases by 40 Points. Selecting low quality is thus a pun-
ishment of the buyer.
Step 7: Profit calculations. After all decisions have been made, individual
profits for the current round are calculated and displayed to the subjects.
Step 8: Market information for the buyers. All buyers receive market infor-
mation to enhance learning among them since the game is fairly complicated
with ex ante uncertainty about states, auctions and many choices. The buyers
get aggregated information about 1) all buyers’ contract choice in the current
round and 2) buyers’ average profits with both contract types over all rounds.
Then, a new round begins and the subjects are randomly assigned to a new
interaction group.
3.2.2 Court treatment
The design of the court treatment is close to the baseline treatment. The main
difference is that trade is not voluntary as in the baseline treatment. Voluntary
trade can be interpreted as an enforcement procedure in which the court auto-
matically enforces the contract unless one party wants to void it. In contrast,
in the court treatment the court enforces the contract as written if there is a
complaint. Consequently, trade can occur in either state with either type of
contract (and thus the seller can make negative payoffs in the bad state).
Contract enforcement in the experiment works in the following way. The
seller can decide to reject the buyer’s price offer and let the court settle the
contract by enforcing pc.9 Contract enforcement is costly to both parties and
both pay litigation cost e = 5. With a rigid contract, the court imposes trade at
the contract price, pc = pr. With a flexible contract, the court enforces the price
9Note that the term ‘court’ is not used in the experiment but instead subjects are told that
the ‘computer settles the contract’.
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that has been offered by the buyer as long as it is within the contract price
range (even if it is lower than seller’s cost). If the trade price offer is outside
of the contract price range, the contract is regarded as breached and the court
imposes trade at a price randomly chosen from the price range. The payoff
structure and contract restrictions are the same than in the baseline treatment.
The structure of each round in the experiment is as follows.
Step 1: Formation of interaction groups. (Same as in baseline treatment)
Step 2: Buyer’s choice of the contract type. (Same as in baseline treatment)
Step 3: Determination of trade terms by the sellers in the contract auction.
The auction proceeds similar than in the baseline treatment. However, the
auction starts at 50 Points (and similarly does not go above 75 Points).10
Step 4: Determination of the state of nature. For each contract indepen-
dently, the computer randomly determines the state of nature which is ob-
served by both buyer and seller.
Step 5: Buyer’s trade price offer. After the subjects have learned the state, the
buyer makes an offer for the actual trade price. In this treatment, he always has
a choice irrespective of the contract type. With both contract types, the buyer
can choose any price p̂ ∈ [25, 140].11
Step 6: Seller’s choice to accept of reject buyer’s price offer. After observing
buyer’s trade price offer, the seller chooses whether to accept, or reject and
10With these restrictions, I want to ensure that the seller does not make less payoffs in
expectation when winning the auction as compared to her outside option. Following FHZ, I
use the cost associated with low quality (c(qL, σ)) to calculate the bounds, such that the seller
is not refraining from punishment due to loss aversion. Thus, the auction start price should be
47 Points. However, I use 50 Points because all other parameters are in units of 5. The upper
bound is the same than in the baseline treatment to keep the same trade restriction for the rigid
contract.
11The lower restriction on p̂ ensures that at least in the good state without litigation, the
seller will not refrain from punishment due to loss aversion.
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litigate. If she accepts, the parties trade at p̂. If she rejects, both parties’ payoffs
decrease by 5 Points due to the litigation costs. With a rigid contract, trade at
the contract price is enforced, pc = pr. With a flexible contract, trade at pc = p̂
is enforced as long as pL ≤ p̂ ≤ pH . Otherwise, the court enforces a price pc
randomly drawn from the price range.
Step 7: Seller’s quality choice. After observing the trade price which has
been determined either by accepting p̂ or by contract enforcement, the seller
chooses the quality level. Irrespective of the state, when choosing low quality
(qL) instead of normal quality (qN ), the seller’s cost increases by 5 Points and
buyer’s value decreases by 40 Points. Selecting low quality is thus a punish-
ment of the buyer.
Step 8: Profit calculations. (Same as in baseline treatment)
Step 9: Market information for the buyers. (Same as in baseline treatment)
Then, a new round begins and subjects are randomly assigned to a new inter-
action group.
3.2.3 Procedure and payments
The experiment was conducted in the BLUE laboratory at the University of
Edinburgh using z-Tree by Fischbacher (2007). There were 4 sessions for each
of the two treatments, i.e. 8 sessions in total. In 7 sessions, 16 subjects (8 buyers
and 8 sellers) participated per session. In one of the court treatment sessions,
only 12 subjects (6 buyers and 6 sellers) participated due to no-shows. The
sessions of the baseline treatment lasted approximately one hour, and of the
court treatment 1.5 hours. On average, subjects earned GBP 17 plus a show-up
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fee of GBP 3.12
All of the 124 subjects were students of a variety of degrees, including eco-
nomics. Each subject only participated in one session. The subjects were ran-
domly divided into sellers and buyers at the beginning of the experiment and
kept their role for the entire experiment. All interactions were anonymous.
The subjects interacted with the same opponents more than once, but repeated
game effects are unlikely because the subjects did not know with whom they
were interacting at any point.
Before the start of the experiment, a short (ca 10 minutes) presentation sum-
marised the set-up and subjects’ actions. Then, the subjects read detailed in-
structions. The instructions provided to sellers and buyers in the court treat-
ment can be found in Appendix 3.D.13 Afterwards, the subjects were asked to
answer several questions regarding feasible actions and payoff consequences.
The session only proceeded after all subjects answered all questions correctly.
The instruction and question part of the experiment lasted approximately 30
minutes.
3.3 Behavioural predictions
This sections discusses hypotheses for the experimental results and examines
in more detail some experimental design features.
3.3.1 Predictions for purely selfish subjects
In the following, predictions for purely selfish subjects are derived. Similar to
FHZ, I do not expect that these predictions describe subjects’ behaviour accu-
rately, however, they offer a benchmark for other predictions.
12Average earnings were GBP 16 and GBP 19 in the baseline and court treatment, respec-
tively.
13The first part of the instructions, ‘short summary of the procedure’, was read out loud to
the subjects in the presentation.
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Baseline treatment. Because of the competition among sellers in the auction
stage, the fixed price in rigid contracts and the lower bound of the price range
in flexible contracts end up at the competitive level of 35 Points, pr = pL = 35.
Assuming common knowledge of rationality and payoff-maximising strate-
gies, purely selfish sellers never punish buyers for their price offers because
punishment is costly. Since buyers can anticipate this, they always offer the
lowest possible price with each contract type. That is 35 Points in the good
state, p̂(g) = pr = pL = 35, and 95 Points in the bad state with flexible con-
tracts, p̂(b) = c(ql, b) + xS = 95. Buyers’ expected payoff with rigid contracts is
thusE(U rB) = P (g)∗(v(qN)−p̂(g))+P (b)∗xS = 0.8∗(140−35)+0.2∗10. Buyers’
expected payoff with flexible contracts is higher, E(U fB) = P (g)∗ (v(qN)− p̂(g))
+ P (b) ∗ (v(qN) − p̂(b)) = 0.8 ∗ (140 − 35) + 0.2 ∗ (140 − 95). Therefore, buyers
always select flexible contracts.
Court treatment. Because of the competition among sellers, the fixed price
and the lower bound of the price range end up at the competitive level of
50 Points, pr = pL = 50. Purely selfish sellers never punish buyers for their
price offers because punishment is costly. Self-interested buyers have thus no
incentives to offer prices above the contract price. Sellers only litigate if the
gain is higher than the litigation cost of 5 Points. With rigid contracts, sell-
ers are indifferent to litigation if the contract price is undercut by 5 Points.
Anticipating this, under rigid contracts buyers offer the fixed price minus 5,
p̂r = pr − e = 50 − 5 = 45. Under flexible contracts, any price offer below the
lower bound of the price range leads to litigation. Sellers pay 5 Points litigation
cost but the court enforces in expectations a price of 95 Points. Hence under
flexible contracts, buyers offer the lower bound, p̂f = pL = 50. Buyers’ antic-
ipated payoff with rigid contracts, E(U rB) = v(q
N) − p̂r = 140 − 45, is higher
than with flexible contracts, E(U fB) = v(q
N)− p̂f = 140− 50. Therefore, buyers
select rigid contracts.
121
Hypotheses for purely self-interested contractors:
i) Auction outcome: The contract prices are at the competitive level;
pr = pL = 35 in the baseline and pr = pL = 50 in the court treatment.
ii) Punishment: Sellers never punish buyers irrespective of buyers’ price
offers, contract type, state of nature or treatment.
iii) Price offer in the baseline treatment: Buyers offer the fixed price under
rigid and the lower bound under flexible contracts, p̂r = pr and p̂f = pL.
iv) Litigation and price offer in the court treatment: Under rigid contracts,
sellers litigate if the fixed price is undercut by more than the litigation
cost. Under flexible contracts, sellers litigate if buyers offer less than the
lower bound of the price range. Therefore, buyers offer p̂r = pr− e under
rigid contracts and p̂f = pL under flexible contracts.
v) Contract choice: Buyers select flexible contracts in the baseline treatment
and rigid contracts in the court treatment.
3.3.2 Predictions for subjects with feelings of entitlement
HM’s theory predicts that the contractors feel ex post entitled to the best pos-
sible outcome permitted by the contract that was written under competitive
conditions ex ante. The best possible outcome permitted by the contract is the
fixed price in rigid contracts and the upper bound of the price range in flexible
contracts. If the contractors do not receive what they feel entitled to, they are
aggrieved and punish the opponent by selecting low quality (HM refer to this
as ‘shading on performance’). Based on this theory, the following predictions
about subjects’ behaviour in the experiment can be derived.
Baseline treatment. Reference dependent behaviour is not expected to affect
the auction outcome and the competition among sellers leads to pr = pL = 35.
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In the baseline treatment and with rigid contracts, buyers have by design no
choice over the price offer after state uncertainty is resolved. Rigid contracts do
not allow for more than one price and thus align reference points. The sellers
receive what they expect, are not aggrieved and do not select low quality as
a punishment. In contrast, buyers do have a meaningful choice over which
price to offer under flexible contracts and the contractors implicitly agree on
ex post renegotiation when signing flexible contracts. HM’s theory predicts
that sellers feel entitled to the best possible outcome under the contract, i.e.
the upper bound of the price range. Thus, sellers are aggrieved if they get a
price offer below 140 Points in flexible contracts. Sellers may not feel entitled to
the entire surplus, but it is possible that sellers feel entitled to a certain share of
the surplus, as assumed by Halonen-Akatwijuka and Hart (2013). In that case,
sellers may refrain from punishment if offered some price above the lower
bound. If that is true, buyers may be willing to offer prices above the lower
bound to avoid punishment. Hence, buyers’ payoffs with flexible contracts
may be lower than with rigid contracts.
Court treatment. Reference dependent behaviour is not expected to affect
the auction outcome and the competition among sellers leads to pr = pL = 50.
The court treatment has two crucial design features. First, it gives the buyer a
meaningful choice over the price offer with both contract types in both states of
nature. This makes it possible for the seller to receive a price offer of 140 Points
(and get the whole surplus) under all circumstances, but it also allows buyers
to offer prices as low as 25 Points. Second, sellers have the option of litigation,
which limits very low price offers but still allows for (voluntary) high price
offers. Sellers litigate if the gain is higher than the litigation cost of 5 Points.
Anticipating this, buyers offer p̂r = pL − e = 50− 5 = 45 under rigid contracts
and p̂f = pL = 50 under flexible contracts.
The design features of the court treatment may affect sellers’ reference
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points in different ways. One hypothesis is that sellers, similarly to the baseline
treatment, feel entitled to the best possible outcome permitted by the contract,
as hypothesised by HM. Sellers do not punish when offered the fixed price
but do punish when offered the lower bound in flexible contracts. An alter-
native hypothesis is that sellers feel entitled to the best possible outcome from
renegotiation. In that case, buyers may offer prices above the lowest possible
price permitted by the contract with both contract types to avoid punishment.
Also, sellers may feel entitled to what the court would enforce based on the
contract. In that case, buyers offer the lowest possible price permitted by the
contract. Since the court would enforce this offer in litigation, sellers do not
punish such offers. If the first hypothesis is true, rigid contracts yield higher
profits for buyers as they allow for trade in each state without punishment. For
the latter two hypotheses, there is no difference in expected profits between the
contract types. Trade will always take place and the sellers would under both
contract types expect equally high prices (second hypothesis) or equally low
prices (third hypothesis where pc = p̂f = pL = 50).
Hypotheses for punishing subjects with feelings of entitlement:
i) Auction outcome: The contract prices are at the competitive level;
pr = pL = 35 in the baseline and pr = pL = 50 in the court treatment.
ii) Reference point hypotheses for the baseline treatment: Sellers feel enti-
tled to the best (or more favourable) outcomes permitted by the contract.
Under rigid contracts, sellers never punish buyers and buyers offer the
fixed price, p̂r = pr. Under flexible contracts, sellers’ punishment choice
is price dependent and buyers may offer prices above the lower bound
of the price range, p̂f ≥ pL.
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iii) Litigation in the court treatment: Under rigid contracts, sellers litigate if
the fixed price is undercut by more than the litigation cost and buyers
offer at least the fixed price minus 5 Points, p̂r ≥ pr − e. Under flexible
contracts, sellers litigate if buyers offer less than the lower bound of the
price range and buyers offer at least that, p̂f ≥ pL.
iv) Reference point hypotheses for the court treatment:
(a) Sellers feel entitled to the best possible outcome permitted by the
contract. Under rigid contracts, sellers do not punish. Under flexible
contracts, sellers do punish when offered the lower bound of the
price range and buyers offer higher prices to avoid this.
(b) Sellers feel entitled to the best possible outcome from renegotiation.
Sellers punish with both contract types when offered the lowest pos-
sible price permitted by the contract. Buyers may offer higher prices
to avoid this.
(c) Sellers feel entitled to what the court would enforce based on the
contract. Sellers do not punish under both contract types when of-
fered the lowest possible price permitted by the contract. Thus, that
is what buyers offer.
v) Contract choice in the baseline treatment: If sellers’ punishment behaviour
has a strong effect, buyers’ profits may be higher with rigid contracts.
vi) Contract choice in the court treatment: Under hypothesis a), buyers se-
lect rigid contracts. Under hypotheses b) and c), buyers are indifferent
between the contract types.
3.4 Aggregate findings
The following summarises aggregate findings of the baseline and the court
treatment. The experimental results of the baseline treatment are compared to
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FHZ’s results in order to examine differences and similarities in the replica-
tion of the experiment. Furthermore, the results from the baseline treatment
are compared to the court treatment in order to analyse subjects’ behavioural
responses to the treatment.
3.4.1 Aggregate findings baseline treatment (compared to
FHZ)
Overall, FHZ’s main findings were replicated in this experiment. See Table 3.2
for an overview of my experimental results compared to FHZ.
Auction outcome with rigid and flexible contracts. The auction outcome de-
termines the contract price (i.e. the fixed price in rigid contracts and the lower
bound of the price range in flexible contracts). The average auction outcome
over all rounds is 41.1 Points with both contract types, see Table 3.2. The av-
erages are higher than the competitive level of 35 Points because the auction
outcomes are higher in the first rounds. However for both contract types, the
contract price converges to the competitive level of 35 Points over time, as il-
lustrated in Figure 3.1. FHZ have similar results.
Trade prices with rigid and flexible contracts. Under flexible contracts, buy-
ers may have an incentive to offer prices above the lower bound because low
prices may lead to punishment. The lower bound of the price range is on aver-
age 41.1 Points, the average price level is 45.2 Points in the good state, see Table
3.2. This difference does not disappear over time, see Figure 3.1. In 33.1 per-
cent of flexible contracts, buyers pay a price which is strictly above the lower
bound of the contract. In the bad state, buyers have to choose a price of at least
95 Points with flexible contracts. On average, buyers offer 3.1 Points more than





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.1: Development of punishment and prices over time – baseline treat-
ment
good state and 3.4 Points in the bad state. Note that with rigid contracts there
can be no difference between contract price and trade price. The difference in
the average auction outcome and average trade price in Table 3.2 is due to the
fact that the former is calculated for all concluded rigid contracts whereas the
latter for trades that take place under rigid contracts. Furthermore, there is a
significant difference in the average trade price of rigid and flexible contracts
in the good state.14
Punishment under rigid and flexible contracts. With rigid contracts, low
levels of punishment are observed. Low quality is chosen only in 9 percent
of rigid contract relationships. FHZ observe punishment in 6 percent of cases.
With flexible contracts, sellers punish in 23 percent of good states and in 22
percent of bad states, see Table 3.2. The frequency of punishment with both
contract types is volatile but there is no upward or downward trend, see Fig-
14The p-value for the Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) rank-sum test of the difference in average
trade prices between both contract types in the good state is 0.0043.
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ure 3.1.15 The 13 percentage point difference in punishment levels between the
contract types in the good state is statistically significant. FHZ find similarly
a significant difference, however they observe less punishment with rigid and
more with flexible contracts. There is no statistically significant difference in
punishment under flexible contracts between the good and the bad state.16
Payoffs and contract choice. In the good state, buyers offer lower prices and
face less punishment under rigid than under flexible contracts. Thus, buyers’
payoff is on average 9.5 Points higher with rigid than with flexible contracts.
The opposite holds for sellers. Although, they (costly) punish more with flex-
ible contracts, the price increases beyond the lower bound offset this. Sellers
earn on average 3.2 Points more with flexible contracts. FHZ find similar re-
sults, although they observe even higher differences in the average payoffs
for buyers and sellers, see Table 3.2. In the bad state, trade does not occur
with rigid contracts and both buyer and seller receive the outside option of 10
Points.
In total, buyers get higher payoffs with flexible contracts (76 Points) than
with rigid contracts (72 Points), although prices are higher under flexible con-
tracts and there is more punishment, see Table 3.2. This is due to the fact that
trade always occurs under flexible contracts. Similarly, sellers make higher
profits with flexible contracts. In FHZ, buyers make on average lower payoffs
under flexible contracts whereas sellers make more. This is the case because
buyers offer higher prices in FHZ, probably because they face more punish-
ment.
15OLS regressions with one observation per round and session, where the dependent vari-
able is the fraction of punishment under the respective contract type and the explanatory vari-
able is the round, are used to check for time trends. With rigid contracts, the p-value for the
coefficient on round is 0.56. With flexible contracts, the p-value for the coefficient on round is
0.24. Hence, there are no significant time trends in punishment levels with both contract types.
16The rank-sum test gives a p-value of 0.0037 for the difference in average punishment
between contract types in the good state and a p-value of 0.9480 for the difference in average
punishment between states with flexible contracts.
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FHZ find that on average half of the buyers choose flexible contracts. This
is an interesting result because rigid contracts yield higher average payoffs for
buyers. In my experiment, on average 74 percent of buyers choose flexible con-
tracts. The share increases over time. In the first three rounds, on average 69
percent of buyers choose flexible contract, in the last three rounds 78 percent.
3.4.2 Aggregate findings court treatment (compared to base-
line treatment)
Auction outcomes with rigid and flexible contracts. In the court treatment,
the auction starts at 50 Points. The average auction outcome is with 52 Points
close to the competitive level under both contract types. Even more so than in
the baseline treatment, where the price is on average 6 Points above the com-
petitive level, see Table 3.3. The auction outcome gets closer to the competitive
level over time, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Prices and contract enforcement with rigid and flexible contracts. In the
baseline treatment, buyers have no influence on the trade price under rigid
contracts and the final trade price is equal to the contract price (i.e. the auction
outcome). With flexible contracts, the buyer makes a trade price offer within
the contract price range. In the court treatment, buyers can offer any price be-
tween 25 and 140 Points, irrespective of the contract type or the state of nature.
Sellers can reject buyers’ price offers. In the good state, buyers offer on av-
erage 50.4 Points under rigid and 55 Points under flexible contracts, although
the average auction outcome is 52 Points for both contract types. These price
offers are rejected on average in 20 percent (rigid contract) or 17 percent (flex-
ible contract) of the cases, see Table 3.3. Under flexible contracts, the average
price offers are higher than the lower bound in the first periods. This differ-
ence disappears over time, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. The average price offers
under rigid contracts stay close to (and slightly below) the average contract
price over all rounds. Buyers undercut the contract price in 22 percent of rigid
contracts. However, the lower bound of the price range is undercut rarely, in
0.14 percent of flexible contracts. Sellers punish price undercutting with rejec-
tion in 54 percent of the cases. In the bad state, buyers offer on average higher
prices than the auction outcome but still below the seller’s cost; the average
offered price is 53.6 under rigid and 63 Points under flexible contracts. These
offers are on average rejected in 25 and 14 percent of the cases, respectively.
If a seller rejects an offer, the contract is enforced by the court which leads to
slightly higher average final trading prices, see Table 3.3.
Punishment under rigid and flexible contracts. In the court treatment, buy-
ers offer higher prices (than the auction outcome) in the bad than in the good
state. However, neither the 7 percentage point difference in punishment across
states with rigid contracts nor the 8 percentage point difference across states
with flexible contract is statistically significant. Compared across contract
132
types, punishment is 6 percentage points lower with flexible than with rigid
contracts in the good state, see Table 3.3. This difference is significant at the 10
percent significance level. The punishment behaviour is volatile but no signif-
icant trends over time are observable with both contract types, as illustrated in
Figure 3.2.17
Comparing across treatments, in the good state and with rigid contracts
punishment is higher in the court treatment (15 percent) than in the baseline
treatment (9 percent). This is presumably due to the fact that some buyers
undercut the contract price in the court treatment. However, this difference
is not statistically significant. With flexible contracts and in the good state,
punishment is significantly higher in the baseline treatment. Sellers are by
design getting on average higher prices in the court treatment. However, with
flexible contracts and in the good state, the markups over the lower bound
of the price range are not statistically different across treatments and can thus
not solely explain the difference in punishment levels across treatments. The
average punishment across treatments in the bad state with flexible contracts
is not significantly different.18
As mentioned before, price undercutting seems to explain some of the pun-
ishment under rigid contracts. Undercutting occurs in 32 percent of all rigid
17OLS regressions with one observation per round and session, where the dependent vari-
able is the fraction of punishment under the respective contract type and the explanatory vari-
able is round, check for time trends. With rigid contracts, the p-value for the coefficient on
round is 0.29. With flexible contracts, the p-value for the coefficient on round is 0.468. Hence,
there are no significant time trends in the punishment levels under both contract types. Also
when differentiating between cost states, no significant time trends in punishment levels can
be identified with each contract type.
18The rank-sum tests give a p-value of 0.1342 for the difference in average punishment
across treatments with rigid contract in the good state; a p-value of 0.1683 for comparing the
punishment in the good and bad state with rigid contracts in the court treatment; a p-value of
0.0987 for the difference in the average punishment between contract types in the good state
in the court treatment; a p-value of 0.1912 for the difference in average punishment between
cost states in the court treatment with flexible contracts; a p-value of 0.0014 for the difference
in the average punishment across treatments in the good state and under flexible contracts; a
p-value of 0.3929 for the difference across treatments in the average markups over the lower
bound with flexible contracts in the good state; a p-value of 0.5706 for the difference in the
average punishment across treatments in the bad state under flexible contracts.
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contracts. With self-interested agents, price undercutting by 5 Points (litigation
cost) should be observed. In 21 percent of all rigid contracts, buyers undercut
by less than 5 Points. 41 percent of sellers react to this by accepting the price
offer and providing normal quality. However, an almost equal amount of af-
fected sellers react by one type of punishment, costing them 5 Points each. 24
percent of those punish with low quality and 23 percent choose litigation. The
former causes the buyer a loss of 40 Points, the latter of 5 Points. The remain-
ing 12 percent opt for double punishment, costing the seller 10 Points and the
buyer 45 Points. When buyers undercut prices by more than 5 Points, which
happens in 11 percent of all rigid contracts, sellers reactions are more aligned.
82 percent of affected sellers opt for contract enforcement, but provide nor-
mal quality. 12 percent choose double punishment. When the contract price
of rigid contracts is not undercut, punishment occurs only in 5 percent of the
cases.
In the court treatment, buyers can also offer markups with both contract
types. The markups with flexible contracts are not statistically different across
treatment. However, there is a difference within the court treatment across
contract types. Only in 9 percent of rigid contracts, buyers offer a markup over
the fixed price, whereas in 37 percent of flexible contracts, buyers offer a price
higher than the lower bound of the price range. This difference is statistically
significant.19
Payoffs and contract choice. Buyers receive on average 3 Points higher pay-
offs with rigid contracts than with flexible contracts because although punish-
ment is higher this is offset by lower prices, see Table 3.3. Sellers make on
average 3.2 Points less with rigid than with flexible contracts because of low
prices and high (costly) punishment under rigid contracts. Compared to the
19The p-value from the rank-sum test for the difference in occurrence of markups across
contract types in the court treatment is 0.000.
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baseline treatment buyers receive higher payoffs under both contract types in
the court treatment. This is because trade always occurs in the court treatment
and, although buyers have to pay by design higher prices, they face less pun-
ishment in the court treatment, which offsets this. Also, sellers earn higher
average payoffs in the court treatment as they benefit from the higher prices
and the extra cost for litigation is not prominent.
Buyers choose with 68 percent on average more often rigid than flexible
contracts in the court treatment. The share of buyers choosing flexible contracts
is statistically decreasing over time.20 In the first three rounds, on average 39
percent of buyers choose flexible contracts whereas 22 percent in the last three
rounds. In the baseline treatment, on average 26 percent of buyers choose rigid
contracts. The difference in the contract choice is significant.21
3.5 Sellers’ choices
In this section, I analyse whether sellers self-select into one or the other type of
contract in order to rule out that sellers’ behaviour solely stems from specific
types of sellers always choosing one or the other contract type. Furthermore, I
investigate when sellers punish buyers by choosing low quality. Understand-
ing when punishment does not occur (does occur) gives insights into when
parties receive (do not receive) what they feel entitled to, and therefore allows
for inference about reference points.
3.5.1 Sellers’ contract choice
Sellers can influence which contracts they sign by being more or less aggressive
in the auction stage. However, sellers do not appear to self-select into a specific
20Regressing a dummy for flexible contracts against rounds yields a significant negative
coefficient.
21The p-value for the rank-sum test of the difference in contract choice across treatment is
0.000.
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type of contract in both treatments, see Figure 3.3. In general, sellers write
more flexible contracts in the baseline treatment and more rigid contracts in
the court treatment based on buyers’ different preferences for those contract
types in the two treatments.
Baseline treatment Court treatment
Figure 3.3: Number of rigid and flexible contracts per individual seller by treat-
ment
3.5.2 Sellers’ punishment choice
Table 3.4 provides estimations of what drives sellers’ punishment behaviour in
the two different states of nature. In columns (1) – (4), punishment in the good
(low cost) state is the dependent variable whereas columns (5) – (6) consider
punishment in the bad (high cost) state. Both OLS and Probit estimations are
used.
As mentioned before, punishment occurs with around 9 percent of rigid
contracts in the baseline treatment, see Table 3.3. This cannot be explained
by the reference point theory. The buyer has no choice over the trade price
in this case. Thus, sellers should not expect more than the contract price and
have no reason to punish due to hurt feelings of entitlement. It is possible that
sellers punish buyers for the contract choice, as argued by Erlei and Reinhold
(2016). Since rigid contracts do not allow for price adjustments in the seller’s


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































contracts. However, punishment under rigid contracts might also simply be
driven by some subjects’ random choices. Nevertheless, the frequency of pun-
ishment with rigid contracts is not significantly different between treatments
as the treatment dummy variable (court treat) in columns (1) and (2) of Table
3.4 is not significant. In the court treatment, buyers have the option to offer
prices above the fixed price, whereas this is not possible in the baseline treat-
ment. The result that the punishment level with rigid contracts is not different
across treatment thus indicates that renegotiation does not affect sellers’ refer-
ence points for feelings of entitlement. Sellers do not seem to feel entitled to
more favourable outcomes from renegotiation but the contract shapes sellers’
feelings of entitlement to some extent.
Focusing on the baseline treatment, the contract choice appears to affect
sellers’ punishment behaviour. The dummy variable for writing a flexible con-
tract (Flex) is significant, in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.4. Hence, signing a
flexible contract makes punishment more likely in the baseline treatment. Ta-
ble 3.5 provides OLS and Probit estimations to check whether the punishment
behaviour depends on the trade price. The variable Price minus 35 is defined
as the difference between the actual trade price and the competitive price of 35
Points. Also included is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for flexi-
ble contract (Flex x Price minus 35). In the bad (high cost) state, the similarly de-
fined variable Price minus 95 is utilised, accounting for the fact that buyers have
to offer at least 95 Points in this state. Also included is the dummy Flex to ac-
count for the contract type, which is not relevant in the bad state as trade only
takes place with flexible contracts in this case. The estimation results show
that only the contract choice is significant. The price is neither significantly af-
fecting punishment with rigid nor with flexible contracts in both states.22 The
fixed price and the lower bound of the price range are not significantly differ-
22Similar qualitative results are found if punishment level is regressed against the auction
outcome, a dummy for whether a markup was offered and the dummy for flexible contracts.
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Dependent variable Punishment good state Punishment bad state
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Probit (ME) OLS Probit (ME)




Flex x Price minus 35 0.00237 0.0058
(0.00718) (0.00897)




Observations 380 380 67 67
Adjusted R-squared 0.0196 -0.00117
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Price minus 35 is
defined as the final trade price minus the competitive price of 35 Points. Price minus 95 is
defined as the final trade price minus 95 Points and is only relevant in the bad state with
flexible contracts. Flex is unity for a flexible contract. Flex x Price minus 35 is the interaction
between flexible contract and price increment. Columns (1)-(2) are for the good and (3)-(4)
for the bad state. Columns (1) and (3) report coefficients of OLS estimations. Columns (2)
and (4) report marginal effects based on Probit estimations.
Table 3.5: Price dependency of punishment across contract types – baseline
treatment
ent.23 Nevertheless, sellers seem to expect more favourable outcomes than the
lower bound of the price range under flexible contracts and punish if they do
not receive this. Rigid contracts restrict what sellers feel entitled to and thus
induce less punishment.
Focusing on the court treatment, the punishment increasing effect of a flex-
ible contract (Flex), observed in the baseline treatment, is counteracted by a
significant decreasing effect in the court treatment, see the interaction term
Flex x Treat in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.4. Thus, in the court treatment
the difference in punishment across contract types disappears. The fixed price
23The p-value of the rank-sum test of the difference in auction outcome across contract
types is 0.3002 in the baseline treatment.
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and the lower bound of the price range are also not significantly different in the
court treatment.24 However, because the court treatment allows for renegotia-
tion, buyers can always offer the same trade prices irrespective of the contract
type or the state. One could expect that sellers feel entitled to the same prices
under both contract types, or more specifically the best possible outcome from
renegotiation. Nevertheless, sellers in the court treatment appear to punish
rarely under both contract types, instead of similarly often. Therefore, the ex-
perimental results lead to the conclusion that sellers feel entitled to receive the
fixed price or the lower bound of the price range, respectively, instead of more
favourable outcomes from renegotiation. Note that the fixed price or the lower
bound of the price range is what the court would enforce if there is litigation
and this appears to shape the feelings of entitlement.
The estimations in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.4 allow for more variables
to explain punishment in the good state. Rejecting a price offer from the buyer
(Reject offer) in the court treatment does not appear to affect seller’s punish-
ment behaviour. Offering prices above the lower bound of the price range or
above the fixed price in the court treatment (Markup x Treat) does also not sig-
nificantly affect punishment. In the baseline treatment, offering prices above
the lower bound of the price range (Markup x Flex) appears to decrease pun-
ishment, although this effect is only significant at the 10 percent significance
level in the OLS estimation. Given that the Auction price does not significantly
affect punishment, the treatment effects do not appear to be driven by the dif-
ferent price levels across treatments imposed by the experimental design. The
only additional variable that gives convincing significant effects is the dummy
Undercut. Undercut is unity for a price offer below the fixed price or the lower
bound of the price range, and zero otherwise, and is only relevant in the court
treatment. Since undercutting makes punishment more likely, undercut prices
24The p-value of the rank-sum test of the difference in auction outcome across contract
types is 0.8520 in the court treatment.
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appear to be considered as very unreasonable by sellers.
For the less likely bad (high cost) state, only a limited number of obser-
vations are available. No significant difference in punishment levels under
flexible contracts across treatments can be observed, see variable Court treat in
columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.4. Furthermore, punishment levels across con-
tract types in the court treatment are not significantly different, see variable
Rigid x Treat.
3.5.3 Discussion – court procedure and reference points
To summarise, in the baseline treatment, sellers punish more with flexible con-
tracts than with rigid contracts although they receive similar prices (equal to
the auction outcomes which are similar for both contract types). Hence, sellers
appear more aggrieved under flexible than under rigid contracts when facing
comparable prices. This leads to the conclusion that they have different feel-
ings of entitlement depending on the contract type. The experimental results
cannot verify whether sellers feel entitled to the best possible outcome permit-
ted by the contract, as assumed by HM, but at least indicate that sellers feel
entitled to more favourable outcomes if possible.
In the court treatment, no differences in the frequency of punishment across
contract types is observed. Given that buyers’ price offers are similar under
both contract types, this leads to the conclusion that sellers’ feelings of entitle-
ment are not different with both contract types. The perception of the contract
seems to vary across treatments although the contracts are designed in the
same way. Also, sellers appear to be equally pleased with buyers’ price offers
under flexible and rigid contracts as low levels of punishment are observed.
Hence, sellers do not appear to feel entitled to more favourable outcomes per-
mitted by the contract, in contrast to the baseline treatment.
Furthermore, although renegotiation is allowed with both contract types in
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the court treatment, punishment levels are not only the same with both con-
tract types but also at an equally low level. Since punishment levels are low
although buyers offer prices similar to the auction outcome, sellers also do not
appear to feel entitled to more favourable outcomes from renegotiation.
The experimental results show that punishment is low when sellers receive
either the fixed price or the lower bound of the price range in the court treat-
ment, which is not true in the baseline treatment. The presence of the court ap-
pears to affect sellers’ reference points and the sellers feel entitled to what the
court would enforce in case of litigation. If the buyer offers the lower bound of
the price range, the court would enforce this price. Similarly, the court would
enforce the fixed price. Therefore, the court enforcement seems to create a ref-
erence point for feelings of entitlement and creates an outside validation for
which prices are reasonable. This also holds for trades in which the parties do
not litigate and the sheer presence of the court affects the feelings of entitle-
ment. Note that the court would potentially enforce all possible price offers
within the price range. Buyers could, for example, offer the upper bound of
the price range pH which would be approved by the court. Nevertheless, sell-
ers accept the lower bound pL as a reasonable price, probably also due to the
fact that the lower bound is set by the sellers in the auction.
Furthermore, sellers’ behaviour can be distinguished from simply respond-
ing to the anticipated optimal behaviour by the buyers. If this were driving
sellers, they would similarly respond to buyers’ anticipated behaviour in the
baseline treatment. Sellers can anticipate that with flexible contracts, it is in
the buyers’ interests to offer the lower bound. Nevertheless, sellers appear
to expect higher price offers from buyers and otherwise punish in the base-
line treatment. In addition, concerns that the treatment effect is driven by the
difference in price levels, as the auction starts at a higher price in the court
treatment, are mitigated as the auction outcome is found to not significantly
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affect punishment levels.
Subjects’ behaviour may also be driven by fairness considerations. With in-
equity aversion (see for example Fehr and Schmidt (1999)), subjects are willing
to forgo material payoffs to avoid inequitable outcomes. With flexible con-
tracts, buyers decide on the share of the surplus for sellers. In order to limit
the payoff inequality, sellers may punish buyers when a low share is offered. In
turn, buyers may offer higher shares to avoid punishment. This game is com-
parable to an ultimatum game (see for example Camerer and Thaler (1995)).
If inequity aversion were driving sellers’ behaviour, punishment should not
only occur under flexible but also under rigid contracts, where sellers only
get a low share of the surplus and punishment could reduce payoff inequal-
ity. Moreover, same punishment levels should be observed across treatments
when inequity aversion is what mainly drives sellers’ choices. However, all of
this is not observed in the experiment. Furthermore, also reciprocity models
(see for example Gary Charness (2002), Falk and Fischbacher (2006)) cannot
describe sellers’ behaviour. The underlying idea is that subjects care about
how unfavourable outcomes occur and whether they are beyond the oppo-
nent’s control. Following this, agents punish when favourable outcomes are
intentionally not achieved. Reciprocity models would thus predict high pun-
ishment levels in the court treatment where renegotiation is possible. Price
offers that lead to a fairer share of the surplus are available but are not se-
lected by the buyers in the court treatment. Nevertheless, punishment is not




Buyers can potentially affect punishment levels with the price offers and strate-
gically adjust prices to avoid punishment. Hence in order to understand sell-
ers’ punishment behaviour, an analysis of buyers’ price offers is relevant. Fur-
thermore, the influence of the enforcement procedure on the contract design,
chosen by the buyer, is examined.
3.6.1 Buyers’ price offers
Baseline treatment. With rigid contracts, buyers have no choice over the
price. With flexible contracts, buyers have to choose a price from the price
range. Figure 3.4 illustrates how many buyers decide to offer always or some-
times markups under flexible contracts. A markup is defined as a price offer
above the lower bound of the price range (p̂ > pL). Many buyers never offer
markups (43 percent), a third of buyers offer markups at least 8 times.
Figure 3.4: Number of markups per individual buyer under flexible contracts
– baseline treatment
In order to explain buyers’ choice to offer a markup, a Markup dummy
is regressed against a one-round-lagged markup dummy (LagMarkup), one-
round-lagged punishment dummy (LagPunish) and an interaction of the two
(LagPunish x LagMarkup). The regression results are presented in column (1) of
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Dependent variable Markup baseline treat Markup court treat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS (Buyer FE) OLS OLS (Buyer FE)
LagMarkup 0.7107∗∗∗ 0.2035∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.2236∗∗∗
(0.0456) (0.057) (0.0402) (0.0459)
LagPunish 0.0862 0.0240 -0.0617 -0.0297
(0.0526) (0.0491) (0.0467) (0.0459)
LagPunishxLagMarkup -0.0626 0.0584 0.0950 0.0284
(0.105) (0.0956) (0.147) (0.142)
Flex 0.176∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.0324) (0.0429)
Constant 0.0893∗∗∗ 3.08e− 14 0.0283 -0.0158
(0.0265) (0.0797) (0.0197) (0.0758)
Observations 327 327 420 420
Adjusted R-squared 0.468 0.626 0.312 0.400
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. All variables
are indicator variables. LagMarkup is unity if the buyer has offered a markup over the fixed
price or the lower bound of the price range in the previous round. LagPunish is unity if the
buyer has faced punishment by the seller in the previous round. LagPunish x LagMarkup is the
interaction between those two variables. Flex is unity for a flexible contract. Columns (1)-(2)
are for the baseline and (3)-(4) for the court treatment. All columns report coefficients of OLS
estimations. Columns (2) and (4) are based on OLS estimations including buyer fixed effects.
Table 3.6: Buyers’ markup choices – baseline and court treatment
Table 3.6. Column (2) presents the results of a similar regression but accounting
for buyer fixed effects to control for unobserved differences among buyers.25
The only significant effect on the choice to offer a markup that can be identified
is whether the buyer has offered a markup in the previous round. If a markup
has been offered previously, buyers are more likely to offer it again. This also
holds in the buyer fixed effect estimation. The experience of punishment in the
previous round appears to have no effect on buyers’ markup offers.
25Note that I am not providing Probit estimations when using individual fixed effects due
to the incidental parameter problem, see Lancaster (2000).
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Court treatment. In the court treatment and with both contract types, buyers
always have a choice over the price offer. They can always offer markups
but also undercut. Undercutting is defined as offering a price below the fixed
price in rigid contracts (p̂ < pr) or below the lower bound of the price range in
flexible contracts (p̂ < pL).
Markups with rigid contracts are never offered by 57 percent of buyers un-
der rigid contracts and 39 percent under flexible contracts, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.5. The estimation results regarding buyers’ markup choices in the court
treatment are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.6. Markup is, sim-
ilarly to the baseline treatment, estimated using a one-round-lagged markup
dummy, a one-round-lagged punishment dummy and an interaction of the
two. Additionally, the dummy for writing a flexible contract (Flex) is included,
see column (3), because markups are possible with both contract types in this
treatment. The regression in column (4) also considers buyer fixed effects. As
in the baseline treatment, buyers are significantly more likely to offer markups
if they have offered them in the previous round. Also, buyers appear to be sig-
nificantly more likely to offer markups with flexible than with rigid contracts
in the court treatment.
Rigid contract Flexible contract
Figure 3.5: Number of markups per individual buyer by contract type – court
treatment
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Buyers’ choice to undercut is investigated with estimations presented in
Table 3.7. Undercut is estimated using a one-round-lagged undercut dummy
(LagUndercut), a one-round-lagged punishment dummy (LagPunish), an inter-
action of the two (LagPunish x LagUndercut) and a dummy for concluding a
flexible contract (Flex), see column (1) of Table 3.7. The estimation presented
in column (2) also allows for buyer fixed effects and finds that some buyers
are in general more likely to undercut than others. If buyers have undercut
in the previous round, they are significantly more likely to undercut again.
However, if buyers experienced punishment after having undercut in the pre-
vious round, they are significantly less likely to undercut again. Accounting
for buyer fixed effects, if buyers have experienced punishment without un-
dercutting in the previous round this has an increasing effect on undercutting.
With flexible contracts, undercutting is significantly less likely. In fact, under-
cutting only occurs in 0.14 percent of flexible contracts. Figure 3.6 illustrates
that many buyers (64 percent) try undercutting at least once under rigid con-
tracts.
Figure 3.6: Number of undercutting per individual buyer under rigid contracts
– court treatment
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Dependent variable Undercut court treatment






LagPunish x LagUndercut -0.186∗ -0.196∗∗
(0.0999) (0.0813)





Adjusted R-squared 0.396 0.628
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. All variables
are indicator variables. LagUndercut is unity if the buyer has undercut the fixed price or
the lower bound of the price range in the previous round. LagPunish is unity if the buyer
has faced punishment by the seller in the previous round. LagPunish x LagUndercut is
the interaction between those two variables. Flex is unity for a flexible contract. Under-
cutting can only occur in the court treatment. Column (1) reports coefficients of an OLS
estimation, column (2) is based on an OLS estimation including buyer fixed effects.
Table 3.7: Buyers’ undercutting choice – court treatment
3.6.2 Buyers’ contract choice
Baseline Treatment. The majority (74 percent) of contracts in the baseline
treatment are flexible contracts. The advantage of flexible contracts in this
treatment is that trade can take place in both states; the disadvantage is that
buyers may face punishment. As long as only a certain fraction of sellers pun-
ish with flexible contracts, the buyers should prefer flexible contracts.26 Most
26Given that 9 percent of sellers punish under rigid contracts in the baseline treatment,
buyers should prefer flexible contracts if less than 24.7 percent of sellers punish under flexible
contracts, which is observed in the experiment. Buyers prefer flexible contracts if x ≤ 0.175 +
0.8z, where z is the share of sellers punishing under rigid contracts and x the share of sellers
punishing under flexible contracts. This is because 0.8[(1−z)(140−35)+z(100−35)]+0.2(10) ≤
(1−x)[0.8(140−35)+0.2(140−95)]+x[0.8(100−35)+0.2(100−95)], where the left-hand side
is the expected payoff from a rigid contract and the right-hand side from a flexible contract.
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Baseline treatment Court treatment
Figure 3.7: Number of flexible contracts per individual buyer by treatment
buyers indeed prefer flexible contracts in the baseline treatment because the
punishment levels are not too high. There are many buyers who always choose
flexible contracts, but many also try both, see Figure 3.7.
Columns (1) – (2) in Table 3.8 present the estimation results regarding buy-
ers’ contract choice in the baseline treatment with the dummy for flexible con-
tract (Flex) as the dependent variable. At the end of each round, buyers are
provided with information about the average profit of all rigid and flexible
contracts that have been signed until that round. This information does not ap-
pear to significantly influence buyer’s contract choice. In columns (1) and (2),
the one-round-lagged difference in average profits from both contract types
(LagDiffAverageProfit) is not significant. Neither does previous round’s profit
(LagProfit) have a significant effect on the contract choice. However, having
experienced punishment under rigid contracts in the previous round (LagPun-
ish) makes buyers more likely to offer flexible contracts. Also, having selected
a flexible contract in the previous round (LagFlex) makes buyers more likely to
offer it again. However, if buyers have experienced punishment with a flex-
ible contract in the previous round (LagPunish x LagFlex), they are less likely
to offer a flexible contract. The regression accounting for buyer fixed effect in
column (2) of Table 3.8 gives similar qualitative results.
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Court Treatment. The majority (68 percent) of contracts in the baseline treat-
ment are rigid contracts. There are many buyers who always choose rigid con-
tracts but also many who try both contract types, see Figure 3.7. The estimation
results regarding buyers’ contract choice in the court treatment can be found
in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.8. In contrast to the baseline treatment, the
one-round-lagged difference in average profits between fixed price and flexi-
ble contracts (LagDiffAverageProfit) is significant. Thus, if buyers observe that
all buyers have earned more with fixed price contracts in all previous rounds,
they are more likely to offer fixed price contracts. Also in contrast to the base-
line treatment, the experience of punishment does not significantly affect the
contract choice. However, similarly to the baseline treatment, having selected
a flexible contract in the previous round makes buyers more likely to offer it
again. Accounting for buyer fixed effect gives similar qualitative results, see
column (4) in Table 3.8.
In the court treatment, buyers face the same (little) restrictions on the price
offer under both contract types. However, there is a difference between the
contract types (in addition to possible effects on reference points and punish-
ment) because they provide different incentives for sellers to litigate. Under
flexible contracts, buyers have no incentives to undercut because sellers have
strong incentives to litigate as the litigation cost is lower than the expected
price gain. Under rigid contracts and with self-interested subjects, a price un-
dercut by 5 Points (litigation cost) should be observed, making sellers indiffer-
ent to litigation and buyers prefer rigid contracts. In the experiment, undercut-
ting by up to 5 Points can cause punishment. Only 21 percent of rigid contract
prices are undercut by up to 5 Points. Thus, it seems that sellers’ response to
punish diminishes buyers’ incentives to undercut, making rigid contracts less
attractive to buyers. As analysed before, the lower bound and the fixed price
(i.e. the auction outcomes) are not significantly different and flexible contracts
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do not trigger more punishment in the court treatment. However, 68 percent
of buyers choose rigid and 32 percent select flexible contracts in the court treat-
ment. Some buyers experience that undercutting is not worthwhile, whereas
others realise they can get away with undercutting (sometimes even by more
than 5 Points) and thus prefer rigid contracts. Also, buyers appear to be more
driven by profit comparisons across contract types than by punishment expe-
riences.
Dependent variable Flex baseline treatment Flex court treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS (buyer FE) OLS OLS (buyer FE)
LagProfit -0.000427 0.000189 0.000701 -0.000937
(0.000807) (0.000739) (0.00191) (0.00197)
LagPunish 0.440∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.0418 0.00557
(0.130) (0.119) (0.0970) (0.0975)
LagFlex 0.610∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.0461) (0.0558) (0.0430) (0.0509)
LagPun x LagFlex -0.503∗∗∗ -0.480∗∗∗ 0.0903 0.0699
(0.134) (0.122) (0.121) (0.111)
LagDiffAvgProfit -0.000481 -0.000953 -0.0126∗∗∗ -0.00938∗
(0.00165) (0.00146) (0.00369) (0.00478)
Constant 0.334∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ 0.126 0.237
(0.0881) (0.119) (0.167) (0.205)
Observations 416 416 420 420
Adjusted R-squared 0.314 0.493 0.358 0.497
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. LagProfit measures a
buyer’s profit in the previous round. LagDiffAvgProfit is the difference in average profits from
both contract types for all previous rounds. All other variables are indicator variables. Lag-
Punish is unity if the buyer has faced punishment by the seller in the previous round. LagFlex
is unity if the buyer has selected a flexible contract in the previous round. LagPun x LagFlex is
the interaction between those two variables. Columns (1)-(2) consider the baseline, columns
(3)-(4) the court treatment. All columns report coefficients of OLS estimations. Column (2)
and (4) include buyer fixed effects.
Table 3.8: Buyers’ choice of a flexible contract by treatment
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides experimental evidence that the option of contract enforce-
ment, even if it is not invoked, affects agents’ behaviour in a contractual re-
lationship. Different enforcement procedures appear to cause different be-
havioural effects because they create different reference points for feelings of
entitlement. The experimental results suggest that contracts, even if incom-
plete, are not only giving contractors the right to make claims in court about
verifiable terms but also shape parties’ behaviour regarding noncontractual
terms. This is true even for an uninformed court that can impose detrimental
prices for the seller.
In the baseline treatment, the implicit enforcement procedure is such that
the court does not impose a price on the contractors but ensures that buyers’
price offers are not outside of the contract. With flexible contracts, the parties
implicitly agree to renegotiate ex post. The court simply provides a bargaining
protocol and the trade price is at the discretion of the buyers. The bargain-
ing protocol defines the boundaries (i.e. the contract price range) and gives
the buyer the power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Thus, although buyers’
price offers are more restricted in the baseline treatment, sellers may regard
this situation as one in which higher prices are reasonable and expect more
than the lower bound. This leaves room for disappointment and high levels of
punishment are observed under flexible contracts. When the seller is unhappy
with the offer, she undertakes costly punishment. With rigid contracts, sellers
know what to expect and punishment occurs rarely. The results provide ev-
idence that (more favourable outcomes within) contracts are reference points
when this implicit enforcement procedure is employed. This supports HM’s
reference point theory.
In the court treatment, the enforcement procedure is different. The court
does not automatically enforce contracts and the contractors are aware that all
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prices are possible.27 However, if the seller actively decides to let the court set-
tle the contract, the court makes a foreseeable decision dictated by the contract.
There is a tighter bound on sellers’ expectations which disciplines sellers’ feel-
ings of entitlement. Sellers appear to feel entitled to the price that the court
would enforce based on the contract and punish less if they receive this price.
Thus, the court provides an outside validation for which prices are reasonable.
This holds although there is more than one (reasonable) price that the court
would enforce and sellers appear not to be aggrieved when offered the worst
of those. Hence, sellers do not seem to feel entitled to more favourable out-
comes within the contract. Neither do sellers appear to feel entitled to better
possible outcomes from renegotiation. Therefore, the contract enforcement is
the reference point for feelings of entitlement in the court treatment.
In the literature, contracts are often simply regarded as a disagreement
point in ex post renegotiations on which parties can fall back on if renegoti-
ation fails (Bartling and Schmidt, 2015). Also some (option) contracts are con-
sidered only valuable if renegotiation is prohibited (Hoppe and Schmitz, 2011).
My results show that contracts in the presence of a contract enforcing court can
shape what the contracting parties regard as appropriate in contract renegotia-
tions. Therefore, contracts are neither irrelevant when renegotiation is possible
nor solely threat points. This is an insight complementary to the existing lit-
erature on the behavioural effects of contracts in renegotiation, such as Iyer
and Schoar (2015) who find that social norms limit exploitative behaviour in
renegotiations; Herweg and Schmidt (2014) who argue that loss aversion leads
to inefficient renegotiation because the contractors compare renegotiated out-
comes to the contract; and the basic reference point theory by Hart and Moore
(2008) that assumes a self-serving bias in renegotiations in the absence of out-
27Strictly speaking there is some form of automatic enforcement because buyers can only
offer prices between 25 and 140 Points. However, these are extreme boundaries and can be
ignored.
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side validation of appropriate terms by a court.
The experimental results furthermore show that the role of courts goes be-
yond simple enforcement of contracts. Expectations on contract enforcement
affect how contractors regard their own and their opponent’s obligations from
(incomplete) contracts. This affects the contract design and the outcome of the
contractual relationship. These results can inform the discussion about opti-
mal enforcement procedures that limit aggrievement among contractors and
reduce detrimental punishment behaviour. It is desirable to analyse in further
research the effect of different, more realistic enforcement procedures on con-
tractors’ feelings of entitlement and also to examine the effect of certain versus
uncertain contract enforcement rules.
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Appendix
This appendix provides additional information, which is not necessary for the
analysis of the research question but which nevertheless offers some additional
checks and interesting insights. In part 3.A, the regression models used by
FHZ are replicated to ensure comparability to my experimental results. Also,
I show that the qualitative results do not depend on the utilised regression
models and specifications. In part 3.B, I use additional information about the
subjects and examine how subjects’ behaviour in the experiment is affected.
Part 3.C investigates session effects in the experiment. The instructions which
were provided to buyers and sellers in the court treatment of the experiment
can be found in Part 3.D.
3.A Replication of FHZ’s regression
When analysing the price dependency of sellers’ punishment behaviour, I es-
timate slightly different models than FHZ in order to focus on the difference
in my treatments. In this section, I provide estimations of the same models
as utilised by FHZ to facilitate comparison and to check whether the results
depend on the estimated models. Table 3.9 replicates FHZ’s regression (Table
3, FHZ 2011) and uses standard errors adjusted for clustering at the session
level.28
28Clustering at the session level is problematic in this case because adjusting standard errors
for clustering is only valid when the number of clusters is large (Cameron and Miller, 2015).
Since there are only 4 sessions per treatment, I do not use clustering at the session level in the
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The results from the OLS and Probit regression are presented in Table 3.9.
Quality is an indicator variable equal to one if the seller chooses normal quality
and is thus reversely defined as the variable Punish in the main part of the pa-
per. Price increment is defined as the difference between the trade price and the
competitive auction price of 35 Points in the good state and as the difference
between the trade price and the minimum possible price of 95 Points in the bad
state. Also included is a dummy for flexible contracts (Flex) and an interaction
term for price increment and flexible contract (Flex x Price increment). Trading
at a higher price than the competitive price does not significantly effect the
quality choice with both rigid or flexible contracts. However, normal quality
appears significantly less likely (i.e. punishment is more likely) with flexible
than with rigid contracts. When focusing only on the bad state and thus only
on flexible contracts, no significant effects of price increments on quality can
be identified. Thus, the quality choice in the good state can only be explained
by the contract choice. FHZ get similar results, although they find an even
stronger effect of the contract type on the quality choice. Also, FHZ find a
slight effect of price increments with flexible contracts. The Probit estimation
results in columns (2) and (4) give similar qualitative results. Overall, these
results are in line with the results from the analysis in Table 3.4 in the main
part of this paper.
In Table 3.10, FHZ’s analysis is applied to the court treatment. Quality is the
dependent variable. Price minus 50 is similarly defined to Price increment in the
baseline treatment, however accounting for the fact that the auction starts at
50 Points in the court treatment. Note that this variable follows the same defi-
nition in both states because in the court treatment the restrictions on buyer’s
price offers are not state dependent. Also included are the flexible contract
dummy (Flex) dummy and an interaction term of flexible contract and price
regressions in the main part of this paper. However for completeness, I provide the regression
results with clustering in appendix 3.C.
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Dependent variable Normal qual good state Normal qual bad state
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Probit (ME) OLS Probit (ME)
Price increment 0.00492 0.008 0.00780 0.0189
(0.00569) (0.011) (0.00521) (0.0255)
Flex -0.134∗ -0.139∗∗∗
(0.0422) (0.051)




Observations 380 380 67 67
Adjusted R-squared 0.0196 -0.00117
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors
are adjusted for clustering at the session level. Only data from the 4 baseline treatment
sessions are considered. Price increment is defined as the difference between the trade price
and 35 in the good state (columns (1)-(2)) and as the difference between trade price and 95
in the bad state (columns (3)-(4)). Flex is an indicator variable and unity for a flexible con-
tract. Also included is the interaction between those two variables, Flex x PriceIncrement.
Columns (1) and (3) report coefficients of OLS estimations. Columns (2) and (4) report
marginal effects based on Probit estimations.
Table 3.9: Replicating FHZ’s regression – price dependence of quality across
contract types clustered by session – baseline treatment
increment (Flex x Price minus 50). Clustering at the session level is utilised. In
the good state, neither Price minus 50 nor its interaction with flexible contracts
is significant. Also, agreeing on a flexible contract has no significant effect on
the provision of normal quality. For the bad state, no clear significant results
can be identified with both OLS and Probit estimations. These results are in
line with the results from the analysis in Table 3.4 in the main part of the pa-
per.
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Dependent variable Normal qual good state Normal qual bad state
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Probit (ME) OLS Probit (ME)
Price minus 50 -0.0000181 -0.000013 0.00394∗ 0.0081
(0.00401) (0.0029) (0.00131) (0.0057)
Flex 0.0615 0.0659 -0.137 -0.136∗∗
(0.0351) (0.04066) (0.0829) (0.068)
Flex x Price minus 50 0.000335 0.0004 0.000507 0.00122
(0.00553) (0.004997) (0.00192) (0.006)
Constant 0.848∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗
(0.0415) (0.0369)
Observations 370 370 80 80
Adjusted R-squared -0.000715 0.0217
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors
are adjusted for clustering at the session level. Only data from the 4 court treatment ses-
sions are considered. Price minus 50 is defined as the difference between the trade price
and 50. Flex is an indicator variable and unity for a flexible contract. Also included is the
interaction between those two variables, Flex x Price minus 50. Columns (1)-(2) consider
the good state and columns (3)-(4) the bad state. Columns (1) and (3) report coefficients of
OLS estimations. Columns (2) and (4) report marginal effects based on Probit estimations.
All estimations are only for the court treatment.
Table 3.10: Replicating FHZ’s regression – price dependence of quality across
contract types clustered by session – court treatment
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3.B Subject heterogeneity
At the end of the experiment, the subjects filled out a short questionnaire ask-
ing, inter alia, for gender and degree. This section provides some information
about subject’s heterogeneity and whether or not this influenced subjects’ de-
cisions.
Baseline treatment. More females than males participated in the experiment.
In the baseline treatment, 58 percent of subjects were female, see Table 3.11. In
the baseline treatment, female buyers are more likely to offer flexible contracts
than male buyers. However, buyers do not significantly differ by gender in
their markup offers under flexible contracts. With regard to sellers’ choices,
there are also no significant gender effects. Women do not appear to self-select
more into either contract type. Also, women’s punishment behaviour is not
significantly different to men’s. However, subjects who study economics as
part of their degree are less likely to punish than non-economics students. The
p-values of the signed rank-sum tests are presented in Table 3.12.
Court treatment. In the court treatment, 73 percent of subjects are female,
see Table 3.11. Buyers’ gender does not appear to affect the contract choice.
However, female buyers appear to be less likely to offer a markup but are
more likely to undercut. Thus, women behave more rational (or ruthless) then
men in the court treatment. Female sellers are also more likely to punish than
males. However, no gender difference in rejecting the buyer’s price offer can
be identified. Furthermore, the degree has not significant effect on the sellers’
punishment choice. The p-values of the signed rank-sum tests are presented
in Table 3.12.
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Baseline treatment Court treatment
Buyer 63% Female 63% Female
Seller 53% Female 83% Female
Total 58% Female 73% Female
Table 3.11: Share of female subjects by role and treatment
P-value of rank-sum tests
Baseline treatment
Difference in buyers’ contract choice by gender 0.0055∗∗∗
Difference in buyers’ markup offers by gender 0.7019
Difference in sellers’ contract selection by gender 0.5074
Difference in sellers’ punishment choice by gender 0.887
Difference in sellers’ punishment choice by econ degree 0.0003∗∗∗
Court treatment
Difference in buyers’ contract choice by gender 0.2996
Difference in buyers’ markup offers by gender 0.0046∗∗∗
Difference in buyer’s undercutting choice by gender 0.0098∗∗∗
Difference in sellers’ punishment choice by gender 0.043∗∗
Difference in sellers’ litigation decision by gender 0.3186
Difference in sellers’ punishment choice by econ degree 0.2987
Notes: This table reports p-values for various Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) rank-sum tests.
Table 3.12: P-values for rank-sum tests regarding subject heterogeneity
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3.C Session effects
Observations of subjects who participated in the same session may be corre-
lated, which would affect hypothesis testing. This can be caused by the dy-
namic interaction of the subjects, as the subjects observe the other subjects’
behaviour and responses. Furthermore, there may be unobserved static differ-
ences across sessions (Fréchette, 2012). In order to check whether my results
depend on session effects, the main regressions from the paper in Table 3.4 are
replicated by adjusting standard errors for clustering at the session level, see
Table 3.13, and by including session fixed effects, see Table 3.14. The former
approach has limitations in the case of a small number of clusters, as it is the
case here, but is a robust approach to testing. The latter addresses potential
static session-effects.
My main results regarding sellers’ punishment behaviour in the good state,
see Table 3.4, also holds when using clustering at the session level, see Table
3.13. The Flex and Flex x Treat variables are similarly found to significantly af-
fect punishment. Offering a markup with flexible contract (Markup x Flex) in
the baseline treatment is found to not significantly affect punishment with this
approach. Undercut is similarly significant. In addition, the variable Reject un-
dercut is significant with both OLS and Probit estimations using this approach.
This means that sellers are less likely to punish after they have experienced un-
dercutting by the buyer and litigated. Thus, there is some evidence that sellers
are less likely to punish by choosing low quality after they already punished
the buyer by litigation. This only supports the interpretation that the price en-
forced by the court is a reference point for feelings of entitlement. If sellers
receive this price (either with or without court’s help), they are not aggrieved
and do not punish by choosing low quality. For the bad state, the variable
Rigid x Treat appears significant in the Probit estimation when using clustering
at the session level. This indicates that punishment is less likely under rigid
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than flexible contracts in the bad state, meaning that sellers may feel entitled to
higher prices under flexible contracts. Hence, there is some tendency for differ-
ent reference points depending on the contract type in the bad state. However,
the evidence is not very strong as Rigid x Treat is neither significant in the OLS
estimation nor in the estimations presented in Table 3.4 and 3.14.
Looking at the results from replicating the main regression from Table 3.4
with session fixed effects, the main variables Flex and Flex x Treat are signif-
icant, see column (1) in Table 3.14. However when allowing for more vari-
ables, see column (2), Flex x Treat is only significant at a 14 percent significance
level. This might be driven by the limited number of observations compared
to the amount of explanatory variables when accounting for session fixed ef-
fects. Since all other tests and regressions found significant effects, this does
not cause fundamental concerns. Markup x Flex appears to significantly de-
crease punishment whereas Undercut significantly increases punishment. No


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Markup x Flex -0.117∗∗∗
(0.0425)








Rigid x Treat -0.0813
(0.0865)
Session 2 0.243∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.217
(0.0534) (0.0541) (0.135)
Session 3 0.233∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.190
(0.0530) (0.0534) (0.139)
Session 4 0.198∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.150
(0.0542) (0.0534) (0.128)
Session 5 0.157∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ -0.0104
(0.0606) (0.0656) (0.166)
Session 6 0.104∗ 0.0645 0.0151
(0.0596) (0.0692) (0.137)
Session 7 0.242∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.104
(0.0602) (0.0658) (0.137)
Session 8 0.261∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.202
(0.0599) (0.0665) (0.140)
Constant -0.0362 0.0679 0.0769
(0.0450) (0.110) (0.102)
Observations 750 750 147
Adjusted R-squared 0.0601 0.0979 0.0230
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Session 2 - Session 8 are the session
fixed effects (Session 1-4 baseline and Session 5-8 court treatment). Auction price is the lower bound of the
price range or the fixed price. All other variables are indicator variables. Flex is unity for a flexible contract.
Markup is unity if the buyer offers a price above the auction price. Only relevant for the court treatment are:
Undercut, unity for a price offer below the auction price; Reject offer, unity if a seller litigates; Reject undercut,
unity if a seller litigates after observing price undercutting; Rigid, unity for a rigid contract. Also included
are interactions denoted by variable x variable. All columns report coefficients for OLS estimations. Columns
(1)-(2) are for the good and column (3) for the bad state.
Table 3.14: Sellers’ punishment choice by state with session fixed effects
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3.D Experimental instructions – court treatment
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SELLERS
For participating in this experiment, you will receive a show-up fee of £3. You can earn more
by accumulating points during the experiment. The experiment has 15 rounds. How many
points you earn in one round depends on your decisions and those of other participants. At
the end of the experiment, all points will be added and converted to pounds at the following
conversion rate:
25 Points = £0.50.
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your earnings in pounds plus the show-up fee.
Please note that communication is strictly prohibited during the experiment. You are only
allowed to use the computer for completing the experiment. Any form of communication and
misuse of the computer will lead to exclusion from the experiment and from any payment.
However, you are at all times allowed to ask questions by raising your hand.
Short summary of the procedure
The 16 participants in this room have been randomly divided into two groups: sellers and
buyers. There are 8 sellers and 8 buyers. You are a seller for the entire duration of the
experiment.
The experiment is divided into 15 rounds. In every round, you will interact in a new group of
four with 2 sellers and 2 buyers and you can earn points. How many points you earn depends
on the decisions that you and the other participants in your group make. All the decisions are
made on the computer. Once one round is finished, all participants are randomly assigned to
new groups of four. The following describes what happens in every round.
In your group of four, each buyer wants to purchase one product from the sellers. The two
sellers can sell up to two products each. Thus, the sellers are competing for selling their prod-
ucts. The buyer pays a price in exchange for receiving a product. The product has value to the
buyer. The seller incurs costs for producing products. In order to trade a product, a buyer and
a seller agree on a contract. We refer to this as ‘concluding a contract’. The contract specifies
the pricing terms of the purchase.
The following describes the different steps in one round of the experiment. Note that you
always interact in your group of four and all your decisions in the current round only have
consequences for the current round.
1. The buyer selects the type of contract that (s)he wants to conclude with one of the
sellers in your group of four. The buyer can choose between a contract that fixes a
single price or a contract that specifies a price range.
2. After the buyers have selected the type of contract, the two sellers compete for the first
contract in an auction. The first buyer concludes the contract with the seller that offers
him/her the best pricing terms. The other seller cannot sell his/her product to this
buyer. In a similar way, the sellers compete in another auction for the contract with the
second buyer in your group. If a seller does not conclude either of the two contracts,
the round ends for the seller at this stage.
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3. The computer randomly determines whether the cost of production for the seller is
high or low. Producing a product of normal quality costs 20 points if costs are low and
80 points if costs are high.
4. After the buyer has been informed about the cost level of his/her seller, the buyer pro-
poses the final price of the trade. The buyer may choose any price between 25 and 140
points, independent of the contract.
5. The seller decides to accept or reject the buyer’s final price offer. If the seller accepts
the price offer, the seller and buyer trade at that price.
6. If the seller rejects the buyer’s price offer, the computer settles the contract and decides
at which price seller and buyer trade. Contract settlement is costly to both seller and
buyer. The outcome of the settlement depends on the type of contract that has been
concluded.
 If a contract with a fixed price has been concluded, the computer enforces trade
at the price specified in the contract.
 If a contract with a price range has been concluded, the contract settlement de-
pends on the price offer: If the buyer’s price offer lies within the price range of
the contract, the contract is not breached and the computer enforces trade at the
offered price. If the buyer’s price offer lies outside of the price range, the contract
is breached. In order to ensure trade at the terms specified in the contract, the
computer enforces trade at a price randomly picked from the price range of the
contract.
7. After the final price has been determined, either with or without contract settlement by
the computer, the seller decides on the quality of the product that the buyer purchases.
The seller has two quality levels to choose from: normal and low quality. Normal qual-
ity gives the buyer a value of 140 points and low quality a value of 100 points. For the
seller, delivering a product of low quality is 5 points MORE costly than a product of
normal quality.
8. The round ends and all participants are informed about their earnings in this round.
The buyer’s earnings are the difference between the value of the product to the buyer
and the price (s)he must pay to the seller. The seller’s earnings from a sale are the
difference between the price (s)he receives from the buyer and her cost of production. If
the seller cannot sell a product, (s)he receives a fixed income of 10 points. Buyer’s and
seller’s earnings may be reduced by 5 points due to contract settlement.
Following this, the next round begins in which you and the other participants go through
the same procedure. Note that you will interact in a new group of four every round. All
participants are anonymous and you will not know with whom you are interacting at any
point during the experiment.
Please read now the detailed explanation of the procedure in your instructions pages 4-10!
You have approximately 20 minutes for reading. Once you have finished reading, you can
start with the test questions on your computer screen. Try to solve all questions. If you enter
a wrong answer and click “OK”, a message appears with help to solve the question. You are
allowed to use the calculator on your desk.
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Detailed explanation of the experimental procedure
The following shows step by step which types of decisions you and the other participants
will make in each round. The experiment has 15 rounds. At the beginning of each round,
you will be randomly assigned to a new group of four participants, in which 2 are buyers
and 2 are sellers. Note that you will only interact with the participants in the group of four
that you have been assigned to in a round. But, every round your group will consist of
different participants. The whole experiment is anonymous and you will not know with
whom you are interacting at any point during the experiment. Your decisions in a round will
only have consequences for that round. Remember, you are a seller for the entire duration of
the experiment.
1 Selection of the type of contract by the buyer
After the random assignment to groups of four, both buyers in your group first select the type
of contract that they want to conclude. They have two options to choose from:
1) Contract with a fixed price: If a buyer chooses a contract with a fixed price, (s)he agrees
with a seller on a single price for the purchase of the product. You and the other seller in your
group compete for selling your products to a buyer. A buyer will trade with the seller that
offers the lowest price. If, at a later stage, you decide to let the computer settle the contract,
the computer will enforce trade at the price specified in the contract.
2) Contract with a price range: If a buyer chooses a contract with a price range, a price floor
(minimum possible price) and a price ceiling (maximum possible price) are specified in the
contract. You and the other seller in your group compete for selling your products to the
buyer. The buyer will trade with the seller that offers the lowest price floor. The price ceiling
is always set at 140 points. If you decide at a later stage to let the computer settle the contract,
the computer will enforce trade at a price that lies within the price range of the contract.
2 Determination of the contract price by the sellers
You and the other seller each want to sell two identical products to the buyers in your group
of four. Each buyer can only buy one product. Thus, you and the other seller compete for
selling your products. In order to decide who is selling a product to a buyer, you engage in
an auction with the other seller. There are two auctions, one for each buyer. The computer
randomly determines for which buyer in your group you compete first. The seller that offers
the lowest fixed price (if the buyer has selected a contract with a fixed price) or the lowest price
floor (if the buyer has selected a contract with a price range) wins the auction. The winner of
the auction concludes a contract with the buyer. A contract specifies the pricing terms of the
trade. After the first auction, you proceed with the second auction. After both auctions have
finished, you have either concluded two, one or no contracts.
2.1 Auction when the buyer has chosen a contract with a fixed price
If a buyer has chosen a contract with a fixed price, the auction proceeds in the following way.
First, you are informed about the contract type. Then, a notification, that indicates how many
seconds remain until the beginning of the auction, appears.
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Sale of Product 1
The buyer has selected a contract with a: Fixed Price
Time until the beginning of the auction: 3
As soon as the time expires, you are notified that the auction begins.
The auction starts now!
The auction always starts with a fixed price of 50 points and this price is displayed on the
screen. From the beginning of the auction, the price increases by one point every half second.
If you or the other seller wants to trade at a shown fixed price, you can decide to conclude a
contract at this price by clicking the “Agree” button.
Fixed Price: XX
Agree
The first seller to click “Agree” wins the contract and the auction ends. Both sellers are notified
about which seller won the auction. The seller who lost the auction cannot sell this product in
this round and receives a fixed earning of 10 points.
If neither you or the other seller clicks the “Agree” button, the price increases to a maximum
of 75 points. Once a price of 75 points is reached, the price remains at this level until one seller
agrees. Hence, the price can never exceed 75 points in a contract with a fixed price.
2.2 Auction when the buyer has chosen a contract with a price range
If the buyer has chosen a contract with a price range, the auction proceeds in a similar way.
Sale of Product 1
The buyer has selected a contract with a: Price Range
The difference from the auction of a fixed price contract, as explained above, is that you agree
to a price range and not a single price. The price range consists of a price floor (minimum
possible price) and a price ceiling (maximum possible price). The price floor is determined
in the auction, but the price ceiling is always set at 140 points and thus is not affected by the
auction. The auction always begins with the lowest possible price floor of 50 points which is
displayed on the screen. The price floor increases by one point every half second. The price
ceiling is always set at 140 points. If you or the other seller wants to conclude a contract with
the displayed price range, you can do so by clicking the “Agree” button.
Price range: XX to 140
Agree
The first seller to click “Agree” wins the contract and the auction ends. Both sellers are notified
about which seller won the auction. The seller who lost the auction cannot sell this product in
this round and receives a fixed earning of 10 points. If neither of the sellers clicks the “Agree”
button, the price floor increases to a maximum of 75 points. Once a price floor of 75 points is
reached, it remains at this level until one seller agrees.
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3 Determination of the cost level by the computer
When you sell a product, you must bear the cost of production. After the contracts have been
concluded, the computer randomly determines whether the cost of production is high or low.
The cost level is determined for each product (i.e. each contract) separately. There is an 80%
probability (8/10 chance) that costs are low and thus that the production of the product of
normal quality costs only 20 points. There is a 20% probability (2/10 chance) that costs are
high and that the production of the product of normal quality costs 80 points. This means that
low costs of production are 4 times more likely than high costs.
Your cost of producing
Probability
a product of normal quality
80 (high) 20 %
20 (low) 80 %
You and the buyer are informed whether the cost of production is low or high. Also, you are
reminded of the type and the pricing terms of your contract with the buyer.
For example, you might get the following information screen. Note that the buyer gets similar
information.
Sale of Product 1
You have concluded a contract with a: Fixed Price
Fixed Price: XX
Your cost of production for this product: Low
Or another possible information screen at this stage is:
Sale of Product 2
You have concluded a contract with a: Price Range
Price Floor: XX
Price Ceiling: 140
Your cost of production for this product: Low
4 Final price offer by the buyer
After the computer has randomly determined the seller’s cost of productions, each buyer is
informed about the fixed price or the price range that resulted from the auction of his/her
contract. Furthermore, each buyer learns whether his/her seller has low or high cost of
production.
Then, your buyer must declare the final price that (s)he wants to offer to you. Independent of
the pricing terms and the type of contract that you have concluded with the buyer, (s)he may
choose any price between 25 and 140 points.
5 Your choice to accept or reject the price offer
After observing the buyer’s proposed final price, you have two options to choose from:
1) Accept the buyer’s final price offer: You can accept to trade at the final price that the buyer
has suggested. In this case, you trade with the buyer at the proposed final price and the
experiment proceeds with the next stage (your product quality choice).
2) Reject the buyer’s final price offer: You can alternatively reject the buyer’s price offer. In
this case, the computer settles the contract, i.e. the computer makes a decision about the price
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at which you trade with the buyer. Contract settlement costs both you and the buyer 5 points
each, which will be deducted from your earnings for this round. The outcome of the contract
settlement by the computer depends on the type of contract that you have concluded with the
buyer:
 Contract with a fixed price: The computer enforces that you and the buyer trade at the
price specified in the contract, irrespective of the final price offer.
 Contract with a price range: If the buyer has proposed a final price that lies within the
contract price range, (s)he complied with the contract. In this case, the computer enforces
trade at the final price that the buyer has suggested.
On the other hand, if the buyer has offered a price outside of the contract price range (i.e.
the buyer has offered a price below the price floor of the contract), the buyer breached
the contract. The contract settlement always ensures that trade takes place as it was
agreed upon in the contract. Therefore, in this case, the computer randomly picks a
price from within the price range and enforces trade at that price. Note that all prices
within the price range are equally likely to be selected by the computer. Also, prices are
rounded to whole numbers (e.g. 51, 52, 53,...).
6 Selection of the product quality by you (the seller)
After the final price has been determined, either because you have accepted the buyer’s final
price offer or because the computer has enforced a final price, you decide on the quality of your
product. You can choose between two possible quality levels for each sold product: normal
quality and low quality.
The choice of the quality level determines the value of the product to the buyer. Products
of normal quality have a higher value (140 points) than products of low quality (100 points).
Details are presented in the following table:
Product quality Value to the buyer
normal 140
low 100
The choice of the quality level influences your cost of production. If you choose low quality
instead of normal quality, your cost increases slightly. If the cost level has been randomly
determined to be low, a product of normal quality costs you 20 points whereas a product of
low quality costs 25 points. Given a high cost level, a product of normal quality costs 80 points
and of low quality 85 points. This is summarised in the following table:
Product quality
Your cost of production
low cost high cost
normal 20 80
low 25 85
Thus, if you choose low quality instead of normal quality, your cost of production increases
by 5 points, whereas the value of the product to the buyer decreases by 40 points.
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7 Calculation of the earnings in each round
7.1 Your earnings in each round
You sell a product to a buyer, if you win the competition and conclude a contract with the
buyer. In case of a sale, your earnings are the difference between the price you receive from
the buyer and your cost of production. Thus, your earnings from the sale of a product are
higher, the higher the price is and the lower the cost of production is. The price depends on
the final price that the buyer offers or the contract settlement. The cost of production depends
on the randomly determined cost level and your quality choice. If you let the computer settle
the contract, your earnings decrease by 5 points.
If you do not win a contract in the auction, you cannot sell this product in this round and you
receive a fixed payment of 10 points.
Your earnings from a product are either the earnings you get from the sale of the product, with
or without contract settlement, or from not selling a product.
Sale without contract settlement: Your earnings = price− cost of production
or Sale with contract settlement: Your earnings = price− cost of production− 5
or No sale: Your earnings = 10
Since you can sell up to two products in each round, your earnings in each round always
consist of the sum of the earnings from product 1 and product 2. Each of these earnings are
calculated either as earnings from the sale of a product or from no sale.
Your earnings in one round = earnings from product 1 + earnings from product 2
7.2 The buyer’s earnings in each round
The buyer will always buy a product from a seller. The buyer’s earnings from the purchase are
the difference between the value of the product to him/her and the price (s)he must pay to the
seller. The buyer’s earnings are higher, the lower the price (s)he must pay is, and the higher
the value of the product is. The value of the product is affected by the product quality that
is chosen by the seller. If the seller lets the computer settle the contract, the buyer’s earnings
decrease by 5 points.
Without contract settlement: Buyer’s earnings = value of product− price
or With contract settlement: Buyer’s earnings = value of product− price− 5
After the sellers and the buyers have been informed about their respective earnings in this
round, the next round begins. At the beginning of the next round, you and the other partici-
pants will be randomly assigned to a new group of four consisting of 2 sellers and 2 buyers.
Thus, every round you will interact with different participants. The procedure will be exactly
the same.
Accumulated earnings
At the end of the experiment, you will get paid all earnings that you have accumulated over
the 15 rounds. You and the other sellers start with a credit of 150 points, the buyers start with a
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credit of 50 points. In each round, you can gain or lose points. In the very unlikely case where
your total earnings up to a certain round become negative, we set your total earnings to zero.
From the following round, you can accumulate points again.
In order to make sure that all participants are completely aware of the experimental procedure,
we ask you to solve test questions, which will not affect your earnings. Once you have finished
reading, you can start with the questions on your computer screen. Try to solve all questions. If
you enter a wrong answer and click “OK”, a message appears with help to solve the question.
You are allowed to use the calculator on your desk.
Summary:
Product quality Value to the buyer
Seller’s cost of production
low cost high cost
normal quality 140 20 80
low quality 100 25 85
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR BUYERS
For participating in this experiment, you will receive a show-up fee of £3. You can earn more
by accumulating points during the experiment. The experiment has 15 rounds. How many
points you earn in one round depends on your decisions and those of other participants. At
the end of the experiment, all points will be added and converted to pounds at the following
conversion rate:
25 Points = £0.50.
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your earnings in pounds plus the show-up fee.
Please note that communication is strictly prohibited during the experiment. You are only
allowed to use the computer for completing the experiment. Any form of communication and
misuse of the computer will lead to exclusion from the experiment and from any payment.
However, you are at all times allowed to ask questions by raising your hand.
Short summary of the procedure
The 16 participants in this room have been randomly divided into two groups: sellers and
buyers. There are 8 sellers and 8 buyers. You are a buyer for the entire duration of the
experiment.
The experiment is divided into 15 rounds. In every round, you will interact in a new group of
four with 2 sellers and 2 buyers and you can earn points. How many points you earn depends
on the decisions that you and the other participants in your group make. All the decisions are
made on the computer. Once one round is finished, all participants are randomly assigned to
new groups of four. The following describes what happens in every round.
In your group of four, each buyer wants to purchase one product from the sellers. The two
sellers can sell up to two products each. Thus, the sellers are competing for selling their prod-
ucts. The buyer pays a price in exchange for receiving a product. The product has value to the
buyer. The seller incurs costs for producing products. In order to trade a product, a buyer and
a seller agree on a contract. We refer to this as ‘concluding a contract’. The contract specifies
the pricing terms of the purchase.
The following describes the different steps in one round of the experiment. Note that you
always interact in your group of four and all your decisions in the current round only have
consequences for the current round.
1. The buyer selects the type of contract that (s)he wants to conclude with one of the
sellers in your group of four. The buyer can choose between a contract that fixes a
single price or a contract that specifies a price range.
2. After the buyers have selected the type of contract, the two sellers compete for the first
contract in an auction. The first buyer concludes the contract with the seller that offers
him/her the best pricing terms. The other seller cannot sell his/her product to this
buyer. In a similar way, the sellers compete in another auction for the contract with the
second buyer in your group. If a seller does not conclude either of the two contracts,
the round ends for the seller at this stage.
3. The computer randomly determines whether the cost of production for the seller is
high or low. Producing a product of normal quality costs 20 points if costs are low and
80 points if costs are high.
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4. After the buyer has been informed about the cost level of his/her seller, the buyer pro-
poses the final price of the trade. The buyer may choose any price between 25 and 140
points, independent of the contract.
5. The seller decides to accept or reject the buyer’s final price offer. If the seller accepts
the price offer, the seller and buyer trade at that price.
6. If the seller rejects the buyer’s price offer, the computer settles the contract and decides
at which price seller and buyer trade. Contract settlement is costly to both seller and
buyer. The outcome of the settlement depends on the type of contract that has been
concluded.
 If a contract with a fixed price has been concluded, the computer enforces trade
at the price specified in the contract.
 If a contract with a price range has been concluded, the contract settlement de-
pends on the price offer: If the buyer’s price offer lies within the price range of
the contract, the contract is not breached and the computer enforces trade at the
offered price. If the buyer’s price offer lies outside of the price range, the contract
is breached. In order to ensure trade at the terms specified in the contract, the
computer enforces trade at a price randomly picked from the price range of the
contract.
7. After the final price has been determined, either with or without contract settlement by
the computer, the seller decides on the quality of the product that the buyer purchases.
The seller has two quality levels to choose from: normal and low quality. Normal qual-
ity gives the buyer a value of 140 points and low quality a value of 100 points. For the
seller, delivering a product of low quality is 5 points MORE costly than a product of
normal quality.
8. The round ends and all participants are informed about their earnings in this round.
The buyer’s earnings are the difference between the value of the product to the buyer
and the price (s)he must pay to the seller. The seller’s earnings from a sale are the
difference between the price (s)he receives from the buyer and her cost of production. If
the seller cannot sell a product, (s)he receives a fixed income of 10 points. Buyer’s and
seller’s earnings may be reduced by 5 points due to contract settlement.
Following this, the next round begins in which you and the other participants go through
the same procedure. Note that you will interact in a new group of four every round. All
participants are anonymous and you will not know with whom you are interacting at any
point during the experiment.
Please read now the detailed explanation of the procedure in your instructions pages 4-10!
You have approximately 20 minutes for reading. Once you have finished reading, you can
start with the test questions on your computer screen. Try to solve all questions. If you enter
a wrong answer and click “OK”, a message appears with help to solve the question. You are
allowed to use the calculator on your desk.
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Detailed explanation of the experimental procedure
The following shows step by step which types of decisions you and the other participants
will make in each round. The experiment has 15 rounds. At the beginning of each round,
you will be randomly assigned to a new group of four participants, in which 2 are buyers
and 2 are sellers. Note that you will only interact with the participants in the group of four
that you have been assigned to in a round. But, every round your group will consist of
different participants. The whole experiment is anonymous and you will not know with
whom you are interacting at any point during the experiment. Your decisions in a round will
only have consequences for that round. Remember, you are a buyer for the entire duration of
the experiment. Both sellers in your group will try to sell their products to you. You will not
interact with the other buyer in your group.
1 Selection of the type of contract by you (the buyer)
After the random assignment to groups of four, you first select the type of contract that you
want to conclude. You have two options:
1) Contract with a fixed price: If you choose a contract with a fixed price, you agree with a
seller on a single price for the purchase of the product. The two sellers in your group compete
for selling their products to you. You will trade with the seller that offers the lowest price.
If, at a later stage, the seller decides to let the computer settle the contract, the computer will
enforce trade at the price specified in the contract.
2) Contract with a price range: If you choose a contract with a price range, a price floor (mini-
mum possible price) and a price ceiling (maximum possible price) are specified in the contract.
The two sellers in your group compete for selling their products to you. You will trade with
the seller that offers the lowest price floor. The price ceiling is always set at 140 points. If, at a
later stage, the seller decides to let the computer settle the contract, the computer will enforce
trade at a price that lies within the price range of the contract.
2 Determination of the contract price by the sellers
Each of the two sellers want to sell two identical products to you and the other buyer in your
group of four. You and the other buyer can only buy one product each. Thus, the sellers
compete for selling their products. In order to decide who is selling you a product, the sellers
engage in an auction. The seller that offers the lowest fixed price (if you have selected a con-
tract with a fixed price) or the lowest price floor (if you have selected a contract with a price
range) wins the auction. The winner of the auction concludes a contract with you. A contract
specifies the pricing terms of the trade. The sellers also proceed in a similar auction with the
other buyer. The computer randomly determines whether the sellers compete first for you or
the other buyer in your group.
2.1 Auction when the buyer has chosen a contract with a fixed price
If you have chosen a contract with a fixed price, the auction proceeds in the following way.
First, the two sellers are informed about the contract type. Then, a notification, that indicates
how many seconds remain until the beginning of the auction, appears.
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Sale of Product 1
The buyer has selected a contract with a: Fixed Price
Time until the beginning of the auction: 3
As soon as the time expires, the sellers are notified that the auction begins.
The auction starts now!
The auction always starts with a fixed price of 50 points and this price is displayed on the
screen. From the beginning of the auction, the price increases by one point every half second.
If a seller wants to trade at a shown fixed price, (s)he can decide to conclude a contract at this
price by clicking the “Agree” button.
Fixed Price: XX
Agree
As soon as the first seller clicks “Agree”, (s)he wins the contract and the auction ends. Both
sellers are notified about which seller won the auction. The seller who lost the auction cannot
sell this product in this round and receives a fixed earning of 10 points.
If neither of the sellers clicks the “Agree” button, the price increases to a maximum of 75
points. Once a price of 75 points is reached, the price remains at this level until one seller
agrees. Hence, the price can never exceed 75 points in a contract with a fixed price.
2.2 Auction when the buyer has chosen a contract with a price range
If the buyer has chosen a contract with a price range, the auction proceeds in a similar way.
Sale of Product 1
The buyer has selected a contract with a: Price Range
The difference from the auction of a fixed price contract, as explained above, is that the seller
agrees to a price range and not a single price. The price range consists of a price floor (min-
imum possible price) and a price ceiling (maximum possible price). The price floor is deter-
mined in the auction, but the price ceiling is always set at 140 points and thus is not affected
by the auction. The auction always begins with the lowest possible price floor of 50 points
which is displayed on the screen. The price floor increases by one point every half second.
The price ceiling is always set at 140 points. If a seller wants to conclude a contract with the
displayed price range, (s)he can do so by clicking the “Agree” button.
Price range: XX to 140
Agree
As soon as the first seller clicks “Agree”, (s)he wins the contract and the auction ends. Both
sellers are notified about which seller won the auction. The seller who lost the auction cannot
sell this product in this round and receives a fixed earning of 10 points. If neither of the sellers
clicks the “Agree” button, the price floor increases to a maximum of 75 points. Once a price
floor of 75 points is reached, it remains at this level until one seller agrees.
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3 Determination of the cost level by the computer
When a seller sells a product, (s)he must bear the cost of production. After the contracts have
been concluded, the computer randomly determines whether the cost of production is high or
low. The cost level is determined for each product (i.e. each contract) separately. There is an
80% probability (8/10 chance) that costs are low and thus that the production of the product
of normal quality costs only 20 points. There is a 20% probability (2/10 chance) that costs are
high and that the production of the product of normal quality costs 80 points. This means
that low costs of production are 4 times more likely than high costs. As soon as the computer
has randomly determined the cost level, you and the seller are informed whether the cost of
production is low or high. Note that the seller knows that you are informed about his/her cost
level.
Seller’s cost of producing
Probability
a product of normal quality
80 (high) 20 %
20 (low) 80 %
4 Final price offer by you (the buyer)
After the computer has randomly determined the seller’s cost of production, you are informed
about the fixed price or the price range that resulted from the competition between the sellers
in the auction. Furthermore, you learn the cost level for the seller.
For example, you might get the following information:
You have chosen a contract with a: Fixed Price
The following fixed price was determined in the auction.
Fixed Price: XX
The cost of production for the seller is: Low
Or another possible information screen at this stage is:
You have chosen a contract with a: Price Range
The following price range was determined in the auction.
Price Floor: XX
Price Ceiling: 140
The cost of production for the seller is: High
After you have examined this information, you must declare the final price that you want to
offer to the seller. Independent of the pricing terms and the type of contract that you have
concluded with the seller, you may choose any price between 25 and 140 points.
5 The seller’s choice to accept or reject your price offer
After observing your final price offer, the seller has two options to choose from:
1) Accept your final price offer: The seller can accept to trade at the final price that you have
suggested. In this case, you trade with the seller at the proposed final price and the experiment
proceeds with the next stage (seller’s product quality choice).
2) Reject your final price offer: The seller can alternatively reject your final price offer. In this
case, the computer settles the contract, i.e. the computer makes a decision about the price at
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which you trade with the seller. Contract settlement costs both you and the seller 5 points
each, which will be deducted from your earnings for this round. The outcome of the contract
settlement by the computer depends on the type of contract that you have concluded with the
seller:
 Contract with a fixed price: The computer enforces that you and the seller trade at the
price specified in the contract, irrespective of your final price offer.
 Contract with a price range: If you have proposed a final price that lies within the con-
tract price range, you complied with the contract. In this case, the computer enforces
trade at the final price that you have suggested.
On the other hand, if you have offered a price outside of the contract price range (i.e. you
have offered a price below the price floor of the contract), you breached the contract.
The contract settlement always ensures that trade takes place as it was agreed upon in
the contract. Therefore, in this case, the computer randomly picks a price from within
the price range and enforces trade at that price. Note that all prices within the price
range are equally likely to be selected by the computer. Also, prices are rounded to
whole numbers (e.g. 51, 52, 53,...).
6 Selection of the product quality by the seller
After the final price has been determined, either because the seller has accepted your final price
offer or because the computer has enforced a final price, the seller decides on the quality of
his/her product. (S)he can choose between two possible quality levels for each sold product:
normal quality and low quality.
The choice of the quality level determines the value of the product to you. Products of
normal quality have a higher value (140 points) than products of low quality (100 points).
Details are presented in the following table:
Product quality Value to you (the buyer)
normal 140
low 100
The choice of the quality level influences the cost of production for the seller. If a seller
chooses low quality instead of normal quality, his/her cost increases slightly. If the cost level
has been randomly determined to be low, a product of normal quality costs the seller 20 points
whereas a product of low quality costs 25 points. Given a high cost level, a product of normal
quality costs 80 points and of low quality 85 points. This is summarised in the following table:
Product quality
The seller’s cost of production
low cost high cost
normal 20 80
low 25 85
Thus, if the seller chooses low quality instead of normal quality, his/her cost of production
increases by 5 points, whereas the value of the product to the buyer decreases by 40 points.
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7 Calculation of the earnings in each round
7.1 Your earnings in each round
You will always buy a product from the seller. Your earnings from the purchase are the differ-
ence between the value of the product to you and the price you must pay to the seller. Your
earnings are higher, the lower the price you must pay is, and the higher the value of the prod-
uct is. The value of the product is affected by the product quality that is chosen by the seller.
The price depends on your final price offer and whether or not the contract has been settled
by the computer. If the contract has been settled, your earnings decrease by 5 points.
Without contract settlement: Your earnings = value of product− price
or With contract settlement: Your earnings = value of product− price− 5
7.2 The seller’s earnings in each round
The seller only sells a product to a buyer, if (s)he wins the competition and concludes a contract
with a buyer. In case of a sale, the seller’s earnings are the difference between the price (s)he
receives from the buyer and his/her cost of production. Thus, the seller’s earnings from the
sale of a product are higher, the higher the price is and the lower the cost of production is. The
cost of production depends on the randomly determined cost level and the seller’s quality
choice. If the seller lets the computer settle the contract, his/her earnings decrease by 5 points.
If a seller does not win a contract in the auction, the seller cannot sell this product in this round
and (s)he receives a fixed payment of 10 points.
The seller’s earnings from a product are either the earnings (s)he gets from the sale of the
product, with or without contract settlement, or from not selling a product.
Sale without contract settlement: Seller’s earnings = price− cost of production
or Sale with contract settlement: Seller’s earnings = price− cost of production− 5
or No sale: Seller’s earnings = 10
Since the seller can sell up to two products in each round, his/her earnings in each round
always consist of the sum of the earnings from product 1 and product 2. Each of these earnings
are calculated either as earnings from the sale of a product or from no sale.
Seller’s earnings in one round = earnings from product 1 + earnings from product 2
8 Summary information
At the end of each round, you receive information on the average earnings that all buyers
have received in all previous rounds of the experiment. This information will be provided for
both contract types separately. You will also be informed how many buyers choose either a
contract with a fixed price or a contract with a price range in the current round. The summary
information looks like this:
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Fixed Price Price Range
Average earnings of buyers in all previous
rounds
XX XX
Number of contracts in the current round XX XX
After you have had a chance to examine this summary information, the next round begins. At
the beginning of the next round, you and the other participants will be randomly assigned to
a new group of four consisting of 2 sellers and 2 buyers. Thus, every round you will interact
with different participants. The procedure will be exactly the same.
Accumulated earnings
At the end of the experiment, you will get paid all earnings that you have accumulated over
the 15 rounds. You and the other buyer start with a credit of 50 points, the sellers start with
a credit of 150 points. In each round, you can gain or lose points. In the very unlikely case,
where your total earnings up to a certain round become negative, we set your total earnings
to zero. From the following round, you can accumulate points again.
In order to make sure that all participants are completely aware of the experimental procedure,
we ask you to solve test questions. Once you are done reading, you can start with the questions
on your computer screen. Try to solve all questions. If you enter a wrong answer and click
“OK”, a message appears with help to solve the question. You are allowed to use the calculator
on your desk.
Summary:
Product quality Value to the buyer
Seller’s cost of production
low cost high cost
normal quality 140 20 80
low quality 100 25 85
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